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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction 
South African civil society is currently facing a funding crisis. This has resulted in a multiplicity of sustainability and institutional development challenges. Reasons for these 
circumstances include declining international funding, leadership and identity changes and 
the apparent unwillingness of government to meet its responsibilities to the sector. Government 
has been particularly remiss about its obligations regarding legislated and budgeted resource 
flows to CSOs. As a result of the above, the sustainability of many important CSOs is seriously 
compromised, a situation that has been exacerbated by the prevailing economic recession.
To mitigate these challenges, a coalition of CSOs (subsequently referred to as the Coalition)1 
implemented a research and advocacy programme aimed at contributing to a more enabling 
funding environment for South African civil society. The intention of the programme was 
to mobilise and enhance resource flows, and to improve the practice of government grant-
making and investment in the sector. 
The project focused on the National Lotteries Board (NLB) and the National Development 
Agency (NDA), both conduits of funding to civil society. The NDA and the NLB were 
conceived as major funders for CSOs, especially those involved in welfare and other essential 
delivery areas. The ongoing governance and accountability problems of these institutions 
have impacted negatively on their ability to comply effectively with their legislated roles, and 
thus they have been widely criticised by CSOs. 
This report presents the findings of a research and advocacy process that included consultative 
workshops with CSOs in all nine of South Africa’s provinces, interviews with CSOs, 
politicians, government departments, the NLB, NDA and local funders. The report highlights 
the successes and ongoing problems associated with the NLB and the NDA. It locates them 
within a broader context of government unevenness, inefficiency and corruption. 
The research found that the legislated ‘enabling environment’ for civil society was 
dysfunctional. The NPO Directorate within the Department of Social Development (DSD) has 
been unable to implement its responsibilities in accordance with the Non-Profit Organisations 
Act. The National Lotteries Distribution Trust Fund (NLDTF) and the National Development 
Agency (NDA) have not managed to disburse funding effectively to the sector in accordance 
with the relevant legislation. 
The serious lack of current and reliable national data about the size, scope and activities 
of the sector negatively affects the ability of the sector and of government to support it. 
The sustainability and effectiveness of civil society to address poverty and inequality is 
compromised by these problems.
1  The Coalition is made up of CAF Southern Africa, CIVICUS, CORE, Legal Resources Centre, National 
Welfare Forum and SANGONeT.
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The report has seven chapters. The first introduces the study. The second provides an outline 
of the research and advocacy process that informed the content of the report. The third 
provides a brief overview of the historical role of civil society in South Africa. Chapters 4 
and 5 are windows into the socio-economic context and South Africa as a developmental 
state. This is followed by chapters 6 and 7 which look at the NLB and the NDA respectively 
and contain recommendations for improvement. By contrast, Chapter 8 presents brief good 
grant-making practices evident from lotteries internationally, and by a few independent local 
funders. The final chapter provides concluding comments and final recommendations.
CHAPTER TWO
The research and  
advocacy process 
The Coalition of CSOs with a range of skills and collective experience implemented a research-based advocacy programme aimed at contributing towards a more enabling 
environment for South African civil society. The Coalition included CAF Southern Africa, 
CIVICUS, CORE, Legal Resources Centre, National Welfare Forum and SANGONeT. 
The Coalition’s programme was informed by consultation and engagement with the relevant 
role-players, including CSOs, politicians, government departments and representatives from 
the NLB, the NLDTF and the NDA. 
The Coalition programme had the following aims: 
•   to enhance resource flows towards, and impact on, the sustainability of CSOs;
•   to improve the practice of grant-making and investment in the sector, particularly by 
government; and
•   to enrich the relevance and impact of civil society development action.
The Coalition sought various channels to engage with civil society to learn first-hand about 
their experiences of funding from the NLB and the NDA. Through the SANGONeT CEO circle, 
the Coalition met with CSO leaders and obtained feedback and information. The Coalition 
hosted provincial consultative meetings with CSOs in all provinces. Participants were assured 
that their opinions and comments would be shared anonymously as some were ‘frightened 
to bite the hand that feeds us’. This report therefore reflects opinions that were shared by a 
majority of participants and does not attribute these insights to individuals or organisations 
participating in the process. 
The research process included collecting case studies of organisations’ experiences with the 
NLDTF and the NDA. It was further informed by desk research, including a scan of relevant 
academic articles and numerous media reports, along with recent court cases. 
The Coalition sought constructive engagement with government in an effort to seek solutions 
to the current funding crisis facing many CSOs. To this end it held meetings with: 
•   the Minister of Trade and Industry; 
•   representatives of the board and executive management of the NLDTF and the NDA;
•   managers in the DSD; 
•   an executive in the Ministry of the Presidency;
•   representatives of Statistics South Africa (Stats SA): and 
•   a representative of the National Economic, Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). 
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In addition, the Coalition commissioned comprehensive legal research into the legislation and 
regulations currently governing the NLDTF and the NDA. Concrete recommendations were 
made through this process to assist and guide proposed legal changes that would facilitate 
and improve the effectiveness of resource flows to civil society. 
The research process was not an academic exercise, but rather one of practical engagement, 
consultation and solution-seeking in partnership with relevant stakeholders. 
This report reflects findings that emerged  
through the process of dialogue  
and practical engagement.
CHAPTER THREE
The historical role of  
civil society in South Africa  
pre- and post-1994
While definitions of civil society remain contested, the sector is broadly understood as occupying the space between the state, the market and the family. Often referred to as 
the ‘voluntary sector’, and in South Africa the ‘non-profit sector’, civil society encompasses 
the way in which communities organise, provide services and undertake policy and advocacy 
activities. Civil society includes non-governmental organisations (NGOs), social movements, 
community-based organisations (CBOs), civics, school-governing bodies, women’s groups, 
peace and justice organisations, academics, students, faith-based organisations (FBOs), special 
interest organisations (refugees, people with disabilities, etc.), professional associations, 
trade unions and many others. In South Africa this sector is usually termed the ‘non-profit’ 
sector, comprising non-profit organisations (NPOs) registered in terms of the South African 
Non-Profit Organisations Act 18487 of 1997.
The notion of civil society is one in which organisations make a positive contribution to the 
development of the nation. These organisations exist and operate independently of the state, 
although the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, 
blurred and negotiated.2 
In South Africa, CSOs have played varied roles historically. They were vocal and active 
players in the struggle against apartheid. During the period of transition, CSOs continued 
to engage and influence the drafting of the new constitution, and contributed to dismantling 
apartheid legislation and policies. With the focus moving to service delivery, CSOs have 
continued to play key roles in filling gaps and advocating on behalf of those living in poverty. 
During apartheid, CSOs played a central role in both mitigating the effects of apartheid’s 
unequal development and mobilising opposition to the apartheid state. In 1966 the 
United Nations General Assembly declared apartheid a crime against humanity. With 
rising international condemnation of the apartheid state, European governments and other 
international donors looked for credible local South African agencies through which to 
channel their funds.
The largest conduits at the time were Kagiso Trust, Interfund, the South African Council of 
Churches and the South African Catholics Bishops Conference. This intermediary approach 
was unique to South Africa, as bilateral aid around the world usually flowed through 
government. 
As international donors supported ‘struggle’ NPOs, they deliberately required little follow 
up to avoid exposing anti-apartheid activities to the apartheid state. According to Kuljian 
(2009:124):
2  http://www.areda.ch/P22E.html 
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submerging financial information was not unusual among NPOs at the time, as it was 
not safe to reveal one’s sources of funding, nor exactly where the funds were going, for 
fear of state reprisal.
Any information about activities of organisations opposing apartheid could lead to arrest, 
beatings, brutal torture and death. The opposition to apartheid united a range of civil society 
actors. The main political opposition movement, the United Democratic Front (UDF), 
provided an organisational framework for hundreds of CSOs, CBOs, youth, women, and 
student organisations, neighbourhood and township associations, religious organisations and 
unions. It is important to note that these were all CSOs. 
Although the main goal of the movement was to bring down the apartheid regime, many 
other concerns were raised by affiliate organisations that fuelled political mass mobilisation. 
Civics stepped in to demand basic services at local government level. CSOs attempted to 
provide services in areas such as literacy, health care, human rights and welfare. Images of 
courageous, often young, South Africans rising up in protest against armed apartheid police 
and soldiers lit up the television screens and conscience of the world. Civil society groups 
across the globe voiced their support for the anti-apartheid struggle. 
The transition from apartheid
With the ANC election victory in 1994, civil society, like the rest of the country, entered a 
phase of transition. Assumptions about the role and ability of the post-apartheid state led to 
many anti-apartheid formations being absorbed into the state or co-opted by the ANC. The 
UDF had disbanded in 1991 believing that it no longer had a role to play. Debates continued 
about whether this was a premature move. As Marais (2011:447) notes: 
For some this seemed perfectly ‘natural’: after all, the custodian of liberation was ready 
to take up its duties. The trend was less sinister than it seemed. The demobilisation of 
popular organisations is a fairly common phenomenon in democratic transitions; as 
political systems become democratised, extra-institutional mobilising and organising 
trends tend to flag.
Despite these shifts, CSOs during President Mandela’s time in office continued to view 
themselves as active players and partners in the transition, resulting in a cross pollination of 
ideas and inputs in the early policy formulation phase. CSOs contributed towards drafting 
the South African Constitution, which was approved in December 1996 and took effect 
in February 1997. The South African Constitution has been described as one of the most 
advanced and progressive human rights-based constitutions in the world. The contents were 
influenced by the input of civil society, and many of its provisions, including the socio-
economic rights, were strongly lobbied for by CSOs. Since that time, CSOs have remained 
vigilant in maintaining and advancing the principles and rights enshrined in the constitution. 
CSOs helped draft the legislation that established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) along with setting up support groups, gathering evidence and raising awareness on the 
process. Some CSOs disagreed on the fairness of amnesties and of the TRC as a substitute for 
trials. They also disagreed on the extent and design of reparations for the victims of human 
rights abuses (Naidoo 2010:143). 
During this transitional period, additional funding conduits emerged including the Urban 
Foundation, which was supported by the private sector, and the Independent Development 
Trust (IDT), which was set up by government to fund poverty relief, infrastructure development 
and services in the education, housing and welfare sectors. While many CSOs remained 
active, others, such as the civic movement, failed to sustain support into the transition. With 
foreign donor funding being redirected as bilateral aid towards government, previously well-
funded CSOs found themselves in financial difficulty. 
After 1994, thousands of key activists and leaders in progressive organisations moved out of 
the sector to participate in Parliament, the transformation of state structures and the private 
sector, taking a great deal of institutional memory and experience with them. Coinciding with 
leaders departing from the civil society sector, donors developed more sophisticated criteria 
for funding. According to Kuljian (2009:125):
International funding priorities began to focus more on developmental goals and to 
have greater programmatic coherence.
After the struggle years, where well-funded CSOs were often able to overlook reporting and 
accountability, this new phase required that NPOs become proficient in fundraising and 
meticulous in their financial management. Funders required programme plans and clear 
objectives along with more rigorous donor reporting requirements. 
Many CSOs struggled to meet the new demands, in part because of the loss of leadership and 
management capacity, but also because of questions regarding their relevance and their role 
in this new context, particularly for activist organisations (Kuljian 2009:127). A new kind of 
activism was required within a constitutional democracy. Engaging within a constitutional 
framework meant that the ‘enemy’ was not clearly defined. However, the new terrain required 
active citizens to ensure that rights on paper became reality. 
As international funding was channelled through government, CSOs increasingly relied on 
funding flows through government. The Non-Profit Study (2001)3 found that in the late 1990s 
the bulk of financial resources for the NPO sector came from domestic sources, mainly from 
government (42%), the South African corporate sector (21%) with 34% from self-generated 
income. Organisations from an oppositional history, however, shunned government funds in 
fear of becoming service delivery arms of the state. 
Larger, more urban-based CSOs still relied on international sources. Considering fears that 
relying on government funding would detract from creating the active citizenry needed 
to utilise post-apartheid, democratic tools of social change, it is possible that diminishing 
funding has eroded the advocacy function of CSOs in post-apartheid South Africa. 
Changing relationship with the state
Whereas CSOs were active partners in drafting the constitution and the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP), the release of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) plan in 1996 formally marked a shift in the social contract between government and 
civil society. According to Ranchod (2007:4):
3  Swilling, M and Russell, B, The Size and Scope of the Non-profit Sector in South Africa, Graduate 
School of Public & Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand, and the Centre for Civil 
Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2001
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In 1996 the ANC-led government’s macro-economic strategy changed into Growth 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). There was little, if any, civil society 
participation.
GEAR prioritised the for-profit sector in economic growth and service delivery and the non-
profit sector in poverty alleviation.
As the limitations of the state became evident, new social movements and pressure groups 
began emerging. These included, amongst others, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, 
the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC). 
These formations highlighted gaps in basic services, labour practices, landlessness and 
homelessness, environmental destruction, gender equity, sexual minorities and issues facing 
refugees and migrants. 
Often engaging in violent protests and popular uprisings, these groupings exposed the living 
conditions of the poor and disadvantaged, particularly around access to basic services. They 
have not, however, led to constructive engagement with the state or the development of policy 
alternatives that can effect systemic change. 
CSOs finding their voice in the new terrain 
Into the new South Africa, infused with hope of ‘a better life for all’ came the scourge of 
HIV and AIDS, a bitter pill accompanying the long-fought-for freedom. While government 
vacillated and entertained various unscientific theories and responses to HIV at the expense of 
providing life-saving anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs), a new organisation emerged, the Treatment 
Action Campaign (TAC), demanding the provision of treatment and advocating for the rights 
of people living with HIV and AIDS. The TAC effectively utilised the tools of South Africa’s 
constitutional democracy and both challenged and cooperated with the government (Marais 
2011:455). 
The TAC used multiple strategies including court challenges, public awareness and 
education campaigns, petitions, a highly effective communications strategy, direct action 
and grassroots mobilisation. It also developed networks with local and international 
organisations to ensure maximum publicity and impact for its campaigns (Ranchod 2007:12). 
The action of the TAC led to significant changes in government policy, which was initially 
resistant to rolling out life-saving ARV treatment. The TAC’s strategy has now also shifted, 
and its current strategic plans are aligned to government’s national strategic plan on HIV 
and AIDS.
The tension between CSOs partnering with government and those wanting to retain distance 
to ensure their independence remains. Organisations likely to forge partnerships with 
government tend to work in the fields of health, social welfare and education. CSOs working 
towards democratic and political objectives are less likely to have close links with government. 
With the global recession and increased reliance by CSOs on government funding, it remains 
to be seen how the terrain will shift in the next few years. 
Legal and policy framework
Despite these concerns, NPOs have continued to lobby for an enabling environment, including 
government support and funding to be made available to the sector. An extensive process was 
undertaken to negotiate new policies and mechanisms for funding, such as the creation of the 
NDA, the lottery and tax exemption for NPOs. 
Apartheid-era legislation that governed the CSO sector included the National Welfare Act of 
1978 and the Fundraising Act of 1978. These pieces of legislation provided a legal framework 
through which the apartheid state sought to control, monitor and suppress civil society. 
The reform of legislation affecting South Africa’s non-profit sector was influenced by the 1992 
Independent Study into an Enabling Environment for NGOs which was supported by the 
Development Resources Centre. This study found that CSOs: 
•   had an unsatisfactory relationship with government; 
•   were constrained by a hostile funding framework; 
•   lacked skilled management; and 
•   encountered difficulties in registering organisations. 
The study identified an agenda for reform including new legislation to give content to the 
freedoms in the new constitution, repealing politically motivated legislation and dismantling 
oppressive and restrictive bureaucratic requirements. 
New legislation thus sought to create an enabling environment for NPOs with minimal state 
regulation. The new regulatory framework aimed to establish a progressive public space in 
which state–civil society relations could be managed and the non-profit sector funded. 
The Non-Profit Organisations Act of 1997
The Non-Profit Organisation’s Act of 1997 came into operation in September 1998. The Act 
repealed the old Fundraising Act that had been used by the apartheid state to constrain the 
activities of CSOs. The principle of voluntary registration of NPOs was asserted, and became 
the foundation of the NPO Bill, and subsequently the NPO Act of 1997 (Kuljian 2009:128). 
The Non-Profit Organisations Act defines an NPO as:
A trust, company or other association of persons established for a public purpose and 
the income and property of which are not distributable to its members or office-bearers, 
except as reasonable compensation for services rendered.
The Act made the registration process simple and affordable. 
Of relevance to this paper, the Act maintains that:
Every organ of state must determine and co-ordinate the implementation of its policies 
and measures in a manner designed to promote, support and enhance the capacity of 
non-profit organisations to perform their functions.4
4  A previous piece of legislation is still used to register Trusts or Foundations. This is the Trust Property 
Control Act of 1988. This Act makes it possible for organisations to register a Trust with the Master of the 
Supreme Court office in their district, governed by the Department of Justice. A Trust is not an independent 
legal entity; in other words, if there is litigation against or by the organisation, the trustees themselves can 
sue or be sued. A Trust’s founding document (not all Trusts are non-profit organisations) is a Trust Deed.
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The Non-Profit Organisations Act of 1997 defines its scope to encompass trusts, companies 
and other associations that are ‘established for a public purpose’. It is important to note that 
the NLB and the NDA were also established for a public purpose, the purpose outlined in the 
NPO Act above. 
Section 21 of the Companies Act of 1973 
Section 21 of the Companies Act of 1973 made it possible for a company without share 
capital to register a legal entity with the Registrar of Companies within the Department of 
Trade and Industry.
A Section 21 company could fundraise and invest funds with recognised institutions, but it 
could not distribute funds or profits to its members beyond paying them a salary for services 
rendered. The reporting requirements for a Section 21 company are more rigorous than those 
of the NPO Act.
The Companies Act was amended in May 2011. There is a transition period in which Section 
21 companies will transfer to non-profit companies. The amendment codified the duties of, 
and set standards for, non-profit directors. The standard of governance has increased and 
those serving on sub-committees also expose themselves to liability if they do not comply 
with requirements in the Act. The non-profit company legislation is more enabling from a 
legal perspective, but it remains to be seen whether it will be enabling in execution.5 
The Taxation Laws Amendment Act of 2000 
Another piece of legislation affecting funding for the NPO sector was the Taxation Laws 
Amendment Act of 2000. According to the Act, Public Benefit Organisations (PBOs) were 
created with and are exempt from paying taxes under certain conditions for non-profit activities.
A study conducted in 2003 found that NPOs that benefited the most from the legislation 
were organisations defined as CSOs, based in the urban areas, operating at the provincial and 
national levels, registered as Section 21 companies and members of networks or coalitions 
(Umhlaba Development Services 2005:47). 
Impact of the legislation
The NPO Act was intended to improve the standard of governance and increase accountability 
and transparency within the sector. This was expected to enhance donor confidence. 
Although the Act made provision for the creation of a dedicated unit within the DSD to 
provide support to NPOs, the lack of coordination between the NPO directorate and other 
government departments and agencies such as the NDA and the NLB has resulted in the 
expected benefits not being forthcoming. 
Despite this array of legislation, a systemic and overarching legislative framework ensuring 
cross-governmental cooperation to enable NPO agency is lacking. While the NPO Act was 
intended to create an enabling environment for CSOs, this has not happened in practice. The 
vision has been further hampered by implementation capacity constraints within the DSD. 
5 Interview with Ricardo Wyngaard, non-profit lawyer, 12 January 2012
The role of civil society today 
Currently there is little reliable national information on South African civil society. This 
is due to the difficulty of obtaining funding for research, together with the unwillingness 
of government agencies, most notably Stats SA, to include the civil society sector within 
research frameworks and surveys. 
The 2001 Non-Profit study revealed that:
•   There were 98 920 NPOs in South Africa of which 53% were less formalised, 
community-based, often staffed by volunteers, and provided a range of essential 
support services within poor and marginalised communities. 
•   South African civil society is as large and as vibrant as in most advanced 
industrialised countries.
Of the different fields in which NPOs operated, the largest ones at the time were social 
services (22% of the total), culture and recreation (20%), and development and housing 
(20%), followed by health (7%), education (6%) and environment (3%). The data focused 
on organisations involved in service delivery rather than advocacy, capacity building and 
building participatory democracy. 
Strategies and contributions by civil society
The plurality of civil society and the diverse sets of relations that it engenders with the 
state is… the best guarantee for the consolidation of democracy in South Africa.
(Professor Adam Habib)
Civil society is not homogenous and the roles played by, and strategies used by, CSOs vary 
significantly. South African civil society came from a history of advocacy for social and 
economic justice and has shifted to a more service delivery and developmental role with the 
demise of apartheid. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a comprehensive account of the role and strategies 
of the contemporary civil society sector in South Africa. However, it is important to highlight 
some of the multiplicity of roles that CSOs play, in order to interrogate where state-channelled 
or aligned funding is likely to be appropriate. Participants in the research process agreed 
that civil society is about ‘doing good’ and ‘closing gaps’ including service delivery gaps, 
equality gaps, and gaps in the quality of life experienced by people in poor and marginalised 
communities. 
Service delivery 
In a society still confronted with massive service-delivery backlogs and limited state capacity, 
many CSOs are engaged in service delivery at various levels and in a range of sectors. As early 
as 1997, a survey of the voluntary sector identified CSOs and CBOs as having an important 
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role to play in filling the gaps left by the government, especially in poor communities. This 
role was strengthened through:
the strategic location of NGOs, their access to communities and the credibility they 
enjoy from these communities. Further, their organisational flexibility and capacity to 
identify development alternatives make them the missing link in many of the state’s 
development ventures.
(Boulle 1997)
CSOs, and CBOs in particular, usually arise organically in response to needs within a 
community and are able to reach areas where there is little formal organisation but where the 
need is often greatest. 
There is ongoing debate in the available literature regarding the service delivery and 
implementing partners’ role of many CSOs. Umhlaba Development Services (2005:56) argued 
that: 
the grand policy formulation phase of the early transition years (mid- to late-1990s), 
which was characterised initially by passionate intensity and lofty visions, has 
passed… The focus today in most areas, however, is indeed on delivery, and that is 
what communities largely expect [emphasis added]. Nostalgically invoking the days of 
‘the struggle’, and the transition days that seemed to offer unlimited prospects for re-
shaping South African society, may be fun, but not very practical.
It is in the role as service delivery providers and partners that government most supports civil 
society financially. 
Building active citizenry 
In democracies, elections are one way in which citizens participate and where governments 
are held accountable. The gaps between elections mean that there is a need for ongoing 
influence in decision-making and it is civil society that usually speaks up for the needs of the 
poor, disenfranchised and disadvantaged.
The state is the main implementer of poverty eradication and development initiatives. The 
role of civil society is therefore to ensure that national and political systems are people-
oriented. Habib (2003:41) wrote that civil society ensures that: 
marginalised citizens have a voice and leverage so that political élites are conditioned 
to become responsive to their interests. It requires a political regime that prioritises the 
interests of the nation’s most dispossessed and marginalised. Without such a moral 
centre underpinning South African society, poverty, inequality and underdevelopment, 
and their consequences, are likely to be with citizens for the foreseeable future.
(Habib et al 2003:41)
CSOs thus provide channels for those voices and issues that may not have been prioritised 
by political parties. The South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) anti-poverty 
hearings held in 1998 were an example of civil society influencing debates and action related 
to poverty eradication and ensuring that community voices are heard. 
Since the advent of democracy, there are various routes to participation in policy processes 
including formal corporatist structures such as NEDLAC, ward committees at local government 
level, commenting and testifying on proposed policy and legislation through the green and 
white paper process, and participating in government imbizos. Civil society can also place 
issues on the policy agenda through research, advocacy, lobbying Parliament, litigation and 
mobilising public opinion and action. Many of these strategies have been utilised by this 
Coalition. 
Atlantic Philanthropies, a global funding organisation supporting South African CSOs, 
including this research Coalition, promotes advocacy as a non-violent strategy to bring about 
social justice and change. It sees the Constitution as providing a basis for the realisation of 
human rights and recognises that this will not happen without active citizens fighting to 
uphold their rights. In a case study on the power of advocacy it states, ‘When apartheid went, 
the struggle was not over.’6 South African CSOs have advocated through movements and 
coalitions such as the People’s Health Movement, the National Welfare Forum and the Global 
Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAAP). 
Advocacy is strengthened when grounded in contextual research. This assists to raise 
awareness and mobilise communities. Effective advocacy requires organisational capacity 
and the ability to develop policy alternatives. Lobbying is required to ensure that policy 
alternatives are promoted.7 It is unfortunate that many CSOs, including some that participated 
in this process, have had to spend valuable time and resources employing advocacy strategies, 
including litigation, in attempts to extract funding from the NLB and the NDA. 
Currently the space for lobbying and advocacy is largely held by the more organised and 
resourced CBOs and CSOs. It is these that have access to finance for costly research, organising 
and/or litigation. With declining international resources and the increased reliance by CSOs 
on government funding, there is evidence that advocacy CSOs have been negatively affected. 
Acknowledging that advocacy is essential to ensure social change, it is possible that with 
a weakened advocacy voice the pace of social change may slow down. The importance of 
active citizenry was noted by Sachs (2008:51–52) when he wrote:
Governments can be named and shamed into doing the right thing only if the global 
citizenry is paying attention, understands the stakes, cares about the outcomes and has 
the organisational heft to take on the shirkers.
He emphasised the need for mobilising the private and non-profit sectors in a global effort of 
international cooperation. In a presentation at a Coalition strategy workshop, a government 
representative spoke of how CSOs have retreated from policy debates. Policy is shaped in 
the political arena, and he stressed the importance of civil society involvement at the policy 
level.8 
Those organisations and less formal groupings lacking the resources required for effective 
advocacy are increasingly opting for mass mobilisation and protest action.
6  http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/learning/case-study-guns-and-roses-advocacy-emerging-
democracy
7  http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/learning/atlantic-report/investing-change-why-supporting-
advocacy-makes-sense-foundations
8  Presentation at Coalition for Civil Society Resource Mobilisation, 5 June 2010, Nelson Mandela 
Foundation 
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Protest and mass mobilisation
Inequality in South Africa is reflected in deeply contrasting living conditions between poor 
and wealthier South African communities. Poor communities relying on poor quality state 
service delivery have been pushed to the limit. South Africa has seen a dramatic increase in 
social unrest with the declining economic situation and slow pace of change in the lives of 
people living in poverty. Research by the Centre for Civil Society (CCS 2010) noted:
that there were 5 813 protests (as defined under the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 
of 1993) recorded by the SA Police Service in 2004-05 and, subsequently, an average of 
8 000 per annum.9
Until this figure was topped by a global wave of protests in 2011/12, the CCS estimated this 
to be the highest per capita rate of social protest in the world (Amisi et al, 2010).
In 2011/12 there has been an unprecedented global wave of social and political turmoil as 
protesters have taken to the streets in the Arab Spring, the riots in London, student riots in 
Chile and more recently the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement taking place across the United 
States and many other developed economies. While not always focusing on service delivery, 
the global protests in some ways mirror the underlying frustrations expressed by South 
African communities: 
•   high unemployment and underemployment; 
•   inadequate skills and education for young people and workers; 
•   the high cost of food; 
•   resentment against corruption; and 
•   a rise in income and wealth inequality.10 
Protest and mass mobilisation in isolation are unlikely to lead to sustained social change. 
Beyond forcing government to put out temporary fires, influencing policy and resource 
allocation requires more nuanced engagement, policy development and ongoing advocacy. 
2011/12 has, however, reasserted the collective power of masses of people unifying for a 
common cause. 
Building strategic partnerships and coalitions
One of the central features in the anti-apartheid struggle was the banner under which civil 
society mobilised: the United Democratic Front (UDF). The UDF brought together groupings 
from diverse sectors including faith-based communities, women’s groups and issue-based 
groups focusing on land, education, housing, living conditions, etc. 
Since then South African civil society has struggled to work through a cohesive coordinating 
structure. SANGOCO was formed in 1995:
to coordinate NGO input into government policy and ensure that the rich traditions of 
civil society, forged in the resistance to apartheid, continue to serve the people of South 
Africa.
9  Charles Nqakula (2007), ‘Reply to Question 1834, National Assembly, 36/1/4/1/200700232’ (Cape 
Town), 22 November in CCS Study (see Amisi et al), Amisi, B et al 2010. Xenophobia and Civil Society: 
Durban’s Structured Social Division, Centre for Civil Society 
10 Nouriel Roubini http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/roubini43/English 
Its impact has remained limited. In a meeting with the Coalition as part of this research 
process, Kumi Naidoo, current head of Greenpeace and the founder leader of SANGOCO, noted 
the current strength of sectoral groupings in areas such as education, health, disability, etc., 
which are now doing an excellent job in building strategic partnerships and coordination.11 
Naidoo elaborated that partnerships could further result in practical benefits to CSOs, such as 
bulk procurement, reduced travel rates, better medical aid and pension plans, etc. Providing 
better working conditions for staff in the CSO sector through such initiatives would assist in 
retaining good talent. He noted the potential benefits of collectivising the sector’s financial 
muscle and enhanced ability to leverage through cooperation. 
While South African CSOs coordinate on issue-based concerns and in projects, the sector 
could significantly enhance its leverage through effective use of strategic partnerships. Naidoo 
(2010:119) laments:
Part of our problem in civil society is we fail to create spaces to talk about these 
contradictions and how we can manage them. The key message of this volume is that, 
if we are to deliver justice, then civic groups must become a lot better at focusing on the 
many things that unite us while deciding to respectfully disagree on the finer points of 
difference between us.
Naidoo advocates for alliance-building that allows partners to:
enter the minefields of negotiation with opposing interests in search of commonalities 
that foster the advancement of their own causes.
Civil society alliances advocating for better funding practice from the NDA and the NLB fall 
within this arena. 
Thus, in this complex, global, multi-media terrain the strategies available to CSOs to effect 
social change are constantly changing. As mentioned above, the TAC has demonstrated how, 
utilising a combination of strategies and tactics, organisations can ‘punch above their weight’ 
and achieve significant leverage and sustainable change. (Marais 2011:455; Naidoo 2010:44) 
Stepping up the pace: media, new technology and social networking 
In the past decade the media, technology and the growth of social networking have dramatically 
increased and democratised information flows. CSOs now use the internet, social networking 
and mobile phones to collect and instantly disseminate messages across the world. While the 
majority of South Africans still do not have access to the internet through computers, most 
do have access to mobile phones, and increasingly have access to the internet through this 
medium. CSOs are using this new direct access to citizens in a range of ways, including HIV 
messaging, data collection for monitoring and evaluation purposes, reminders to clients of 
service delivery appointments, as a teaching tool and in a range of other innovative ways. 
11  Kumi Naidoo, discussion with the Coalition for Resource Mobilisation at a strategy meeting, 
18 September 2010 
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New media has ensured that far more people are able to communicate and receive information 
on a mass and instant scale, which further increases the pace and scale of discontent. The 
speed at which information can travel to a vast number of people has enhanced the ability to 
mobilise communities for collective action. The use of these technologies in the Arab Spring 
uprisings in North Africa in 2011 has been widely documented. 
New media is speeding up the pace of change, in contrast to governments which are 
notoriously sluggish and lethargic. This is also evident in organisations such as the NDA and 
the NLB, both having painfully slow and inefficient processes. This has been exacerbated by 
an apparent unwillingness to take urgent and immediate action to clear blockages and ensure 
the smooth flow of funds. 
Civil society tested: the xenophobic attacks 2008 
In May 2008 South Africa reeled in horror as 62 people were killed, 670 injured, many 
women raped and thousands driven from their homes and displaced. These were the results 
of a country-wide outbreak of xenophobic violence directed at foreign, mostly African, 
nationals. The attacks brought the harsh conditions of people living in South Africa’s informal 
settlements into living rooms across the globe. 
The image of South Africa as intolerant, divided and  
violent was at odds with the view of South Africa as having  
a ‘miracle’ transition resulting in the ‘rainbow’ nation.  
(Nyar 2010)
Research supported by Atlantic Philanthropies found that the xenophobic attacks in 2008 
presented the most significant challenge to the country since the advent of democracy. The 
attacks provided a litmus test of the ability of civil society to respond to a major crisis. The 
violent outbreak saw a remarkable response by civil society to the crisis. Humanitarian relief, 
advocacy, lobbying and a range of interventions were provided by faith-based organisations, 
trade unions, social movements, non-profit organisations, the general public and others. The 
response to the violence was the largest and most significant mobilisation of the public and of 
civil society since the ANC government came into power in 1994. Many of the CSOs working 
on the response had never worked together before. This demonstrated the latent power of civil 
society despite conventional wisdom expressing the opinion that civil society had withered 
in the post-apartheid period (in Parsley and Everatt 2010). 
Jara and Peberdy (2010:4) found that areas where xenophobic attacks were avoided were 
those where community organisation was functional, with progressive leadership, and where 
citizens and migrants worked together in community activities. In a context where funders 
often prioritise humanitarian or service-delivery support, the Atlantic-funded research 
findings argued for the need for resources also to go towards community mobilisation, 
advocacy, strengthening networks / coalitions, peace building, conflict resolution and 
community-based organisations and social movements. 
As these interventions have traditionally been funded by international funders, if the NLB 
and the NDA are to engage and reflect on their relevance and impact, and as CSOs increasingly 
rely on local sources of funding, it may be necessary for the NLB and the NDA to support such 
initiatives. 
Jara and Peberdy (2010) argue that in the early days of the crisis, ‘civil society essentially 
replaced the absent, incapable and dysfunctional state’. Civil society was found to be closer 
to the needs of the people and with the flexibility to respond in an emergency.
Impact of relying on government-aligned funding 
Naidoo (2010:19) speaks of civil society as operating on three different levels: on governance 
changes (macro); on policy changes (meso); and on implementation and delivery of social 
services (micro). Government funding to CSOs through the DSD and other agencies, such as 
the NLB and the NDA, largely supports the delivery of social services and thus strengthens 
civil society contributions at the micro level. 
Some CSOs align their programmes to government-developed plans such as the National 
Strategic Plan on HIV and AIDS.12 When CSOs and government mobilise around a common 
purpose, it should be simple to release the resources needed and to forge cooperative working 
arrangements. This does not always happen in practice (Naidoo 2010:19). 
As seen above, the role of civil society is more varied and wide-ranging than service delivery. 
Civil society’s contribution to a vibrant democracy requires that it is active in other areas. 
Merely playing the role of a service-delivery vehicle will not challenge or hold the state 
accountable: 
•   it does not ensure that policy is the product of a cross-pollination of ideas, experiences and 
perspectives; 
•   it does not provide the watchful eye needed to ensure that politicians do not dip their 
hands into state coffers or hand out favours and tenders to their friends or relatives; but 
•   it does create possibilities of dependency on the state and the often resultant cooptation 
that comes with that. 
As Naidoo (2010:20) commented:
There is a sad tendency for the fight against poverty to become fragmented, with 
organisations becoming absorbed in delivering services on a micro level, and failing to 
realise that they also need to address the issue on a meso and macro level. This goes 
further, with a failure to realise that the issue of poverty crosses over directly to the 
issue of human rights and justice.
Thus, while government-related support to civil society can have an impact on poverty 
alleviation and addressing the needs of vulnerable groups, it is less likely to invest in building 
the capacity required for active citizenship. While the NDA and the NLB appear to fall into 
this category, there are examples that demonstrate that alternatives are possible. 
Challenges facing civil society
The truth is that we are not yet free, we have merely achieved the freedom to be free, 
the right not to be oppressed.
(Nelson Mandela)
12 The TAC, for example, aligns its programmes to the National Strategic Plan on HIV and AIDS. 
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Financial sustainability
CSOs play a crucial and often under-valued role. One of the challenges currently faced by this 
sector is that of financial sustainability. Whereas under apartheid the sector was generously 
funded by the international donor community, with democracy much of the international 
funding has been channelled through an often ineffective state apparatus. While there are 
no current and reliable statistics on funding to the sector, most organisations rely on a 
combination of diminishing international funding, corporate social investment, donations 
from individuals and a degree of income-generation, often via government contracts. 
This situation is exacerbated by the current economic recession. Traditional foreign donor 
agencies have scaled down their funding drastically or withdrawn completely, mainly due to 
global recession. According to Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu:
Charity organisations, which represent 30 per cent of the social services in the country, 
had R3 billion less to spend on the crucial causes because of the recession! 500 000 
needy South Africans, many of them women and children, have been plunged into 
despair as the country’s charities battle a funding crisis.13 
The US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Global Fund have 
provided essential funds for health and other HIV and AIDS related services. PEPFAR funds 
have decreased and Round 11 of the Global Fund collapsed due to a lack of funds.14 Some of the 
major foreign donor funding agencies (such as the Mott Foundation, Kellogg Foundation and 
DANIDA) have reduced their global funding, in some cases reportedly by as much as 30 per 
cent.15 In addition, as donor attention is drawn to post-conflict reconstruction in North Africa 
or countries with greater levels of poverty, major foreign donors are increasingly viewing 
South Africa as a middle-income country and not a deserving donor-recipient country. 
For NPOs relying on international sources of funding, this ‘has been nothing short of 
catastrophic. The current round of donor funding cut-backs has created a terminal situation 
the likes of which was only witnessed back in the early 1990s. Between 1992 and 1994, 
approximately 1 000 NPOs found themselves deep in financial crisis due to donor funding 
cuts, with 200 to 400 organisations eventually collapsing.’16 How these massive shortfalls in 
funding will be addressed remains to be seen. 
This has prompted many NPOs to look increasingly at government and domestic sources of 
income. Local grant makers have seen applications double in the past year.17 The NLB and the 
NDA are also receiving an increasing volume of applications from CSOs. 
13 http://www.thegivingorganisation.org
14 http://hosted.verticalresponse.com/594745/ee0f811cb8/1468555807/955b05c498/
15  http://www.ngopulse.org/article/funding-crisis-research-ngos-south-africa-looming-larger-ever; 
Friday 23 July, 2010
16  Dr. Thabo Rapoo, Executive Director of the Centre for Policy Studies, http://www.ngopulse.org/article/
funding-crisis-research-ngos-south-africa-looming-larger-ever; Friday 23 July, 2010
17  Applications to the DG Murray Trust, a local grant-maker, increased from 304 in 2010 to 794 in 2011, 
http://www.dgmt.co.za/2011-grant-application-and-allocation-statistics; Interviews with the DG Murray 
Trust (2 December 2011), the Foundation for Human Rights (10 December 2011) and Tshikululu Social 
Investments (7 December 2011) reveal a ‘frenetic’ increase in applications for funding.
Some critics see the current crisis as less about a lack of funds than about priorities and 
values. Commenting on cutbacks to the Global Fund, Stephen Lewis, the director of AIDS 
Free World, said: 
Spare me the economic crisis. Everyone knows that when it comes to financing wars, or 
bailing out the banks, or bailing out Greece, or reinstituting corporate bonuses, or even 
responding to natural disasters that threaten economies, there’s always enough money. 
We’re drowning in crocodile tears. It’s not a matter of the financial crisis; it’s a matter 
of human priorities.18 
Lewis highlighted the fact that the funds needed to support the Global Fund are equivalent to 
US military spending in just one day. 
Service delivery, development and social justice
Participants in the Coalition’s provincial workshops spoke of a disjuncture between welfare, 
human rights and government issues. There is a perception that there is a growing divide 
between ‘middle class’ organisations focusing on civil and political rights (such as recent 
judiciary appointments, the secrecy bill, corruption, environmental issues, etc.) and grassroots 
organisations focusing on socio-economic rights (service-delivery issues). Currently a more 
expansive agenda acknowledging the interconnectedness of civil, political and socio-
economic rights is absent. 
The Protection of State Information Bill is a case in point. While the champions against the Bill 
were largely the media, fearing the impact it would have on freedom of expression, Pierre de 
Vos (2011) highlights the potential impact it could have on grassroots activist organisations:
This means, for example, that where activists of Abahlali baseMjondolo or the Landless 
People’s Movement are illegally targeted by the security services because they are 
perceived to be a threat to the ANC government and their phones are bugged, their 
houses attacked or their leaders tortured and murdered, it would be almost impossible 
for the organisation to prove this when all the documents that could do so are classified. 
Ironically, only the media will have the resources to expose such abuse of power, but 
this would require the media (targeted at middle-class readers) to display far more 
concern for the wellbeing of these social movements whose interests do not always 
align with the interests of the middle classes served by the serious media.19 
Naidoo (2010:94) writes that the authority of CSOs grows when the government in power has 
a legitimacy deficit. Thus, during the apartheid era, the authority of civil society in South 
Africa was significantly higher than that of government. That many CSOs remain engaged 
with government reveals that the South African government still retains legitimacy, albeit 
dwindling. As government undermines its credibility with unpopular legislation, such as the 
Secrecy Bill, evidence of widespread corruption and the erosion of trust that accompanies 
poor service delivery, there is evidence of a growing public voice of dissent emanating from 
CSOs. 
18  http://www.aidsfreeworld.org/Publications-Multimedia/Speeches/Stephen-Lewis-remarks-to-
ICASA-2011.aspx#.Tt4xQ8gTInA.facebook
19 http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/who-can-we-trust; 22 November, 2011 by Pierre De Vos 
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Effectiveness of the CSO sector
While an updated non-profit study is urgently required to map and assess the scope of civil 
society, it is worth considering debates about whether civil society is a worthy sector in 
which to invest. Poverty, inequality and underdevelopment are problems that have worsened 
in spite of government and civil society interventions. In the words of Martin Luther King: 
Philanthropy may be commendable, but it must not overlook the circumstances of 
economic injustice that make philanthropy necessary.
(in Habib 2003:37) 
Habib et al (2003:38) see civil society as weakened with the shift in funding from ‘a social 
justice orientation’ to ‘one that is largely ameliorative’. Stringent funding criteria and demands 
for rigorous standards of accountability, transparency and financial self-sufficiency imposed 
by donors on CSOs, ‘have the unintended effect of distancing these organisations from the 
very poor and marginalised constituencies they are meant to serve’.
NPOs frequently suffer from capacity lacks. It is difficult for them to guarantee continued 
and sustained interventions due to a lack of financial security. The lack of security leads to 
high staff turnover and prevents long-term planning. Low salaries often result in more skilled 
professionals seeking employment in other sectors. These factors impact on the ability of CSOs 
to raise funds, plan, implement quality services and meet the reporting and accountability 
requirements of donors. Many CSOs, partnerships and coalitions are plagued by internal 
tensions. The strategic importance of CBOs tends to be overlooked by government, larger 
CSOs and donors as they often lack the capacity required to manage donor requirements. 
Accountability of CSOs to the communities they serve is not guaranteed. Government can 
claim a mandate that comes from electoral support and CBOs have legitimacy as they are often 
representative of their communities. Conversely CSOs have largely reproduced apartheid 
spacial relations by locating their offices in central business districts (Jara and Peberdy 2010). 
That many organisations dealing with rural people work from an urban base was flagged by 
participants in the Coalition’s provincial workshops.
Many donors do not have the capacity to monitor impact. It is therefore not clear what donor 
aid has achieved or failed to achieve over the past decade. Monitoring and evaluation tend to 
be quantitative, focused on project outputs and financial accounting, with less attention paid 
to qualitative outcomes and results. Donors do not coordinate with other funders, leading to 
duplication of services and waste of resources. As donors increasingly specify their funding 
criteria, NPOs are sometimes seen as implementing donor-driven agendas (Ewing and Guliwe 
2006: 259–261). 
The politics of funding is thus highly complex, which strengthens the argument by the 
Coalition for the importance of government support to civil society from institutions like 
the NLB and the NDA. From a government perspective, the value of supporting CSOs would 
be to ensure that programmes are supporting local agendas – this aspect will remain the 
double-edged sword of government funding, with CSOs fearing cooption to government’s 
agenda, while government ensures that these resources promote a national agenda. Where 
this becomes a win-win approach is when government institutions are oriented towards the 
public benefit and act in the public interest. 
CSOs need to be aware that as much as they need donors, so too do donors need effective 
partners in civil society. Although power dynamics are skewed towards the institution 
holding the purse strings, it is an inter-dependent relationship. 
As a middle-income country, South Africa has the resources to make strides in addressing 
poverty. Ewing and Guliwe (2006:276) noted that this is, ‘unlikely to happen given government’s 
existing political and ideological leanings’. A dramatic decline in foreign donor funding will 
thus impact negatively on the most marginalised in South Africa. 
In light of the above, the Coalition has the following recommendations: 
•   Collective action by civil society to improve its visibility and ensure state recognition.
•   A strong national, membership-based coalition to engage in a unified manner with 
government.
•   Improved understanding by civil society of government systems and initiatives 
achieved.
•   Fundraising for and implementation of an updated ‘Social Giving’ study and ‘Size 
and Scope’ civil society study.
From a government perspective, the value 
of supporting CSOs would be to ensure that 
programmes are supporting local agendas – this 
becomes a win-win approach when government 
institutions are oriented towards the public 
benefit and act in the public interest.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Socio-economic conditions  
in South Africa
‘Poverty is the absence of all human rights. Every person living in  
poverty has no rights. You name it, they don’t have it.’ 
(Muhammad Yunus, Founder of Grameen Bank and Nobel Prize Laureate) 
The South African constitution is a human rights-based constitution. The rights-based approach commits to empowerment, participation, non-discrimination and attention 
to vulnerable groups. The constitution was informed by the United Nations Declaration on 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The South African constitution is one of 
the few constitutions in the world that includes socio-economic rights. 
As South Africa enters its 18th year (adulthood) of democracy, significant strides have been 
made towards transforming the lives of ordinary South Africans: access to education has 
increased; ten million people have been accommodated in formal housing; primary healthcare 
has been expanded; and access to electricity and water has been significantly increased. 
The South African economy grew between 1995 and 2010 after two decades of stagnation 
(National Planning Commission 2011a:7). 
Despite these gains, economic performance has remained mixed and redistribution of wealth 
has not significantly benefited the poor. Indeed, the human development index shows 
reversals in certain areas such as life expectancy, which went from 65 at the time of liberation 
to 52 a decade later.20 
The Coalition’s provincial workshops addressed socio-economic concerns, specifically 
looking at progress achieved with regard to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
as ‘hooks’ on which to hang its proposals for changes in the architecture or operation of 
development finance institutions. 
The eight Millennium Development Goals are: 
•   To eradicate extreme poverty
•   To achieve universal primary education
•   To promote gender equality and empower women
•   To reduce child mortality
•   To improve maternal health
20 http://www.mediationsjournal.org/articles/developmental-state-distraction
•   To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
•   To ensure environmental sustainability
•   To develop a global partnership for development
Participants in the provincial workshops spoke of the limited achievements with regard to 
realising the MDGs in South Africa. They acknowledged that there was progress in some 
areas, such as the roll out of ARVs and expansion of access to early childhood development 
services. Achievements across provinces varied, with provinces such as the Northern Cape 
indicating little progress. 
Three areas will be explored to provide a brief overview of the socio-economic conditions and 
the progress that has been made to address poverty and achieve the MDGs. These are: income 
and asset poverty related to the economic dimensions of poverty; the material dimensions of 
poverty, including access to basic services and safety nets; and capability poverty that looks 
at the political and social dimensions (Swilling and Van Breda 2006).
These three dimensions of poverty are not inclusive, for example issues related to climate 
change and the environment do not fit neatly into these three categories. They do, however, 
provide a useful analytical framework to assess where government and civil society have 
prioritised their interventions. 
Income and asset poverty
As mentioned above, income and asset poverty relate to the economic dimensions of poverty. 
This relates to the first MDG and includes facilitating access to good quality employment 
and economic opportunities and increasing the physical asset-base of the poor, such as land, 
housing and equipment for economic enterprise.
Unemployment, poverty and inequality 
Despite South Africa being considered a middle-income country, massive inequality qualifies 
it as a recipient of aid. The proportion of people living below the poverty line was about 53 
per cent in 1995, fell to 48 per cent in 2008, and moved up to 54 per cent in 2011.21 The first 
and second economies described by former president, Thabo Mbeki, remain, with persistently 
high levels of poverty for a middle-income economy. 
In a presentation to a Coalition strategic workshop in June 2010, Neva Makgetla, an economist 
from the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) said that while there had been 
improvements to services reaching black communities, deep inequalities persist as evident 
in South Africa’s Gini coefficient.22 The years of sustained economic growth have not had a 
transformative impact on the lives of South Africans living in poverty. The NPC Diagnostic 
Overview (2011) stated:
According to the Income and Expenditure Survey, the Gini coefficient was 0.67 in 
2005, which is very high by international standards… The poorest 20 per cent of the 
21 http://www.npconline.co.za/pebble.asp?relid=130
22  A Gini coefficient of ‘1’ is an indication of complete income inequality with one person having all the 
income, while a Gini coefficient of ‘0’ is indicative of complete equality with everybody earning an 
equal income.
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population earns about 2.3 per cent of national income, while the richest 20 per cent 
earns about 70 per cent of the income.
Makgetla pointed out that although inequalities persist, they are less racially based than in 
the past. The rapid growth of the black middle class has meant that inequality has risen 
among black people with the Gini coefficient rising from 0.55 in 1994 to 0.59 in 2008. The 
majority of low-income households remain black. 
Makgetla presented statistics showing that despite some decline since 2001, levels of 
unemployment remain high. Unemployment peaked in 2001 at 31 per cent. Positive and 
sustained growth between 1997 and 2008 did finally make inroads into unemployment, 
which fell to 23 per cent in 2008 (NPC 2001a:9). 
If those who have given up looking for work are counted, unemployment is estimated at 40 
per cent. 60 per cent of the unemployed have never worked and lack the skills needed to 
engage in the economy. This is not uniform geographically, with some informal settlements 
experiencing mass unemployment (Amisi et al 2010). Unemployment is mostly experienced 
by youth with about two thirds of all unemployed people below the age of 35. Black youth 
are more affected (NPC 2011a:11). 
For those who do have employment, wages are comparable to other middle-income countries, 
but due to the high number of dependants as a result of unemployment, even working 
households often live near or below the poverty line. 
Government has undertaken various initiatives to address the debilitating and chronically 
high level of unemployment. These gains, however, were eroded with the global economic 
crisis. As the NPC Diagnostic Overview (2011:8) lamented:
The recession has reduced hard won gains, with per capita income and employment 
falling by about 4 per cent and 1 million jobs between the last quarter of 2008 and 2009. 
While growth has resumed, the long-term impact of the global economic downturn is 
still uncertain, as is the path to employment recovery.
With high levels of unemployment, Makgetla’s presentation revealed how social grants 
have replaced wage income and remittances. The NPC estimates that if cash transfers were 
removed, poverty would rise from 54 per cent to 60 per cent.23 Government grants include the 
child-support grant, foster-care grant, pensions and disability grants. About 15 million South 
Africans receive social welfare grants, which contribute to poverty alleviation by narrowing 
the ‘destitution gap’.24 
Although civil society contributes towards job creation, it is less active in addressing the 
economic aspects of poverty than it is in other areas. With the shift from the RDP to GEAR, 
the private sector was viewed as a key government partner in addressing unemployment 
and inequality. CSOs are, however, active in addressing the consequences of unemployment, 
poverty and inequality. CSOs advocate for pro-poor policies and mobilise people to take 
actions demanding a better quality of life. 
23 http://www.npconline.co.za/pebble.asp?relid=130
24 State of the Nation Address 2011, http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=1426
Apartheid spatial legacy, access to land and housing 
Historically, land-ownership patterns, settlement patterns and home-ownership 
policies made it difficult for black people, particularly Africans, to accumulate assets, 
amass wealth and become entrepreneurs. The small African middle class was largely 
comprised of professionals (nurses, teachers and police), not business people or farmers.
(NPC 2011a:10)
To address this, government implemented various black economic empowerment programmes, 
which have fostered the development of a growing black middle class. Black home ownership 
has grown significantly with black property owners increasing by 60 per cent. While many of 
these transfers formalised township leases, home ownership does provide a degree of asset 
growth and security of tenure.25 
Despite a rise in home ownership for many, the legacy of apartheid spatial planning has had 
an enduring impact on poverty. New settlements are located far away from key commercial 
centres. This marginalises them in terms of access to jobs, urban amenities and social networks 
in addition to increasing travel costs. While government has provided 10 million houses and 
increased access to electricity from 63 per cent in 2000 to 81 per cent in 2011, it is estimated 
that 6 million people live in shacks (Amisi et al 2010). The number of people requiring 
housing increases with migration from rural to urban areas. 
Some government-provided houses have been constructed with less durable building materials 
and lower-quality municipal services have been provided. While free water and electricity 
are provided, the rising costs make the top-up costs unaffordable to many. Makgetla (2010) 
indicated that, while access to municipal services such as piped water, flushed toilets and 
electricity for lighting has increased since 2006, there is still no equality of access between 
Africans and non-Africans.26 The ripple effect of this is felt not only in the income drain of 
high transport costs but in other areas such as parents spending more time away from their 
children as they endure long daily commutes to and from work. 
South Africa’s ability to implement rapid and massive infrastructure projects was ably 
demonstrated with investment in the lead up to the FIFA World Cup in 2010. The National 
Planning Commission states that the government needs to do more to invest in infrastructure 
and maintenance that serves poorer communities.27 
It is estimated that 6 million people live in shacks – in spite of the 
fact that 10 million houses were provided by government.
25 http://www.sagoodnews.co.za/benchmarking_progress/black_home_ownership_on_the_rise.html
26  Neva Makgetla, presentation at Coalition on Civil Society Resource Mobilisation strategy workshop, 
5 June 2010 
27 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mXhPtMoaGa0&sns=fb
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The material dimensions of poverty
The material dimensions of poverty include: facilitating access to basic services for the poor, 
such as water and sanitation, solid waste management, affordable and safe energy, transport, 
education, health and shelter; and ensuring access to safety nets to strengthen the ability to 
manage shocks and stresses (Swilling and Van Breda 2006). 
Education 
After 18 years of democracy, access to education has improved. Of the 14 million learners in 
the country, approximately 12 million are in publicly funded or government schools. Public 
schools cater for over 96 per cent of all learners. Equity in school funding has improved to 
address the legacy of inequality, with public spending higher for African than white children. 
South Africa’s teachers are among the highest paid in the world (NPC 2011a:13). South Africa 
has a high enrolment of girls in schools. 
While progress has thus been made with regard to MDG 2, achieving universal primary 
education, government spending of about 6 per cent of GDP on education has not enhanced 
the quality of education, particularly for poor black South Africans. South Africa’s literacy 
and numeracy test scores are low by African and global standards. South Africa’s education 
system underperforms in international tests in which the country has participated. Of the 50 
countries tested in Grade 8 maths and science in the Trends in International Mathematics 
and Science Study (TIMSS) in 2003, South Africa came last. Of the 40 countries tested in the 
Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) Grade 5 reading and literacy test in 
2006, South Africa came last. South African students score consistently lower than learners 
from other resource-poor countries such as Lesotho, Uganda and Malawi. Physical assets and 
infrastructure at school level remains unequal (NPC 2011a:14).
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Considering the massive financial investments in education, the problems do not lie in a 
scarcity of resources. Research has shown that the problems relate to: the quality of teacher 
performance; low expectations of learners; school management and leadership; accountability; 
and the availability of text books, particularly in the absence of libraries.28 
The NPC Diagnostic Overview (2011:14) highlighted the importance of the home environment 
affecting school performance. The report noted that:
associated factors include the presence of both parents in the household, whether 
parents can read and write, the prevalence of books in the house, adequate nutrition 
and micronutrient intake, and generally stimulating environments for children.
These factors that affect early childhood development (ECD) are influenced by socio-economic 
status. 
The Diagnostic Overview quotes a shocking revelation emerging from a study by the Human 
Sciences Research Council which found that almost 20 per cent of teachers are absent on 
Mondays and Fridays. Absentee rates increase to one-third at month end. Teachers in African 
schools teach an average of 3.5 hours a day compared with about 6.5 hours a day in former 
white schools. The result is that children from disadvantaged home environments are further 
disadvantaged by the absence of teachers committed to their education. Even those most 
hardworking, dedicated children committed to their own empowerment stand little chance 
given this level of dysfunction and lack of commitment.
Of the around one million young people who exit the schooling system annually, 65 per cent 
exit without achieving a Grade 12 certificate (JET 2011; NPC 2011a:16). This has a knock-
on effect with tertiary institutions struggling to address the increasing number of learners 
requiring academic support.
In an attempt to level the playing fields that these gaps in household background produce, the 
government introduced Grade R for five-year-olds and expanded early childhood education. 
Currently about 80 per cent of learners aged five are enrolled in Grade R. The NPC Diagnostic 
Overview notes that about half of children below this age receive some form of pre-school 
education. Civil society groupings estimate that 25 per cent of children below this age receive 
access to early childhood development.29 Government acknowledges that early childhood 
development is underfunded and is largely provided by CSOs. 
These failures in education are disastrous with regard to poverty alleviation. Education levels 
directly impact on income potential and hence education failure is a direct determinant of 
poverty.
Health
From poverty-related to affluence-related diseases, South Africa’s health system is under 
pressure. The United Nations Human Development Index identifies a quadruple disease 
burden consisting of HIV, accidents, infectious diseases and diseases of lifestyle, which 
‘interact in vicious negative feedback loops with malnutrition and HIV’ (NPC 2011a:20). 
28 www.ekon.sun.ac.za; http://mg.co.za/article/2011-04-08-sa-education-the-poorest-choice
29 Interview with David Harrison, DG Murray Trust, 7 December 2011  
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To get a sense of the scale of the problem, the NPC Diagnostic Overview (2011:21) provides 
some global comparisons: 
South Africa has 0.6 per cent of the world’s population, but 17 per cent of the world’s 
HIV infections and 11 per cent of the world’s tuberculosis cases.
•   Trauma cases resulting from violence and road accidents are nearly twice the global 
average.
•   Infant and maternal mortality rates (43 per 1 000 live births and 625 per 100 000 
live births respectively) are extremely high and higher than other middle-income 
countries.
•   Non-communicable diseases, such as diabetes and heart disease, are rising sharply 
(non-communicable diseases in 2004 relative to baseline value in 1997 showed a five-
fold increase).
•   South Africa has the highest rate of foetal alcohol syndrome in the world.
Three MDGs are related to health outcomes. These are reducing child mortality, improving 
maternal health and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. At a Coalition strategic 
workshop in 2010, it was pointed out that South Africa is one of only 12 countries where 
maternal mortality has risen since 1990.30 The increase in the number of deaths is linked 
to the lack of access to safe abortions31 and an increase in non-pregnancy-related infections 
associated with AIDS. From 2005–2007, there was a 20.1 per cent increase in the number 
of deaths reported compared with the previous triennium 2002–2004.32 The Department of 
Health expects this figure to decrease in its next report due to the roll-out of anti-retroviral 
therapy during pregnancy. 
Similar patterns are evident for infant mortality. South Africa is one of the few countries in 
the world that experienced an increase in infant mortality from 1992–2003. During this time 
the HIV-prevalence rate in pregnant women increased from 7.6% to 22.8%. Given the limited 
treatment available to HIV-positive women during pregnancy during the 1990s, most of the 
actual rise in infant mortality has been attributed to AIDS.33 According to World Bank data 
this figure dropped from 82 per 1 000 births in 2003 to 56.6 by 2010.34 
The impact of HIV and AIDS and the harmful government response saw the number of deaths 
in South Africa doubling in the ten years up to 2008. Serious efforts to address the scale and 
impact of HIV and AIDS is relatively new after years of AIDS denialism under the Mbeki 
presidency that lead to the loss of countless lives. 
While the subsequent dramatic roll-out of treatment is noteworthy, the years of neglect 
that preceded a medically sound approach to HIV have left a large number of orphans, 
single-parent families and households. These are significantly poorer as a result of the 
loss of a breadwinner, or funds depleted as families searched for medical care. CSOs have 
30 Coalition for Civil Society Resource Mobilisation workshop, 5 June 2010 
31  Maternal mortality report of deaths from 2005–2007 indicated a 44% increase in deaths due to lack 
of access to safe abortions http://www.doh.gov.za/list.php?type=Maternal and child health; see also 
http://mg.co.za/article/2012-03-09-conspiracy-of-silence-over-abortion
32 http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/reports/2011/saving_b.pdf
33 http://childrencount.ci.org.za/indicator.php?id=5&indicator=23
34  http://www.google.co.za/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=sh_dyn_mort&idim=country:Z
AF&dl=en&hl=en&q=child+mortality+in+south+africa
made significant contributions in mitigating the impact of HIV and AIDS in South African 
communities. 
Issues related to mental health are rarely mentioned in poverty-reduction strategies. 
Organisations working with people living in poverty have found high rates of depression and 
hopelessness. Depression is a debilitating condition, reducing the impact of other measures 
designed to lift people out of poverty. Depression and hopelessness can lead to, or exacerbate, 
alcohol abuse, substance abuse and family violence, and can lead to a cycle of adverse life 
circumstances and poor health.35 
The NPC Diagnostic Overview (2011:20) chillingly acknowledges that, ‘the health system is 
collapsing’.
Capability poverty
Capability poverty refers to the political and social dimensions of poverty. Participants in the 
research process identified the need to equip communities with the means to manage their 
own development. They saw this as a key component of the developmental state. Addressing 
capability poverty requires creating and supporting conditions in which communities act on 
their own behalf. In the words of Mamphela Ramphele:
Human beings need to have control over any developmental process if it is to have the 
desired impact.36 
Government’s approach to community development should thus promote the concept of 
human ‘capabilities’, where society’s standard of living must be assessed by its ability to 
harness the capabilities of its people to allow them to lead the lives that they themselves 
value.37
Swilling and Van Breda (2006:32) include strengthening community management of their 
own initiatives and external programmes and the ability to self-organise in this category. 
With regard to the role of civil society, they note that ‘the most important plank of antipoverty 
interventions for CSOs is to facilitate the autonomy and empowerment of poor households and 
organisations of the poor’. Overcoming capability poverty requires democratic participation 
by the poor in public decision-making. This approach ensures effective monitoring and 
influence over public-resource allocations and service delivery. 
Addressing the gendered dimensions of poverty is integral in all interventions designed to 
eradicate poverty. Gender oppression limits women’s ability to act on their own behalf and 
realise their full potential. With regard to achievements towards MDG 3, promoting gender 
equality and empowering women, South Africa has made strides in women’s participation 
in national decision-making processes. The representation of women in the South African 
Parliament increased from 27.8% in 1994 to 42.3% in 2011. Similarly, the representation of 
35 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/01/07/health-us-depression-poverty-idUKTRE5064ZV20090107
36  http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01584/05lv01585.htm
37  This approach, which is based on the work of Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, underpins the authoritative 
UNDP Human Development Report on South Africa, where the theme chosen was ‘Unlocking 
People’s Creativity’, South Africa, Human Development Report, 2003, The Challenge of Sustainable 
Development: Unlocking People’s Creativity.
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women in provincial legislatures has increased from 25.4% to 42.4% respectively.38 Despite 
these gains, government acknowledges that it faces:
major implementation challenges in ensuring that constitutional, legislative and 
policy imperatives on gender equality and women’s empowerment are translated into 
substantive improvements in the lives of women and girls, for especially those that live 
in disadvantaged environments.39
Particular concern relates to violence against women. 
An additional factor affecting the socio-economic environment is high crime rates, including 
a high incidence of violent crime. Patrick Bond (2007) writes of the impact of high crime 
rates on working-class households. Lower earners and the unemployed are obviously unable 
to afford expensive private security and are therefore more vulnerable to robberies, house-
breaking, car theft and petty crime.40 
Empowerment, capacity development and building the active citizenry of vulnerable groups 
and marginalised communities are areas where civil society plays a key role and needs to 
strengthen its interventions. Poverty is not reduced by simply spending money on providing 
services, but requires building intellectual, psychological, cultural, organisational and 
technical capacity. Addressing poverty is thus linked to the ability of people and communities 
to access and utilise resources. 
Internationally, government shifts from a welfare-based approach to a developmental approach 
were largely the result of ‘mainstream thinking catching up with developmental CSOs 
who had been arguing for the importance of empowerment for decades’ (Swilling and Van 
Breda 2006:27). CSOs have thus played a pioneering role in influencing government policy 
and programmes towards a more developmental approach. Participants in the Coalition’s 
research process saw effective civil society advocacy as about finding alternative practices 
and strengthening participatory democracy, so that community structures and processes can 
improve the quality of life for those living in poverty.
Addressing capability poverty links with MDG 8, developing global partnerships for 
development. Of particular reference to this review is the commitment (or lack thereof) of 
key stakeholders to the principles of collaboration and partnership. This is essential to build 
active citizenship and pursue sustainable development and poverty eradication. The lack of 
reference to civil society in the 2010 MDG summit was raised by international human rights 
authority Mary Robinson when she said:
Civil society is absolutely crucial. But civil society is under threat in a lot of countries... 
they’re the reality check. They’re the accountability people, and their voice is absolutely 
essential if we’re going to ensure that we can deliver on the Millennium Development 
Goals.41 
38 http://www.statssa.gov.za/news_archive/Docs/MDGR_2010.pdf
39 http://www.statssa.gov.za/news_archive/Docs/MDGR_2010.pdf  
40 http://www.mediationsjournal.org/articles/developmental-state-distraction
41 http://www.realizingrights.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id==490&Itemid=134
Gambling and poverty
Within the context of this report it is useful to consider the issue of gambling and its potentially 
damaging effects within poor communities: the prospect of making millions by winning the 
lottery is a dangerous temptation. Fantasies of winning the lottery provide a dream space 
to escape the social exclusion that comes with chronic poverty. A Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) review of the gambling industry found that the lottery is the most widely 
played game in poor communities and overall makes up the highest percentage of gamblers 
nationwide.42 
The DTI research showed that problem gambling is more prevalent in poorer communities. 
The behaviour is associated with high rates of unemployment and associated poverty, 
low levels of education and multiple associated community–social problems including 
disproportionately high rates of alcohol and substance dependencies. Black South Africans 
are more likely to be problem gamblers (4%), while whites are the least likely (1%). The 
majority of poor South Africans are exposed to the lottery and, ‘it is here where the greatest 
potential to cause harm clearly lies’.43 Of particular concern were reports that some youth in 
impoverished areas claim that they gamble in order to buy basic necessities and to pay school 
fees.44 
State services directed at the treatment of addiction do not extend to gambling addiction, as it 
is not officially and legally recognised as a form of addiction. Thus, those that cannot afford 
private treatment for gambling addiction (most people with gambling addictions come from 
poorer communities) are reliant on the National Responsible Gambling Programme (NRGP). 
Treatment of compulsive gamblers is especially difficult and has low success rates. Compulsive 
gamblers invariably have multiple addictions (i.e. gambling, alcohol and substance abuse), 
which contribute to their poor prognosis.45
Gidani, the National Lotteries operator, runs its own Responsible Play Programme, but did 
not provide information to the gambling review team. The gambling review noted:
this does not compare well with the responsible gambling programme developed by  
the rest of the gambling industry, which is widely published and easily accessible. 
Neither does it suggest that harm minimisation is taken seriously by either the operator 
or the NLB.46 
Various CSOs offer treatment and support to poor people suffering from gambling addiction 
and thus deal with the family and community fallout as a result of problem gambling. With 
only a small percentage of the funds raised through lotteries reaching social services, some 
argue that national lotteries are detrimental to the common good.47
42 http://www.dti.gov.za/news2011/Gambling_review.pdf
43 Ibid., pg 58 
44 Ibid., pg 89
45  Ibid., pg 12; see also Rule, S and Sibanyoni, C 2000, The Social Impact of Gambling in South Africa, 
Human Sciences Research Council 
46 http://www.dti.gov.za/news2011/Gambling_review.pdf pg 103 
47 http://www.ayjw.org/articles.php?id=711895 
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CHAPTER FIVE
Civil society and the  
developmental state
At the start of non-racial democracy in South Africa, government policy was guided by the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP was shaped through 
an inclusive participatory process and supported by a wide coalition of social forces. It sought 
to create a ‘developmental state – a viable, globally-competitive economy coupled with social 
welfare’ (Ranchod 2007:4). 
In 1996 the RDP was replaced by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) plan 
which was seen by many on the left as indicative of government’s shift towards a neo-liberal 
economic direction. GEAR was drafted without consultation with civil society and prioritised 
the role of the private sector and black economic empowerment to grow the economy and 
facilitate redistribution. 
In 2006 the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) was launched as 
the engine for growth and development. ASGISA was described by government as a limited 
and specific set of initiatives to spur rapid ‘shared’ growth in South Africa.48 The Joint 
Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) was established a month later to address the 
scarce and critical skills needed to meet ASGISA’s objectives. 
When Jacob Zuma took over from Thabo Mbeki as president in 2009, ASGISA appeared to 
‘have died a quiet death’49 with the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF, 2009–2014) 
identifying the development challenges facing South Africa. 
The language shifted back to that of a developmental state as affirmed in President Zuma’s 
2011 State of the Nation Address: 
Since we are building a developmental and not a welfare state, the social grants will 
be linked to economic activity and community development, to enable short-term 
beneficiaries to become self-supporting in the long run.
President Zuma introduced a new growth path with a focus on job creation. The 2011 State of 
the Nation Address emphasised the role of business and state-owned enterprises, with little 
mention of CSOs. 
Since 1994, the democratic South African state has thus been described as neo-liberal, 
welfarist and developmental. The state has introduced a number of interventions that do not 
neatly fit into any clearly defined model. 
48 http://www.sangoconorthwest.org.za/ASGISA.htm  
49  http://www.tshikululu.org.za/asgisa%E2%80%99s-quiet-death-where-to-next-for-south-
africa%E2%80%99s-economic-policy/
What is a developmental state?
To overcome the enduring challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment, a 
developmental state has been viewed as the most effective vehicle to ensure that the state 
actively and purposefully intervenes in the economy (Turok 2010). A developmental state 
can intervene to enhance global competitiveness, increase investment and achieve economic 
growth. 
Participants in the Coalition’s provincial workshops and strategy meetings saw the 
developmental state playing an active role in guiding economic development, using the 
resources of the country to meet the needs of the people. A developmental state balances 
economic growth and social development. It uses state resources and influence to address 
poverty and expand economic opportunities. Makgetla defined the developmental state as: 
A developmental state is one that has the ability to manage capital to bring about 
broad-based development.50
Developmentalism entails the promotion of human-centered development and not just 
economic growth. It includes economic freedom, social freedom, political freedom and 
environmental sustainability. Central to a South African developmental state is the ability to 
promote economic and social inclusion and dramatically reduce inequality. These objectives 
need to be underpinned by the principles of democratic governance and environmental 
sustainability. 
The concept of the developmental state is associated with emerging industrial countries in 
Asia. Marais (2011:340) described the developmental state as follows: 
Stripped to its basics, the developmental state refers to a model of economic growth 
and social redistribution in which the state acts, with varying degrees of autonomy, as 
a major variable promoting that growth, determining its patterns and ensuring social 
development.
A developmental state thus refers to state-led macro-economic planning. A key attribute 
of developmental states in Asia was a strong and skilled state bureaucracy staffed by the 
brightest and most-qualified civil servants. Developmental states thus need an organised, 
powerful, competent and independent bureaucracy that operates without undue political 
interference. Developmental states require strong planning capacity and analytical strength. 
Three overarching approaches represent different understandings to addressing poverty and 
the role of the state: 
•   Poverty alleviation
•   Poverty reduction
•   Poverty eradication
50 Presentation at Coalition on Civil Society Resource Mobilisation strategy workshop, 5 June 2010 
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Poverty alleviation 
Poverty alleviation refers to interventions to address the plight of the most vulnerable and 
destitute including orphans, widows, people with disabilities, the elderly, etc. Projects address 
food security, access to clean water, safety from abuse and shelter. These interventions mitigate 
the worst effects of poverty and tend to be carried out with a ‘welfarist’ mentality (although 
not necessarily). Such measures are seen as necessary to prevent starvation, ill-health and 
exposure to the elements. Funders, such as the NLB, which support charity projects usually 
engage in poverty alleviation. 
Poverty reduction 
Poverty reduction refers to actions that reduce the depth of poverty that individuals and 
households experience. Interventions could include programmes to enhance income and 
physical asset accumulation, the provision of education, job creation and entrepreneurship 
opportunities. The results of these actions can lead to a reduction in the absolute number 
of people that are poor, but do not necessarily alter the structural conditions that reproduce 
poverty and inequality. The developmental approach to poverty is linked with poverty 
reduction. The NDA supports initiatives that contribute to both poverty alleviation and 
poverty reduction through, for example, its programmes on early-childhood development 
and supporting cooperatives. 
Poverty eradication 
Poverty eradication refers to restructuring society to increase the political power of the poor 
to shape the agenda and address the structural causes of poverty. Overcoming the structural 
forces that create and perpetuate extreme inequality is one of the most efficient routes for 
overcoming extreme poverty, enhancing the welfare of society and accelerating progress 
towards sustainable development.51 This is best done through building the developmental 
capacity of communities. The NLB does not appear to fund interventions working towards 
the political empowerment of poor citizens and addressing unequal power relations. The 
NDA rhetoric is aligned with this approach but not matched by the resources to make a 
meaningful impact.
The South African government combines poverty alleviation and poverty reduction strategies 
through social grants to address destitution, programmes to create jobs and efforts to grow 
the economy with the intention that the benefits of growth will be redistributed to the poor. 
To achieve these goals, a developmental state should ideally garner support from all sectors 
within society, including the corporate sector and civil society groupings. Turok (2010) 
elaborates that the success of a developmental state requires strong public support and active 
involvement of social partners and stakeholders. He emphasises the need for developmental 
states to prioritise national interests over narrow sectional interests. 
Gumede52 remains sceptical and states that developmental states are still a pipedream for 
Africa. Africa continues to be at the backyard of economic development. Poverty and other 
socio-economic ills continue to reach unprecedented levels. There is a high level of illiteracy 
and child mortality, as well as low average life expectancy worldwide and poor infrastructural 
development.
51 Summary Human Development Report, UNDP 2005, pg 24 
52 Gumede V, Developmental States are still a pipedream for Africa, The Thinker (Volume 19/2010)
Even though there are numerous challenges that relate to Africa, there is some renewed 
interest in the idea of a developmental state in Africa. Key milestones for Africa have been: 
hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup; upper hand in conflict resolutions, in countries such as 
Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Burundi, peace processes are being put in place; and the 
humanitarian crisis in Somalia and Sudan is being attended to. There is political stability in 
many countries in the region with successful democratic elections held regularly.
While the challenges remain in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, Gumede nevertheless suggests that 
Africa should continue pursuing its own economic and social development paradigms. Ha-
Joon Chang, a leading economist has warned that most of the strategies used by Europe and 
North America, for example to reach their current levels of development, are inappropriate 
for Africa.53 
The concept of the developmental state is clearly contested terrain in South Africa. Bond 
(2007) describes the developmental state as:
an oft-abused phrase to mean (in the South African context) a combination of macro-
economic neo-liberalism and unsustainable megaproject development, dressed up 
with rather tokenistic social welfare policy and rhetorical support for a more coherent 
industrial policy.54 
Von Holdt (2010:3) questions whether the developmental state is a coherent concept at all. 
Participants in the provincial workshops suggested various understandings including a 
government promoting the welfare of its people in partnership with stakeholders to fulfil 
its socio-economic mandate. Where participants in this process concurred with academic 
authors was on the need for a state with strategic, organisational and technical capacity – a 
quality and high performing bureaucracy. 
How effective has SA been in creating a developmental state? 
Makgetla noted that interest in the notion of a developmental state re-emerged when 
transformation efforts were failing. The reasons for the failure were attributed to inadequate 
state capacity, fragmentation, lack of political will in confronting capital / entrenched élites 
and fiscal restraint.55 
A key strategy by the South African government to address poverty has been through the 
provision of social grants. Social grants directly reach the poor and stimulate the economy as 
the money is spent in South Africa on goods and services produced mostly in the country.56 
Counter arguments suggest that social grants do not contribute to poverty eradication and 
divert funds from productive investments in industry and infrastructure. Social grants have 
not lifted people out of poverty as multiple dependants attempt to survive on grants intended 
for individuals. Social grants provide much-needed temporary relief to those most in need, 
but do not lead to poverty eradication if not coupled with other effective strategies. Social 
grants, while alleviating poverty, cannot lead to equitable distribution of income and wealth. 
53  Ha-Joon Chang (2010), How to ‘do’ a Developmental State: Political, Organizational, Human 
Requirement for the Developmental State
54 http://www.mediationsjournal.org/articles/developmental-state-distraction 
55 Presentation at Coalition on Civil Society Resource Mobilisation, June 2010 
56 http://www.ngopulse.org/article/growth-and-emergence-south-african-nanny-state; Andile Ncontsa
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Some critics suggest that there is little distinction between the South African concept of a 
developmental state and that of a welfare state.57 
The effectiveness of South Africa as a developmental state is best assessed by analysis of the 
quality of state bureaucracy. If the central tenet of a developmental state is the capacity and 
quality of the bureaucracy, then here lies a key weakness in South Africa’s ability to act as a 
developmental state. Participants in the provincial workshops spoke of the lack of capacity 
in government, with government employees lacking skills and being bogged down by ‘red 
tape’. Government was viewed as slow and lacking ‘drive’ and ‘will’. The competence of 
government to implement its developmental objectives was questioned. 
While not all state institutions are dysfunctional, a number of authors and participants in 
the Coalition’s process believe that many are. Despite massive allocations of funding towards 
government departments and development institutions, the levels of dysfunction result in 
poor outcomes irrespective of the budget allocated. Von Holdt (2010:4) argues that the South 
African state lacks ‘well-organised and effective routines, as well as analytical, discretionary 
and innovative capacity’. The National Planning Commission adds that high levels of political 
interference in the day-to-day operations of the public service undermine its stability (NPC 
2011b:24). If these features define many state institutions, with the NLB and the NDA closely 
located to government, are they similarly affected? 
Efforts to address the disconnection between social spending and actual outcomes have 
focused on policy recommendations, management structures and strategies to address 
perceived blockages in the system. Von Holdt (2010:7) argues for an analytical shift:
that attention be paid to organisational culture and processes of meaning-formation, the 
informal codes which shape officials’ priorities, choices and interactions with others.
Von Holdt’s (2010:8) illuminating study on the health sector posits that black class formation 
through affirmative action together with skills gaps create opportunities for rapid upward 
mobility within the bureaucracy. This leads to high staff turnover and the loss of institutional 
capacity and expertise. Von Holdt argues that class mobility has become a key motivation 
for many in the bureaucracy, a motivation that competes with that of public service and has 
resulted in incompetence. Combined with ambivalence to skill, an organisational culture of 
extreme deference towards authority and towards the administrative and political leadership 
has emerged. This culture ‘inhibits open and frank dialogue between leadership, management 
and subordinates and contributes to the failure to understand and solve delivery breakdowns’. 
While deference to authority is prevalent in all bureaucracies to varying degrees, it undermines 
the institutional effectiveness when it draws attention away from the purpose of the institution. 
Participants in the Coalition’s provincial workshops lamented the fact that personal enrichment 
rather than service delivery has become the goal of many government officials. This impacts 
on the quality of service delivery, as delivery becomes the institution’s secondary purpose 
with élite formation as the primary purpose. This fuels hostility towards those requiring 
services and exacerbates a vicious cycle of deteriorating relationships. Von Holdt (2010:19) 
recognises the many civil servants who do still care about the people they serve and calls 
them the ‘unsung miracles of the post-apartheid state’. He argues for a set of reforms in South 
Africa that define meeting the needs of the people as the most profound way of uprooting the 
legacies of white domination. 
57 Ibid.
The NPC’s National Development Plan: Vision 2030 (2011b) asserts that state performance is 
uneven and suggests that the reasons for this are: firstly, the lack of capacity of the state and 
lack of coordination between government, the private sector and civil society; and secondly, 
external shocks and changing international conditions. The plan seeks to ‘shift the paradigm 
from entitlement to capabilities, opportunity and participation’. How it plans to address 
the contradictory rationales competing within the public service and the powerful interests 
served by them remains to be seen. In the current context, Von Holdt (2010) finds little 
grounds for optimism that South Africa will indeed reach the achievements of the successful 
developmental states. 
The issues raised by Von Holdt and mentioned by the NPC may be applied to an analysis 
of the NLB and the NDA. Both institutions are closely aligned to government. Numerous 
media reports show evidence of fraud, corruption, mismanagement and unethical decisions. 
Participants in the Coalition’s workshops and the case studies undertaken for this study attest 
to the fact that these two institutions are mirroring the ineffective cultures outlined above. 
If service delivery is indeed only their secondary purpose, then policy recommendations, 
management restructuring and strategies to address perceived blockages in the system will 
have little impact. The first point of intervention should be reorienting these organisations to 
meeting the public good as a primary objective. 
More research into the internal workings and organisational dynamics of the NLB and the NDA 
is required. Over the past year, the NLB itself has started to consider the myriad complaints of 
civil society as voiced in the media and through the courts. 
The erosion of accountability and growth of corruption 
The high levels of social protest related to service delivery failures reflect the extent to which 
poor and marginalised South Africans feel that their needs and concerns are not being met. It 
also reveals that other mechanisms to hold government accountable and express discontent 
are not working. 
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58  http://www.sabc.co.za/wps/portal/news/pages/details?id=9c68c30046d9be4d85698d0e4d35f062&page
=Analysis.Group1
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The NPC Diagnostic Overview (2011a) acknowledges that improving the effectiveness and 
performance of public service requires ‘mechanisms for ensuring accountability of public 
servants to the citizens they serve’. It notes that accountability mechanisms are frequently 
not implemented as managers seek to avoid taking responsibility. Participants in Coalition 
processes questioned whether government is addressing basic questions such as ‘What does 
it means to be a good civil servant?’ 
Public sector capability
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Participants in the provincial workshops and strategy meetings raised the issue of corruption 
and the effect this has on eroding resources intended for the poor. The Diagnostic Overview 
(2011a) declares, ‘One of the most striking breakdowns in accountability is corruption’. 
According to the Special Investigating Unit, it is estimated that 20–25 per cent of state 
procurement expenditure, amounting to roughly R30 billion a year, is wasted through 
overpayment or corruption.59
Once again the interconnectedness of middle-class and grassroots concerns is revealed in 
the issue of corruption. As poor South Africans are robbed of much-needed funds to address 
poverty, those paying the taxes are slowly waking up to the need for advocacy. Self-interest 
has illuminated their understanding of the squandering of public funds provided by the 
public fiscus. As noted in the NPC Diagnostic Overview:
The entire country is harmed by corruption, but the costs are not borne equally and fall 
most heavily on the poor through the impact on the quality and accessibility of public 
services.
This raises questions around values, principles and priorities. While the NPC report is frank 
in acknowledging the extent and impact of corruption, the report’s calls for active citizenry are 
vague and make little mention of the role of civil society in holding government accountable. 
59 See also http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/taxpayers-fleeced-of-r30bn-1.1156259
If government is to be its own watchdog or use state-controlled corporatist arrangements to 
hold itself accountable, allegations of the fox watching the chicken coop will remain.
South Africa has legislation to counter corruption, but without rigorous and consistent 
application a culture of impunity has arisen.60 The state procurement system has become 
overly bureaucratised, with an emphasis on compliance by box ticking, making the system 
costly, burdensome, ineffective and open to fraud. A recent court case against the NLB 
suggests similarly problematic systems are used within the NLB.61 
Outspoken Public Protector Thuli Madonsela spoke of the ‘cancer of corruption’ and referred 
to it as a ‘crime against the poor’. She lamented that:
We may have reached the tipping point, after which trying to end corruption will be like 
trying to bring water up from the bottom of a waterfall.62
Whether South Africa has reached this tipping point is a matter of debate. There is evidence, 
given the mounting number of cases of fraud, corruption, conflict of interest and unethical 
decisions prevalent in government and government-aligned institutions, to demonstrate 
widespread corruption. If the implicit rationale for participation in government and 
government-related organisations is indeed private gain, then behaviours including fraud, 
corruption, nepotism, etc., are consistent with this objective. South Africa’s revolution, 
according to Njabulo Ndebele:
may itself have become corrupted by the attractions of instant wealth, reflecting 
a potentially catastrophic collapse in the once cohesive understanding of the post-
apartheid project as embodied in our constitution.63 
In its National Development Plan: Vision 2030 (NPC 2011b:25), the NPC argues that corruption 
is a moral and political problem, the social dimensions of which can only be tackled by 
focusing on values. It states that:
Attitudes that justify breaking the law to help family members because they are poor, or 
because they suffered under apartheid, or just because they are family, must be tackled 
head on.
Ethical leadership approach to public service delivery 
The ruling party is obviously deeply fractured, as demonstrated in daily accounts of internal 
power struggles told on the front pages of newspapers. Battles for access to the sources of 
patronage preoccupy much of the government.64 The needs of the poor are drowned out in 
this jostle for power and privilege; the very condition of poverty viewed with scorn and 
disdain. Steven Friedman commented:
60 http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/taxpayers-fleeced-of-r30bn-1.1156259
61  National Lotteries Board v South African Education and Environment Project (788/2010) [2011] ZASCA 
154, 28 September 2011, (Appeal judgement)
62  http://www.polity.org.za/article/corruption-eating-resources-at-lightning-speed---protector-2011-08-26
63  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/15/world/africa/15iht-letter15.html?_r=2&scp=2&sq=south+Africa&
st=cse
64  http://writingrights.org/2011/11/30/op-ed-contributors-south-africas-restrictive-secrecy-bill2/?utm_
source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=facebook
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Until we stop blaming the poor for their poverty, and address how we can do better 
at helping our society’s victims to cope with their condition, we will lack the moral 
foundation we need to become a society for all our people.65
The crisis of moral leadership and endemic corruption is not isolated to South Africa. 
Globally, civil society is erupting in protests against inequality, financial greed and public 
sector acquiesance. This is evidenced in the global wave of ‘occupy’ protests during the past 
year. The lack of concern for the impact that decisions in public service organisations have 
on people’s lives is evident, for example in the collapse of the Global Fund which supports 
life-saving HIV treatment and support programmes. On the decision by the United States to 
renege on its pledge to the Global Fund, Stephen Lewis, the co-founder of AIDS Free World 
said:
It’s terribly important to recognise the moral implications. It’s not just the fact that 
people will die; it’s the fact that those who have made the decision know that people 
will die.66 
Since the advent of democracy, some politicians and leaders have promoted a return to African 
values, basing leadership practices on the South African philosophical and cultural notion 
of ‘Ubuntu’, which brings to the fore notions of supportiveness, cooperation, solidarity and 
communalism. Ubuntu places great importance on working for the common good. Ubuntu 
implies a social contract that stems from, but transcends, the narrow confines of the nuclear 
family, to the extended kinship network – in other words the community. 
The NPC is working towards reorientation of South Africa’s values compass. However, the 
means by which they plan to achieve these changes is not yet clear.67 They state that:
What we want by 2030 is to have created a country in which 
we value one another, in which we value life and we value our 
communities. We value doing the right thing.
Civil society contributions to development 
The civil society sector is a significant partner in South Africa’s development equation. 
However, this is not widely acknowledged, and there is a growing realisation that government 
cannot achieve its avowed developmental policies without full participation by both the 
business and civil society sectors. A report commissioned by the NDA found that:
in South Africa, many CSOs are filling the gaps by providing socio-economic and basic 
services that the state is unable to provide and in some cases have taken over the 
functions of the state.
(Case et al, 2008) 
65  http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=159943
66 http://hosted.verticalresponse.com/594745/ee0f811cb8/1468555807/955b05c498/
67 http://www.npconline.co.za/pebble.asp?relid=695
CSOs are often more able to meet the needs of poor communities as they can be more flexible 
and are able to identify creative and innovative development alternatives. CSOs provide not 
only qualitative benefits for the state, through their roles and relationships in service delivery 
for development, but also financial benefits. 
The benefits to the state of partnering with NPOs were outlined in an Umhlaba Development 
Services Report (2005:52–54) as follows: 
•   Recognition of the comparative advantage of NPOs in delivering at local level, 
particularly the role NPOs play in providing opportunities for poor communities to 
participate.
•   NPOs do not represent a recurrent cost for the state and frequently manage to raise 
additional funds that would not necessarily be available to the state.
•   NPOs often charge lower rates, draw on a pool of existing resources within the 
organisation, build on existing relationships and networks and thereby add value to a 
project.
•   A perception of the limitations of the state as a vehicle for social change due to its 
inability or unwillingness to be accountable to society.
•   The value of the input received from NPOs usually exceeded the costs to the state.
•   The NPO sector has a capacity to generate employment.
Are CSOs viewed as partners by the state? 
While the benefits of state–CSO partnerships are well demonstrated, there seems to be a 
perception among some within government that CSOs are only an irritant. One of the provincial 
workshop participants said government treats CSOs as ‘spaar wiele’ (spare wheels). Certainly 
the lack of government action on the ongoing problems within the NDA and NLB seems to 
indicate disinterest and even neglect of the sector. This attitude seems in direct contrast to 
that which prevailed towards civil society when the new government took office in 1994. 
At that time CSOs were integrally involved in processes to draft the new constitution and 
rewrite policies. The NPO Act explicitly states: 
‘Within the limits prescribed by law, every organ of state must determine and coordinate 
the implementation of its policies and measures in a manner designed to promote, 
support and enhance the capacity of non-profit organisations to perform their functions.
The initial policy objective of developing a functional relationship between government and 
CSOs, and promoting the objectives of the RDP, was captured in the preamble to the NDA Act 
which states that the NDA is aimed at ‘promoting an appropriate and sustainable partnership 
between the government and CSOs to eradicate poverty and its causes’.
Other legislation also contained provisions recognising CSOs as stakeholders in development. 
NEDLAC was established, consisting of representatives from business, labour, community- 
and development-interests and the state. The Council’s goal is to promote economic growth, 
participate in economic decision-making and conclude agreements on issues relating to social 
and economic policy. 
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An Advisory Committee was established by Cabinet in 1996 to look at the Structural 
Relationships between government and CSOs – with CSOs viewed as having the capacity to 
contribute to the RDP. The RDP mentioned the NDA’s role to ‘channel government funds to 
organisations for programmes aimed at meeting the development needs of the poor and to 
strengthen their institutional capacity.’ During this time CSOs and the NDA were viewed as 
playing a central role in the implementation of government’s policy. 
The policy and legislative objective of promoting a sustainable partnership was, however, 
not pursued in practice once the RDP was replaced. The Non-Profit Study (2002) stated that:
the image conveyed by the notion of ‘public–private partnerships’, which defines the 
state and the private sector as the only relevant actors in policy making and delivery, 
should be questioned. Although it is already present in a number of policy documents, 
more needs to be done to emphasise and strengthen the notion of the three-way 
relationship between the state, the private sector and the non-profit sector.
This shift was concretised with the publication of the draft standardised provisions of 
the Public–Private Partnerships policy by the National Treasury in 2003, which excluded 
NPOs from Public–Private Partnership agreements. Reflecting state focus on private sector 
partnerships, institutions such as the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa 
Ltd (IDC) were prioritised. The billions of rands invested in the IDC dwarf the paltry amounts 
made available to the NDA. 
In line with prioritising the role of the private sector, the state discourse changed to 
corporatist language. The DSD’s policy on Financial Awards to Service Providers revealed 
the department’s intention to enter into service contracts to ensure that ‘expected service 
outcomes are achieved, that there is customer satisfaction and value for money’.
An assessment of the NPO Act found that civil society is perceived by the ANC-led government 
as an extension of its delivery capacity. The sector’s role as an independent mechanism to 
challenge, contradict and influence policy has been largely overlooked. Ranchod starkly notes 
that CSOs are becoming ‘delivery intermediaries between the framers of social policy and those 
for whom it is intended’ (Ranchod 2007:5). There are growing voices in civil society raising 
concern that government sees CSOs as service delivery and technical support contractors 
rather than development partners. Ways in which civil society can engage meaningfully and 
constructively with government are currently limited. 
Government rhetoric continues to call for partnerships across sectors. The National Planning 
Commission at the launch of the Diagnostic Overview said, ‘An active citizenry, working in 
partnership with government, business and civil society is critical to this new development 
paradigm’. At the launch Minister Trevor Manuel said:
While the state can build schools, we need communities to ensure that the schools work 
properly and that children study hard. Our paradigm is one where communities are 
active in their own development.68 
Once again, the plan does not define how communities are to engage – is it through local 
citizen action or government-dominated structures? 
If the state and government are indeed populated by those with more interest in personal 
68 http://www.npconline.co.za/pebble.asp?relid=695
enrichment than civil service, then civil society’s focus on poverty eradication strategies that 
prioritise empowerment of the poor and marginalised communities may be seen as a potential 
threat. Democratic participation requires the skill and openness to have difficult conversations, 
come up with compromises or, through robust, honest and reflective engagement, to develop 
new and better alternatives to those previously suggested. Mangcu (2008) adds that a critical 
relationship between civil society and the state serves to extend the developmental agenda. 
The plural nature of society inevitably leads to criticism and disagreement, key ingredients 
to the healthy engagement required for a vibrant democracy. 
The organisational culture emerging in government and described in Von Holdt’s study (2010) 
does not show openness to these types of prickly, messy engagements that are more likely 
to generate innovative win-win solutions. An institutional culture that displays ambiguity 
towards skills, promotes deference to authority at the expense of organisational effectiveness, 
and one that avoids conflict in an effort to save ‘face’ for superiors, is one that is unable to 
hear independent and critical voices without feeling threatened. This is a significant obstacle 
to meaningful state–civil society partnerships. 
The Umhlaba Development Services’ (2005:34) research on the NPO Act found the following 
obstacles to partnerships between government and NPOs: 
•   A lack of clarity or consensus on the vision of the partnership: government partners 
prioritised rapid service delivery while civil society partners focused on capacity 
building and participation. 
•   Institutional capacity constraints: this was evident from both government and civil 
society partners and included lack of skilled staff and lack of financial, management 
and human resources systems.
•   Raising funds from government is time consuming, which deflects time and staff from 
development work and service delivery.
•   Legal obstacles to partnerships between government and civil society included the 
complex tender system, strict government financial regulations, cumbersome budget-
approval procedures and a lack of tax incentives for donors.
Participants in the Coalition’s provincial workshops spoke of challenges in working with 
government. Some described the difficulty of achieving practical outcomes during meetings 
with government. Some CSOs found it difficult to access relevant government officials. 
Training offered by government was described as ‘poor, disjointed and uninformed’. CSOs 
requested to be active participants in the NPC without success. 
The NPC concedes that relationships across sectors and between citizens and the government 
need to be repaired:
This plan that we present to the President and the country today is principally about 
relationships: relationships that people have with their country; relationships that we 
have with one another; and the relationship that, as citizens of South Africa, we have 
with the state. At the moment these relationships are broken.69 
69 http://www.npconline.co.za/pebble.asp?relid=695
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It is part of the NDAs mandate to build relationships between government and civil society. 
That these relationships are ‘broken’ speaks to one of the NDA’s failures. 
Within a context in which relationships have been eroded, the recent passing of the Protection 
of State Information Bill, or ‘Secrecy Bill’, after a sham consultation process, does little to 
repair them. The strong reaction of civil society to the Bill speaks as much to concern about 
the conduct of the ruling party and state institutions that continue to squander the trust and 
goodwill of its citizenry as it does to the provisions of the Bill.70 
Participants in the Coalition’s provincial workshops and strategy meetings argued for 
improvements in the systemic relations between the state and civil society. They made the 
following specific suggestions:
•   There is need for better coordination between CSOs and government departments.
•   There is similarly an urgent need for all government and government-related agencies 
with some responsibility for civil society to coordinate with one another, for example 
Treasury, SARS, DSD, the NLB and NDA.
•   Civil society should consider all plans and programmes mooted by government, 
and engage with these in ways that optimise results and strengthen participatory 
democracy.
•   Organisations of civil society should form cooperative relationships, strengthening 
the voice and agency of the sector.
A strong desire to move from critique to action was expressed by workshop participants. It was 
noted that many CSOs have demonstrated their ability to meet sophisticated developmental 
requirements, thus revealing their ability to operate as equal partners with government agencies. 
For example, the Community Work Programme, which is intended to involve 4.5 million people 
by 2014, was cited as an opportunity for effective government–civil society collaboration. 
Recommendations 
The Coalition processes revealed suggestions for a ‘doing framework’ – a new mission 
that all sectors of society can identify with and support. For example, the ‘Zero Hunger’ 
campaign in Brazil mobilised thousands of agencies in government and across civil society. 
The campaign captured the imagination of individuals, families, trade unions, churches, 
business, government departments and parastatal agencies. It brought benefits to millions of 
people, and also influenced changes in development policy and government interaction with 
civil society. 
Suggestions were that CSOs in South Africa mobilise in a similar way and in so doing 
encourage the needed resource flows. The Coalition envisioned the possibility of government 
and communities constructing coherent goals that are shared, whose concrete implementation 
can be ‘co-produced’ by public agencies and communities. 
The Coalition calls for a review by the NPC of the developmental aid architecture in South 
Africa as a matter of urgency. To ensure cooperation and avoid duplication, the Coalition calls 
for a cross-governmental task team to be appointed to review and make recommendations on 
all policies affecting the civil society sector.
70 http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/who-can-we-trust, 22 November, 2011 by Pierre De Vos
CHAPTER SIX
The National Lotteries Board (NLB)  
and the National Lotteries Distribution 
Trust Fund (NLDTF)
It is impossible to suggest that a developmental state can be built in the absence of 
visionary legislation that defines the human development objectives of the country.71
The Coalition’s commitment to contribute towards more effective funding of the civil society sector informed its engagement with the NLB, and the NLDTF. The research 
and advocacy process included commissioned legal research by Ricardo Wyngaard, a non-
profit lawyer. This chapter includes the contents of the legal research, in addition to findings 
from the provincial consultations, case studies and meetings held with the NLB, government 
representatives and the Minister of the DTI. The section includes reference to secondary 
sources, the many media reports that have been published and recent court findings. 
While the lottery was commended for disbursing large amounts of funds to the sector, 
findings from the research process indicate significant problems at all levels. As a starting 
point, the Coalition laments the lack of an over-arching developmental vision to guide lottery 
funding. The Coalition argues that collection and regulation functions should be the NLB’s 
sole mandate, and that the disbursement function should be vested in a separate, autonomous 
structure with relevant development funding expertise. The lack of clarity around the roles 
and responsibilities of the NLB and the distribution agencies has led to a dysfunctional 
distribution system. Serious management weaknesses and process flaws make navigating the 
application and adjudication process for most CSOs cumbersome and, for CBOs, virtually 
impossible. Ultimately the needs of CSOs and the communities they serve suffer as a result 
of this. 
Background 
Gambling was restricted in South Africa as early as 1673. The Gambling Act of 1965 officially 
banned all forms of gambling except betting on horse racing. However, gambling was legal 
in the former ‘homelands’ of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC). The 
prohibition on gambling was ineffective, with an estimated 2 000 casinos operating illegally 
in South Africa by 1995.72 
The South African government promulgated the Lotteries and Gambling Act of 1993, which 
made provision for the establishment of the Lotteries and Gambling Board. Through the board, 
71 http://www.forum.org.za/The-Need-for-an-Over-Arching-Legislative-Framework-May-2010
72  Sallaz, 2001 in Report of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry on the Review of the National 
Gambling Legislation, 11 March 2010
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‘the new government was charged with the task of managing the burgeoning underground 
gambling industry’ (Louw 2002:5).
The board consisted of government representatives, business representatives and people 
with experience in the fields of welfare, disability, community development, sport and socio-
economic development.73 The board published its Interim Report on Lotteries and Gambling 
in the Republic of South Africa in October 1994. The Interim Report observed that illegal 
gambling deprived the state of tax, and that regulated gambling would provide a source of 
income that could provide tax relief.74 It was proposed by the board that the government 
acknowledge gambling as a ‘social reality’ and seek to regulate the industry and ensure that 
some of the profits from legal gambling be used to support the RDP, welfare and other good 
causes (Louw 2002:1). The Interim Report stated that funding would assist in the upliftment 
and development of disadvantaged and disabled people.
The Lotteries and Gambling Board Act of 1993 was repealed and replaced by the National 
Gambling Act of 1996. The National Lotteries Act of 1997 established the National Lottery. 
The Board was appointed in 1998. The first National Lottery was launched on 2 March 
1999. A Consortium called Uthingo, chaired by Professor Barney Pityana, won the contract 
to operate the lottery, which was launched in March 2000. Former President Thabo Mbeki 
predicted that:
The National Lottery would raise R13 billion for good causes within five years.
(in Louw 2002) 
The money raised through the sale of lottery tickets and scratch cards was to be distributed 
according to a formula: 50 per cent to prizes; 20 per cent as profits to the operating agency; 
and 30 per cent to good causes. 
Using the lottery as a form of revenue collection was motivated by increased demands for 
state expenditure, taxpayer objections to higher taxes and the pressure to balance budgets. It 
is thus a ‘voluntary tax’ as a portion of the proceeds goes to good causes. The National Lottery 
was also seen as a measure to counter illegal gambling. 
The Lotteries Act (Act No. 57 of 1997)
The Lotteries Act established the National Lotteries Board to regulate the National Lottery 
and other lotteries and to administer the National Lottery Distribution Trust Fund (NLDTF). 
The NLDTF was established to distribute the proceeds of the National Lottery. 
Three chapters of the Lotteries Act deal with the main structures that are regulated by it, 
namely, the National Lotteries Board (NLB), the licenced operator, and the distribution 
agencies (DAs). These three structures are interdependent and all are important for the 
effective implementation of the Lotteries Act. 
NPOs can also benefit from the Lotteries Act through the operation of other lotteries, such as 
fundraising society lotteries, bazaars, fêtes, dinners, sporting and other events, as long as the 
proceeds are used to benefit deserving sections of the public. 
73 Section 3 of the Lotteries and Gambling Act of 1993
74 http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2010/comreports/100331pctradereport1.htm
Regulations
The regulations, which fall under Section 60 of the Lotteries Act of 1997, seek to improve 
the efficiency and distribution of resources of the NLDTF. The regulations should be used to 
streamline the handling of applications, making the process more transparent and efficient. 
New regulations, which came into effect in July 2010, provide more guidance on the direction 
of funding decisions as follows. The 2010 regulations prescribe that 50% of monies in the 
National Lottery Distribution Trust Fund (NLDTF) be used for specific priority areas:
•   For the Charities Sector this means expansion to include home-based care services and 
infrastructure development for the care for old people, sick people, orphaned and vulnerable 
children, and the rehabilitation of those with disabilities. Other additions include adult 
literacy programmes and early childhood development initiatives.
•   50% of Arts, Culture and National Heritage allocations to be disbursed to traditional 
knowledge and culture projects, as well as the development and preservation of heritage 
sites and the promotion of arts and craft produced by groups of disabled people and women.
•   50% of Sports allocations are to be disbursed for development of sport and recreation 
facilities in rural areas to assist with talent identification and greater accessibility to 
sporting facilities for the disabled.
The regulations’ aim was also to facilitate access for first-time applicants among smaller non-
governmental and community-based organisations. While the regulations did away with the 
requirement for first-time applicants to produce audited financial statements, these applicants 
must still submit financial statements drawn up by an independent, registered accounting 
officer. Previous beneficiaries of lottery funding are required to submit their most recent set 
of audited financial statements.
According to a notice published on the NLB website, the intentions of the new Regulations 
were:
…to get the proceeds of the National Lottery to reinforce government’s efforts to relieve 
poverty, to develop our least developed areas, and to build a more equal society.75  
The role of the National Lotteries Board (NLB)
The National Lotteries Board’s purpose is outlined in the description of its mandate:
The National Lotteries Board (NLB) was established in terms of the Lotteries Act (No 
57 of 1997) to regulate the National Lottery as well as other lotteries, including society 
lotteries, to raise funds and promotional competitions. 
The NLB also advises the Minister of Trade and Industry on policy matters relating to the 
National Lottery and other lotteries.
Members of the NLB are appointed by the Minister of Trade and Industry and hold office 
for a period of five years, after which they may be reappointed. The NLB consists of seven 
board members.76 Board members hold office for a maximum of five years, but are eligible for 
a second term. At least four members of the NLB must be from sectors beyond government. 
75 http://www.nlb.org.za/2010.html
76 Section 3 of the Lotteries Act
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NLB members are also trustees of the NLDTF, into which National Lottery proceeds that are 
intended for allocation to good causes are deposited. 
The Lotteries Act does not, in contrast to the NDA Act, specifically require the Minister to 
appoint members representing civil society to the NLB. This is in all probability because of 
the difference in function between the two structures. The NLB’s function relates largely to 
the operation and oversight of the National Lottery and the NLB is supposed to play a less 
significant role in the distribution of funding for good causes. 
The NLB does not adjudicate applications for funding or make allocations to organisations. 
This is done by committees known as distribution agencies (DAs) that are also appointed 
by the Minister of Trade and Industry, in conjunction with other relevant ministers, after a 
process of public nomination. The NLDTF provides administrative support to the DAs.77
Governance functions of the NLB
The NLB has an important advisory and oversight function in relation to the National Lottery 
and the licenced operator. The NLB must submit annual activity reports and financial 
statements to Parliament. The report must include the percentages of funding prescribed for 
good causes and any proposals for amendments to the Lotteries Act or regulations proposed 
by the NLB. The NLB is also subject to the stringent regulatory provisions of the Public 
Finance Management Act (PFMA). This Act sets high standards of accountability and should, 
in theory, ensure a high level of accountability of members.
The NLB is responsible for the collection and regulation functions, as well as the distribution 
function of the Lottery. However, it has dealt more successfully with the commercial functions 
of gaming revenue collection, and the regulation of gaming practice. While it is beyond the 
scope of this research to look into the profit-making side of the lottery, Kuljian (2009:128) 
noted that the attention given to the profit-making side of the gaming industry has not been 
matched by an equal commitment to maximise the enormous benefits that this industry 
potentially offers to the funding of civil society. If the profit-making aspect of the lottery 
is functioning effectively with the logistics and coordination required for that to happen, 
weaknesses on the distribution side point less to deficiencies in resources and capacity than 
to priorities and commitment. 
The current service provider Gidani’s contract expires in 2015. When the change-over between 
the first operator Uthingo and Gidani took place in 2007, there was a delay of more than six 
months. During that time, all grantmaking activities were suspended – to the detriment of 
the plans of CSOs. To avoid such delays, applications for the next new operator will be 
considered from 2013. The contender will be announced in 2014 to allow time for legal or 
other challenges. SANGOCO is a four per cent (4%) shareholder in Gidani. This is not viewed 
as a conflict of interest as Gidani has no influence on the distribution of funds. 
77 http://www.nlb.org.za/general-public/our-mandate.html
The role of the National Lotteries Distribution Trust Fund 
(NLDTF)
The NLDTF is established by the NLB to hold and manage disbursement of funds allocated 
by the NLB towards the funding of CSOs. 
Regulations promulgated in 2002, 2004 and 2010 determined that lottery funds be distributed 
as follows:
Category 2002 2004 2010
Charitable causes 36% 45% 45%
Arts, culture and 
national heritage
22% 28% 28%
Sports and 
recreation
22% 22% 22%
RDP 15% - -
Miscellaneous 5% 5% 5%
The inclusion of the RDP category in 2002 was indicative of government policy at that time. 
Lottery funding was envisaged as contributing not only towards welfare and poverty alleviation 
projects, but also to interventions addressing development and poverty eradication. However 
no distribution agency was set up to manage the RDP fund, thus the funds allocated to this 
category were not distributed. 
Charities
The charities sector receives the bulk of lottery funding. This sector covers applications 
from organisations serving the needs of children, the youth, socially vulnerable groups (e.g. 
the elderly, women and the disabled) and people living with HIV/AIDS. Also included are 
community and residential programmes, capacity building and poverty alleviation in areas 
that are under-resourced and under-served. The 2010 regulations include: home-based care 
services; facilities for people living with disabilities; substance rehabilitation and treatment 
services; early childhood development; and adult literacy and vocational training. 
Arts, culture and national heritage
The focus for arts and culture has been on organisations whose activities addressed the 
following: the production and promotion of cultural products and/or performance; education, 
training and skills transfer; and the building of new audiences and increasing public access to 
the arts. This includes festivals, film production and public art. 
52   |   Critical Perspectives on Sustainability of the South African Civil Society Sector The National Lotteries Board (NLB) and the National Lotteries Distribution Trust Fund (NLDTF)   |   53
Heritage projects include architectural, archaeological and heritage preservation and 
conservation projects, as well as developing indigenous knowledge systems. This category 
also includes environment projects such as conservation, waste management, planting 
indigenous trees and youth environment education. 
Sport and recreation
This focus area aims to support promotion of sport development through focusing on the 
following: 
•   existing sports facilities / clubs that lack sports equipment; 
•   upgrading and/or renovation of existing sports facilities; and 
•   training institutions / organisations doing capacity building for sport, i.e. managers, 
coaches, administrators and technical officials. 
Special consideration is given where the activities of organisations applying for funding will 
benefit people in rural areas and vulnerable groups such as women, the youth, people with 
disabilities and the elderly (Swilling and Van Breda 2006). 
NLDTF resources available for civil society 
The DTI’s Gambling Review (2011) found that sales for the National Lottery products have 
fluctuated considerably in the past few years due to a number of factors including declining 
interest in the lottery, the negative impact of the world economic recession, and the effects 
of the controversy over the appointment of a second licensed operator and the suspension of 
the National Lottery for several months in 2007.78 Despite this, the lottery funding distributed 
since inception is significantly higher than that distributed by the NDA. 
In 2011 the NLB reported the following with regard to resources raised and disbursed since 
inception: 
•   R12.3 billion was transferred by the lottery operators to the NLDTF.
•   R3.6 billion was earned in interest.
•   R15.9 billion has been made available in the NLDTF for CSOs – of which R14.4 billion 
(91%) has already been allocated.
•   R11.0 billion (76% of allocated funds) has been paid out.
•   R1.5 billion (that remains unallocated in the NLDTF) is available for allocation in the 
2011/12 financial year.79
The Lotteries Act provides that funds not spent at the end of any financial year be carried 
forward as a credit to the next financial year. 
Lottery distribution structure 
The legislation requires disbursement to be done by a distribution agency (DA) which is 
defined as ‘a person appointed by the Minister to distribute money but not any department in 
the national or provincial sphere of government’. 
78 http://www.dti.gov.za/news2011/Gambling_review.pdf pg 39
79 http://www.nlb.org.za/general-public/mediareleases.html?id=182&tmpl=component
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Refer to page 51 for further information on the regulations.
The distribution structure is aligned to the three categories to be funded: the charities 
distribution agency; the arts, culture and national heritage distribution agency; and the 
sports and recreation distribution agency. The Minister appoints members to the distribution 
agencies that consider applications for grants. 
Distribution agency (DA) members work part time and are employed in the sectors that they 
represent. This provides for knowledge of, and expertise in, the sectors for which they make 
decisions. The DAs have no regulatory or statutory powers. Role clarification between the 
NLB and the DAs has been lacking until a recent court judgment that clarified the function 
of the DAs as:
Limited to receiving and considering applications, and suggesting conditions to be 
imposed when money is granted. They do not have the power to call for applications, 
decide how much money should be made available for different causes or to distribute 
money.80
While there are obvious advantages to DA members representing the sectors in which they 
work, it has also created opportunities for decisions to be made around conflicts of interest. 
Recent media reports revealed that the SA Jazz Foundation received R32 million. The CEO of 
the foundation, Oupa Salemane, was until recently a member of the NLB’s Arts and Culture 
80 SAEP and Others vs the National Lotteries Board and Others in FPA 2011:38
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DA.81 Similarly, media reports exposed that Gideon Sam, the chair of the NLB’s sports 
distribution agency, stands to benefit from lottery funding granted to Cycling SA. Gideon Sam 
is a director of the sports marketing company, Accelerate Sport SA, which stands to receive 
a commission of R1 million from Cycling SA.82 Funding decisions like these, although they 
may pass the test of legality, undermine the integrity and ethical standing of the institution. 
As mentioned above, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) category has 
been dormant since the Lotteries Act was passed and funds are no longer allocated to that 
category. The R63.92 million that was allocated to the RDP category has not been spent. 
An additional category is the miscellaneous fund that is allocated at the discretion of the 
Minister of Trade and Industry. Concern has been raised that the miscellaneous fund has 
been used to fund state bodies such as the National Youth Development Agency and the 
Commission on Gender Equality. This results in less funds being available for CSOs. In 2008, 
the year that South Africa faced a significant emergency with the xenophobic attacks and 
displacement of foreign nationals in South Africa, the NLB allocated just one per cent of its 
emergency fund, which was allocated to one beneficiary.83 It appears not to have considered 
emergency funding to support CSOs that were the first and most accessible port of call for the 
hundreds of injured and displaced people. 
Challenges and problems within the NLB and NLDTF
CSOs, including this research Coalition, have spoken out against the way that the NLB 
governs the lottery, the management of grants and the often poor functioning of the NLDTF. 
In summary, problems identified over the years have been the following.
Lack of developmental vision
There appears to be no overarching development funding vision or mission statement to 
guide the distribution of lottery funding. Section 35 of the Lotteries Act provides that every 
institution, which in any way acts under or in terms of this Act, must comply strictly with 
Section 195 of the Constitution. This section requires public administration to be governed 
by democratic values and principles. This means that the NLB and distribution agencies 
should promote and maintain a high standard of professional ethics, be development-
orientated, respond to the needs of people, encourage public participation in policy-making, 
be accountable and transparent and provide the public with timely, accessible and accurate 
information. 
The Coalition found the lack of a guiding developmental perspective to be a serious impediment 
to effective fulfilment of the intentions of the Act. Consideration of each separate application 
in the absence of an over-arching strategy and accompanying development principles means 
firstly that links are not made with local or national development priorities. This leads to 
inconsistency and lack of even-handedness in grant-making decisions, and ultimately damage 
to the effectiveness of CSOs. 
If civil society would like to see a better-functioning National Lottery, the starting point to an 
advocacy strategy would be to target the Lottery’s vision. If the National Lottery were geared 
81 http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2011/09/11/yet-more-funny-business-over-lottery-funding
82 http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2011/12/04/sascoc-chief-in-lotto-trouble
83 NLB Annual Report 2009, pg 14; http://www.nlb.org.za/images/annual_reports/annual_report_2009.pdf
to achieving an inspired developmental vision, orienting and guiding it to serve the public 
good, the political will and commitment to implementing supportive systems and processes 
would be more likely to follow. As mentioned by the Minister of Trade and Industry at a two-
day consultative meeting hosted by the NLB in June 2011:
We have an obligation to our people to make sure that the lottery meets the public 
interest obligations held out when we launched it.84
Legislative and regulatory concerns
Contradictions between the Act and the regulations
The regulations dealing with grant payments are inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Lotteries Act. In terms of Section 32 of the Lotteries Act, it is envisaged that the allocations be 
paid over to the distribution agency and that the distribution agency pay the recipient. 
However, the regulations, contrary to the Lotteries Act, make provision for the payment of 
grant monies directly from the NLB to grant recipients. Legal experts challenge the Minister’s 
interpretation of appointing a ‘person’ as distribution agencies rather than working through 
‘pre-existing persons’ (in other words potentially working through an existing specialist 
organisation). 
Grant-making process via the distribution agencies 
The regulations introduced a number of requirements for the allocation of funds for the funding 
categories. The regulations require that those applying for funding are NPOs undertaking 
projects for the public good. Organisations have to establish that projects are financially 
viable and that they have the capacity to implement them. Organisations are required to keep 
proper accounting records and financial reports. 
The focus on funding projects has been interpreted by the DAs as a directive not to fund any 
operational or capacity-building costs that are unrelated to funded project costs. This is a 
source of concern to CSOs that see strengthening the institutional capacity of the sector as 
integral to strengthening the ability to implement projects. 
One of the options devised by the NLB to assist recently established organisations that could 
not comply with prescribed requirements is through a provision for partnership arrangements 
to be made. It is now possible for a well-established organisation to assist another to access 
funding. In line with the requirements of the Act, the funding would be transferred to an 
organisation that meets the prescribed requirements. 
Structural and governance problems
Structural issues
The Minister of Trade and Industry is required to appoint the DAs referred to in the Act – 
the initial DAs were appointed for a period of five years. Although this period was extended 
to minimise the impact in the event of no distribution agencies operating, there was still a 
transition period where no appointments were in effect. Delays in the appointment of DAs 
delayed the distribution of funding during 2006. 
84 http://www.dti.gov.za/editspeeches.jsp?id=2235-
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The Coalition research identified systemic problems in the relationship between the DAs 
and the NLB. Adjudication procedures are rushed and informed only by (often poor-quality) 
documentation hastily prepared by NLDTF staff. The NLDTF and the NLB do not have a co-
operative relationship with the DAs as they are not appointed by the NLB. To ensure some 
oversight of DA decisions, an Oversight Committee was set up to oversee all DA adjudication 
decisions. This was challenged by the DAs and was subsequently disbanded. 
Although the DAs are required to submit written reports to the NLB, the NLB itself has 
indicated that the DAs are not held sufficiently accountable in terms of monies distributed. 
For example, the 2009 Annual Report of the NLB indicates that: 
•   There is no oversight of the activities of the DAs – if there are delays in adjudication, they 
are not held accountable. 
•   The DAs are not audited and the provisions of the PFMA are not applied to the DAs.
•   DA members are appointed in their personal capacity and without performance indicators 
or service level agreements to track and monitor their performance. 
•   DAs do not conform strictly to the regulations in making grant decisions. 
The capacity of the DA committees is limited as they work part-time, have only seven members 
each, and hold an insufficient number of committee meetings relative to the huge volume of 
applications to be considered. The qualifications and skills of DA members have been questioned. 
The recruitment process does not include an interview and there are no performance outcomes 
in their letters of appointment. The DA members typically attend between two and eight full-
day committee meetings per month for the adjudication of funding applications.
DA members only receive copies of the applications and funding recommendations at 
committee meetings. This means there is no time to read in advance and reflect to ensure 
high-quality decisions. Decisions are based on the quality of the documentation presented 
to them prepared by NLDTF often under-skilled and demotivated project teams. Poor-quality 
documentation can damage the chances of grant applicants.
The DAs are required to report to the Minister directly, but these meetings seldom happen in 
practice. A DTI presentation to Parliament in February 2010 proposed that the Minister meet 
with the NLB and DAs twice a year. 
Accountability of NLB board members
The Lotteries Act clearly sets out the grounds for compulsory termination of membership of 
the NLB board members with regard to the following: 
Board members, their spouses, life partners, immediate family members, business 
partners or associates may not, while serving, or for a period of 12 months after 
termination of membership, be employed by or receive any benefit from the licence 
operator of the National Lottery, or national sports pool or anyone obtaining any benefit 
or advantage from the Lotteries Act.
Section 7(5) contains a similar clause that applies to the staff of the NLB. This prohibition can 
be extended in length. 
In spite of these stringent requirements in the Act with regard to the appointment and 
ethics of board members, the limitation does not appear to be applied. For example, media 
reports revealed that Makhaya Arts and Culture was the largest recipient of lottery funds 
from the arts and culture category in 2011, with R41 million disbursed to Makhaya to stage 
arts programmes internationally. Makhaya Arts and Culture employs the NLB Chairperson 
Professor Nevhutanda’s daughter.85 
Management, communication and administrative problems
Management
The NLB does not have a clear developmentally oriented vision that finds expression through 
an agreed code of good grant-making practice. This means that even though large amounts 
of funding are disbursed, the experiences of the CSOs that it serves are often negative, with 
the systemic problems negatively affecting their ability to function. Allied to this, there are 
numerous areas where the NLB appears to lack the required skills to run efficiently. 
The relationship between the DAs and the office of the CEO and the chief operating officer 
(COO) is not smooth. DAs have expressed the opinion that the CEO and COO do not view 
them as part of the overall distribution team, despite their central legal and adjudication role. 
DAs have complained that they are treated as ‘outsiders’ who ‘create additional work’ for the 
NLB and NLDTF. While the NLB management views the DAs as managing grants at their own 
discretion, the DAs view the NLB CEO and chairperson as treating the funds as their own to 
manage as they choose. 
The relationship between the NLDTF and the DAs is problematic: because the Minister 
appointed individuals as members of DAs rather than existing organisations, the DAs have 
no administrative staff and are thus reliant on the NLDTF to provide administrative support 
to perform their functions. However, the NLDTF staff are appointed and managed by the NLB 
and are not managed by, or accountable to, the DAs. This means that requests for information 
or assistance by the DAs are often unheeded, and the DAs have very little recourse. 
Legal experts see the Minister requiring the NLDTF staff to support the DAs as contrary to the 
Lotteries Act. It is inconsistent with the structure of the Act for the staff of the regulator also 
to be the staff of the distributor.
Considering the large sums of money disbursed by the lottery, the team of people employed is 
comparatively small. The lottery disburses up to R3 billion per year and employs about 120 
people across all departments, compared to the UK lottery which employs over 400 staff to 
distribute £650 million (R6,5 billion). The NLB spends approximately two per cent (2%) per 
annum on administration, as published in its annual reports.86
Professor Vevek Ram was appointed as CEO of the NLB in 1999 and retained the position 
until his resignation in April 2012. The CEO is accountable to the board for the performance 
of all financial, clerical and administrative functions of the board. However, the Lotteries Act 
does not specify (in the same way as the NDA Act) that the NLB must enter into a written 
performance agreement with its CEO. While the NDA’s CEO is appointed for a maximum 
period of five years, there is no similar restriction in the Lotteries Act. 
Findings from this research process indicate ongoing and serious management problems at 
all levels of the NLDTF. While it is difficult to fully comprehend the internal workings of the 
organisation and further research is required, available evidence suggests that the NLDTF’s 
internal dynamics are not healthy and should be re-focused on achieving a developmental 
vision. 
85 http://www.news24.com/printArticle.aspx?iframe&aid=ec07
86 http://www.nlb.org.za/general-public/mediareleases.html?id=182&tmpl=component
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Under a barrage of criticism in early 2012, and in the wake of the resignation of the CEO, the 
Chairman Professor Nevhutanda announced the creation of five new executive positions: 
corporate affairs, legal compliance, finance, chief IT officer and chief risk officer. 
Communication
CSOs find the NLDTF staff difficult to reach. CSO representatives are not always clear who 
they should speak to for their various concerns. 
The institution could go a long way in enhancing its reputation by employing skilled 
spokespersons and implementing a communications strategy that supports its key activities.
CaSe STudy: Tshepang Victim Support Centre
Tshepang Victim Support Centre is a small NGO working in Winterveld. The Catholic 
Health Care Association of SA (CATHCA) submitted an application to the NLDTF on 
Tshepang’s behalf on 30 March 2007. In November 2007 CATHCA requested an urgent 
meeting with the NLDTF as Tshepang was in a dire financial situation. In September 
2008, after repeated letters and follow up to the NLDTF, CATHCA was notified that 
funds for Tshepang had finally been approved. 
In March 2009 the funds for Tshepang were deposited into CATHCA’s account with 
the understanding that CATHCA would mentor the smaller organisation and build its 
capacity to manage the funds through staggered disbursal of the funds. 
Tshepang staff contacted the NLDTF directly, which in turn contacted CATHCA, 
insisting on the full payment of the first tranche to Tshepang despite their lack of 
experience in financial management. The CATHCA Director submitted a formal 
complaint to the NLDTF about this ‘unprofessional behaviour’, reminding the NLDTF 
that they had appointed CATHCA to mentor Tshepang and assist them to set up 
adequate financial systems so that Tshepang would be able to grow their capacity at a 
measured pace and lottery funds would not be misappropriated.
Administration
Administrative inefficiencies within the NLDTF system may be summarised as follows:
•   An insufficient number of appropriately skilled staff in the NLDTF, exacerbated by high 
staff turnover.
•   The staff are demotivated and demonstrate very little interest in the developmental purpose 
of the institution.
•   Vast time lapses – sometimes over a year – between funding applications and grant decisions.
•   Lack of communication between the NLDTF and potential grantees.
•   Generally poor administration, including loss of funding applications and incorrect 
processing of applicant details.
•   Apparently contradictory criteria used in assessment processes.
The results of the above administrative problems are demonstrated in the following section.
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http://www.nlb.org.za/applicants-and-beneficiaries/how-funds-are-allocated.html
The grant-making process starts with an annual call for proposals. The NLDTF aims to make 
a call for proposals every year, but this is not guaranteed as ‘a new call for applications is 
usually made in each sector after most of the applications from the previous call for the sector 
have been processed and adjudicated’.87 
Organisations responding to the call complete an application form that is submitted to the 
central applications office. The application is then screened for administrative compliance, 
scanned and the data then captured into the Grant Management System (GMS). The next phase 
includes more thorough assessment including site visits. The proposal is then forwarded to 
the DAs, which make the final decision on funding. For applications that are successful, the 
next phase includes the legal agreements and sign off by the NLB. The CSO is notified of the 
outcome and, if rejected, can appeal the decision. Payments follow for successful applications. 
Organisations are expected to submit progress and financial reports. 
87 http://www.nlb.org.za/applicants-and-beneficiaries/faqs.html
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Grant-making details
Application form 
In practice, the process, which should be fairly straightforward, is a minefield for many 
organisations. CSOs consulted in this research process reported that the NLB website has 
conflicting guideline information and criteria, and that the requirements are not clear. The 
application form is complex to complete for less sophisticated organisations. It is difficult 
to access off the website as it cannot be saved as a PDF document. It needs to be completed 
on-line and then printed. This requires a strong and sustained internet connection. The 
application requires many supporting documents. The full application has to be submitted 
as a hard copy, which is expensive and has frequently led to the loss of documents and 
attachments. 
A more simplified approach would be to allow applications to be submitted by email, where 
all supporting documents could be consolidated and scanned and which would provide 
evidence of submission. Participants in the research process raised concern over the exclusive 
use of English in the application process. 
Processing of applications 
The Central Applications Office (CAO) receives the funding applications that are submitted in 
response to the call for proposals. The CAO is headed by COO Jeffrey du Preez and comprises 
80 to 90 of the approximately 120 employees at the NLB.
CAO staff screen applications to ensure that they are accompanied by the necessary supporting 
documents and meet all the requirements. The documents are then scanned and the data 
captured onto the GMS. A challenge in the processing of applications and data is the lack 
of capacity. Delays in capturing data lead to backlogs. Additional staff are needed to capture 
data and scan documents (although this function could be substantially reduced if most of the 
documents were submitted by email).
The Project Teams are required to read all application documentation and distil out a summary, 
a multi-year budget spreadsheet and funding recommendations for the consideration of the 
DAs. Adjudication decisions are largely dependent on the quality of these documents. 
Site visits by compliance team
The NLDTF Compliance Team is required to make site visits for all applications over 
R1 million. Understaffing causes backlogs in site visits being conducted and delays the 
final processing of applications. The conduct of staff making site visits has not always been 
acceptable, such as in a recent case where the NLB fired a staff member for ‘dishonesty’ after 
he tried to make money out of an organisation applying for money.88
A criticism against the NLB approach to site visits is that use of the ‘checklist’ is seen as a 
bureaucratic ‘compliance’ mechanism rather than a developmental experience. This can result 
in site visits being about ‘catching people out’ rather than assessing developmental potential 
and opportunities. Some DAs noted that compliance team reports often lack information on 
the spirit, vision, contribution or other positive aspects of the projects. This limits decision-
making as DAs lack a textured qualitative understanding of the organisations applying for 
funds. It is possible that the compliance objective dominates visits as site visits are often 
conducted when supporting documents appear suspect.
88 http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2011/09/11/yet-more-funny-business-over-lottery-funding
Processing of grant agreements by legal team
All DA committee meetings are recorded and these audio tapes are provided to the legal team 
as a basis for drawing up the grant agreements. The legal team then have to listen to the taped 
proceedings of these all-day meetings as a basis for capturing funding decisions. They draw up 
the grant agreements accordingly. This is a time-consuming process and causes further delays. 
A more efficient system of recording DA adjudication decisions needs to be devised. This 
could include members of the legal team attending DA committee meetings. 
Approval of payments by management
The finance division is responsible for processing grant payments once the agreements 
have been approved. Finance is also responsible for making tranche payments after interim 
progress reports have been approved by the compliance team. The finance and compliance 
teams are separate from the CAO.
Delays in payments occur at the COO’s and CEO’s offices, as all grant agreements and 
payments over R1 million are signed off by the COO, and all grant agreements and payments 
over R3 million are signed off by the CEO. Larger multi-year grants have taken up to a year 
for final sign-off. 
Processing of appeals by project and legal teams
The NLB receives numerous appeals about rejection decisions. This deflects the legal team 
from the grant agreement process. With the global cutback in donor funding, it is likely that 
more organisations, desperate for funding, will appeal rejected applications. A DA member 
interviewed anonymously for this research suggested that there be a separate appeals team 
dedicated to handling these matters. 
The Appeals Committee sees about 25 applications per month. Most of the appeals are related 
to rejections based on documents missing from the application. This could be easily remedied 
by requesting that organisations submit missing documents.
Processing of progress reports and tranche payments by project teams
Organisations participating in consultative meetings for this research found that there were 
times when progress reports submitted by funded organisations were not well understood. 
Reports were routinely lost and had to be re-submitted. This makes for a time-consuming and 
costly duplication of effort. 
Another weakness affecting informed decision-making is that DAs do not receive progress 
reports. DAs have requested that they be included in the full spectrum of the grant management 
process to allow them to get a better sense of the impact of their funding decisions. 
Delays and blockages in the process 
The lottery is notorious among CSOs for excessive waiting times at every step of the process. 
Many organisations have had to wait up to two years between applying for and receiving 
funds. Organisations that had been rewarded grants often waited a further 2–12 months for 
the money to be disbursed. 
The tedious lottery process drains organisations’ capacity. Big Fish, an organisation working 
in the film and television industry, calculated that preparing, submitting and tracking its 
application to the NLDTF took up the time equivalent of two staff members working full time 
for a month. 
62   |   Critical Perspectives on Sustainability of the South African Civil Society Sector The National Lotteries Board (NLB) and the National Lotteries Distribution Trust Fund (NLDTF)   |   63
The impact of these blockages has had a profound effect on the functioning of CSOs relying 
on lottery funding. Staff have been retrenched, programmes have been cancelled, disrupted 
or discontinued, and resources have been diverted from service delivery and management to 
chasing up grant applications. Ultimately it is the beneficiaries of the organisations, mostly 
those living in poverty, who suffer the consequences. 
CaSe STudy: The Catholic Health Care Association of South Africa 
The Catholic Health Care Association of South Africa (CATHCA)89 provides high-
quality affordable health care services to marginalised people in southern Africa 
focusing on health care training, home-based care, HIV and AIDS prevention and a 
parish nurse programme. The organisation was founded in 1988 and works in South 
Africa, Botswana and Swaziland. 
In July 2005 CATHCA applied for R3 million for a year-long accredited training 
programme for 600 home-based caregivers. All necessary supporting documentation 
(including signed reference letters and audited financial statements) was provided. 
CATHCA received a reference number in April 2006. In December 2006 CATHCA 
received a letter from NLDTF requesting audited financial statements and a signed 
letter from one of the referees as these had ‘gone missing’. CATHCA resubmitted the 
documentation in January 2007. 
On 17 July 2007 (two years after the application was submitted) CATHCA received a 
letter from NLDTF advising that the application for R 3 281 000 had been successful. 
The agreement was signed and hand-delivered the following day, 18 July 2007, to the 
NLDTF’s Pretoria office. After repeated meetings and phone calls where CATHCA 
representatives were referred from one staff member to another, the first tranche 
(R1 640 700) of the 2005 application was finally deposited on 22 May 2008 – three 
years after the application was submitted, and one year after the grant agreement was 
signed. 
From August 2008 to April 2009, the CATHCA Director phoned and emailed the 
NLDTF regularly to find out when the second tranche would be received, as the 
one-year training programme had commenced. In March 2009 the NLDTF Audit 
Department phoned saying they had to audit CATHCA before the second tranche (of 
the 2005 grant) could be paid. An NLDTF Project Officer called to say that they had 
not received a progress report from CATHCA on a previous grant. This had in fact 
been submitted to NLDTF and had to be scanned and re-faxed twice. On 31 March 
2009 the second tranche (R1 640 700) was paid to CATHCA and on 1 April 2009 the 
NLDTF Audit Team arrived to conduct a successful audit of the first tranche (of the 
2005 grant). 
CATHCA submitted a R4 million application for a Parish Nurse Programme in 
Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal in November 2008, in response to a call for 
proposals. CATHCA received a letter acknowledging receipt of the application, but 
had no further communication from the NLDTF until March 2010. 
89 Interview conducted with Yvonne Morgan, Director (from case studies document)
After repeated calls and emails to the NLDTF throughout 2009, funding was finally 
received almost two years later, in April 2010, but the monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) costs (a mere R25 000) were excluded from the approved budget. CATHCA has 
a standard policy of doing M&E for all programmes in line with best development 
practice. CATHCA was concerned that the NLDTF appeared not to value a critical 
aspect such as M&E. 
Because of the delays in funding, CATHCA had to cancel the Parish Nurse Programme 
in 2009 and retrench all 20 of the parish nurses. When the funds arrived, they needed 
to re-recruit nurses who were still available and recruit others to replace staff who had 
moved on, resulting in a loss of institutional memory. CATHCA found that the impact 
of such a dysfunctional funding system on CSOs extends beyond major interruptions 
to projects, but also burdens staff members with unnecessary stress related to funding 
insecurity as well as wasting precious human resources in the ongoing follow ups and 
duplication of work through resubmitting documents.
Has the lottery served the needs of CSOs in South Africa? 
Status quo on disbursement of funds
Since inception, the National Lottery has made R12.3 billion available for disbursement via 
the NLDTF. With interest, the amount available for distribution to good causes increased to 
R16 billion, of which R11 billion has been paid out in the following proportions: R2.3 billion 
to 938 organisations in the Arts, Culture and National Heritage Sector; R2.7 billion to 3 564 
organisations in the Sports and Recreation Sector; and R5.8 billion to 4 051 organisations in 
the Charities Sector. Many of the beneficiary organisations have been funded for more than 
one project, bringing the total number of grants made to over 15 000.90 
This is a significant financial injection into the CSO sector. In spite of the many problems 
outlined above, the Lottery (unlike the NDA), has managed to become a long-term distributor 
of funds to a wide range of organisations. 
Government policy as reflected in NLB functioning
Government sees the NLB as supporting organisations to achieve government-aligned 
objectives. According to the DTI Minister:
The NLDTF, as a partner, is already contributing to several of these objectives, such 
as improved quality of pre-school education which is Outcome 1, Poverty alleviation 
and a healthy life for all which is Outcome 2, Vibrant, equitable and sustainable rural 
communities which is Outcome 7, Sustainable human settlements which is Outcome 8 
and Protection of environmental and natural resources which is Outcome 10.91 
Thus, while the lottery has contributed to the CSO sector financially, government also sees 
it as supporting its objectives. The speech mentioned above suggests that government may 
desire greater input into how NLB funds are used. While it is not necessarily problematic for 
90 http://www.dti.gov.za/editspeeches.jsp?id=2235-
91 Ibid.
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the NLB to support projects that align with government objectives, the Minister’s speech does 
raise questions about the independence of the NLB. 
Developmental critique of NLB’s contribution to civil society
As ‘charities’ receive the bulk of NLB funds, the NLB is clearly more ‘welfarist’ than 
developmental in orientation (Swilling and Van Breda 2006:100). Its interpretation of its role 
does not address the underlying power inequalities that cause poverty. The NLB supports 
poverty alleviation projects rather than a more politicised poverty eradication agenda. It is 
important for CSOs to bear this in mind as attention is increasingly turned towards government 
funding of the CSO sector. 
CaSe STudy: The Trevor Huddleston Memorial Centre
The Trevor Huddleston Memorial Centre (THMC)92 started in 2000. Based in 
Sophiatown in Johannesburg, the organisation delivers youth development and 
heritage programmes that connect people from diverse communities. 
The THMC applied for a R1 million multi-annual (three year) grant at the end of 2003. 
The grant agreement was signed in October 2004 in a multi-year agreement providing 
funding for 2005, 2006 and 2007 activities. The first tranche (Year 1) was received in 
January 2005. THMC submitted a progress report for Year 1 activities at the end of 
2005.
THMC then proceeded to deliver Year 2 activities during 2006, expecting that the 
second tranche (for Year 2) would be paid in early 2006, but it was not paid. This 
resulted in a serious cash flow problem for the centre. Attempts to negotiate with the 
NLDTF around the payment of the second tranche were unsuccessful. 
The THMC was informed by NLDTF at the end of 2006 that they had ‘overspent’ on 
the first tranche budget. This was an inaccurate reading of the report submitted as the 
expenses noted were as a result of continuing with the project prior to receiving the 
second tranche payment. THMC also received numerous faxes from NLDTF intended 
for other CSOs, advising that ‘all funds had been paid’. These had been sent to THMC 
in error. 
In October 2006, the Centre was forced to retrench two full-time staff members, 
namely the Programmes Manager and the Senior Librarian, as the organisation no 
longer had the financial reserves to retain these staff members. 
The NLDTF subsequently lost the second tranche progress report twice. After intense 
engagement with the NLDTF, the second tranche was finally paid to THMC in early 
2007. This was then used to fund Year 3 activities in 2007 – given that THMC had 
depleted all their reserves. The Year 3 instalment was paid to THMC in January 2010, 
almost three years later.
92 Interview conducted with Tricia Sibbons, Acting Director, 2011
The ongoing financial uncertainty severely affected the THMC’s ability to plan and 
deliver adequately on their programmes. The funding delays also meant they were 
forced to retrench core programme staff, as well as deplete their reserves in 2007 to 
keep the three-year programme on track. The loss of staff and their reserves severely 
undermined the Centre’s long-term sustainability and they have not yet been able to 
replenish their reserves.
While the NLB has contributed financially to CSO projects, mostly in the welfare sector, it has 
not made a significant contribution to building the capacity of CSOs. A key reason for this is 
the fact that the regulations stipulate that the NLDTF only funds projects and not operational 
expenses. Organisations cannot access lottery funding solely for capacity building – the 
capacity building component must be attached to a project grant. Furthermore, the NLDTF 
has not invested in the development of strong governing boards for CSOs. 
Findings from a study conducted on the UK Lottery highlight the limitations of this approach 
(McKinney, Jones and Khan 2004): 
The policy of funding projects rather than organisations is now common among many 
grant-making bodies, including the Lottery distributors. While this model aims to 
encourage innovation and discourage organisations’ dependency upon single sources 
for core funding, it does little to facilitate organisational development, maximise 
effectiveness or efficiency, or ensure the continuity of services. In many cases, project 
funding can over-stretch core resources rather than strengthen them, or can weaken 
organisational vision and mission. While it is unreasonable to expect funding bodies 
to offer long-term core funding, grant makers must make reasonable contributions for 
overheads and core costs attached to project and/or service provision. These include: 
staff and board training and development, fundraising, administrative support, and 
material resources such as ICT equipment.
The South african education and environment Project (SaeP) court ruling
SAEP and the Claremont Methodist Church Social Impact Ministry, Sikhula Sonke, 
took the NLDTF to court after repeated unsuccessful applications. Between 2003 and 
2009, SAEP submitted seven applications to the NLDTF. Sikhula Sonke submitted 
two applications, one in 2007 and another in 2008. The applicants complained of 
administrative bungling and sought redress under the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act of 2000. 
The NLDTF argued that it had the right to fix guidelines applicable to funding 
applications and that an application will not be considered if the applicants do not 
comply. 
In his court order, Judge Gamble set aside the NLDTF’s refusal to fund three of the 
applications made to it and ordered it to reconsider the applications and make 
decisions within 60 days of the order. The judge ordered that if the NLDTF declined 
to grant any of the applications, it should provide the unsuccessful applicants with 
reasons for the refusal in the communication of its decision. The judgment ordered 
that the NLDTF bear the cost of the lawsuit. 
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The NLB appealed the court decision. Judge Cachalia upheld Judge Gamble’s ruling. 
Judge Cachalia ruled that, despite its protests and ‘disingenuous’ insistence that it 
applies its criteria for funding fairly and rigidly, the NLDTF had not done so in this 
case. The Judge further berated the Chair of the Board for treating the mandate of 
the Lottery as his personal purse for ‘voluntary gratuities’, insisting that the Board is 
mandated to do this job which is not discretionary.93 
The court ruling found that the DAs had applied guidelines with ‘undue rigidity’ 
as there was ‘no legitimate concern as to the honesty of an application and the 
functionality of the applicant’. Judge Cachalia called on ‘a common sense approach’ 
and found that the ‘NLB clearly failed to apply its mind’. While Judge Cachalia 
stopped short of a formal finding of ‘institutional disarray’ at the NLDTF as this case 
did not bring a class action suit against the NLB, he did express his ‘reservations 
about the functioning of the NLB’. His judgement noted that socially worthy projects 
are ‘being deprived of the opportunity to deliver much needed social services’. His 
ruling stated:
‘There is no reason why applicants for funding have to partake in a game of 
administrative snakes and ladders, where the slightest non-compliance with self-
imposed peremptory criteria means that one has to return to the start.’ 
The judgment acknowledged the inherent tension between administrative 
requirements to ensure consistency versus flexibility to allow for discretion. He 
argued against an automated approach when he stated:
‘This problem is inherent with multiple decisions, and does not relieve an 
administrator of the duty to consider each application individually and justify 
every decision. The law requires nothing less. And it is no defence for the board 
to attempt to relieve itself of this duty by complaining that it has insufficient or 
inadequately trained staff to do this.’94
In a forthright critique Judge Cachalia wrote: 
‘The rigid and inconsistent application of the guidelines, at least partly, explains 
why this has happened. Equally distressing is that the board does not appear 
to understand its mandate properly [emphasis added]. Mr Nevhutanda, the 
chairperson of the board and the deponent to its answering affidavit, seems to 
hold the view that grants given by the board are “gratuities”, which are allocated 
at the board’s discretion. He is wrong. The board holds public funds in trust for 
the purpose of allocating them to deserving projects. And it must ensure that 
these funds are allocated to those projects, provided of course that they meet the 
necessary requirements. The funds do not belong to the board to be disbursed as 
its largesse.’ 95
93  National Lotteries Board vs South African Education and Environment Project (788/2010) [2011] 
ZASCA 154 (28 September 2011). (Appeal judgement)
94  Ibid.
95  Ibid., The Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa Judgment A, Cachalia, Judge of Appeal
The NLB was disappointed at the outcome of the case and said in a media release:
‘If half of these applications do not adhere to the guidelines and the Board is 
required to embark on a to-and-fro exercise to request missing information from 
the applicants, it would lengthen the turnaround times significantly.’96
Recent developments
The NLB is aware of many of the concerns about its poor functioning raised by CSOs and in 
the media. Since mid-2011, the agency has made various moves towards improvement. These 
include:
•   Provincial and national consultations with civil society
•   Road shows
•   Capacity building
Provincial and national consultations with civil society
Given the increasing public and legal challenges reflected in media reports and in the courts, 
the NLB responded by hosting provincial meetings, followed by a national consultative 
meeting in June 2011 ‘with a view to aligning the impending amendment of the Lotteries 
Act to the needs of our communities’. The national indaba afforded the NLB a chance to 
share improvements already instituted, as well as providing a platform for new suggestions 
to emerge. 
Road shows
The NLB recently introduced road shows to coincide with the annual call for proposals. The 
road shows have resulted in an increased number of proposals being received by the NLB 
with the number of applications in the Charities Section alone more than doubling from 4 000 
in 2010, to more than 8 500 in 2011.97 As the NLB has struggled to deal with the proposals it 
received prior to the road shows, it remains to be seen how it is going to effectively process 
an increased volume of applications. 
However, advocacy by civil society has led to improvements in the turnaround times, as 
noted by the DTI Minister at the national consultative meeting in June 2011:
I do not believe it is fair to applicants that they have to wait an excessive time (sometimes 
in excess of a year) to know the outcome of their submission. As I have said earlier, 
the Board has already made impressive improvements to the turnaround time from 
adjudication to payment which now is at 90% within three months.
The same improvements are not yet evident from the time of application to the time of 
adjudication. 
96 http://www.nlb.org.za/general-public/mediareleases.html
97 http://www.ngopulse.org/category/tags/lotto
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In 2011 the NLB raised concern about the dependency of organisations relying solely on 
NLDTF funding. The NLB saw the cause of this dependency as organisations failing to pursue 
fundraising from other sources and not making contingency plans in the event that the 
NLDTF is unable to fund them. In a press release, the NLB indicated that the funding requests 
for applications received in the 2010/2011 call for proposals exceeded R40 billion, while 
the NLB had a budget allocation of R796 million.98 There are many possible explanations 
for the increase in funding applications to the NLDTF, but irresponsible NPOs not making 
contingency plans is not the most likely. The increase is more likely linked to organisations 
seeking internal funding sources with the decline in international funding, as well as a 
consequence of the NLB road shows that have created greater awareness of potential lottery 
funding. 
Capacity building
A recent development outlined by the DTI is that of outreach programmes to educate the 
public on requirements for the applications. The capacity-building programmes proposed 
included addressing drafting constitutions, business planning, financial reporting and 
management and record keeping. Proposed amendments to the Lotteries Act will incorporate 
the capacity-building component. While this is a positive development, participants in this 
research process do not believe that the NLB currently has the capacity to implement such 
an initiative. 
Recommendations 
While the changes mentioned above signal steps in the right direction, until there is clear 
evidence of improvement, the lack of confidence by CSOs in the NLDTF will continue until 
all stakeholders are satisfied that the institution is fulfilling its responsibilities as intended.
The recommendations below are informed by the Coalition’s legal research, provincial con-
sultative process, case study interviews, engagement with relevant government representatives, 
strategy workshops, and those that emerged from the NLB national consultative conference. 
Central to the recommendations are issues of developmental vision, governance, accountability, 
management and administration of the NLB and the distribution agencies. 
Legislation 
•   The Lotteries Act should be amended to allow the Minister to appoint DAs rather than 
individual ‘members’. The legislation should include the provision that the Minister 
commence appointment of DAs at least one year prior to the expiry of the serving DAs. 
•   Processing time frames should be stipulated in amended regulations – such as a six-month 
time-frame for processing / adjudicating applications, a 60-day time-frame for drawing up 
grant agreements, etc. 
•   The Minister should issue further directions to make specific provision for a minimum 
allocation of funds to be directed towards capacity building, including governance 
development of grant recipients of lottery funding. 
98 http://www.nlb.org.za/general-public/mediareleases.html
•   The Minister should also provide for fixed percentages of funding to be set aside for certain 
categories, e.g. children, the aged, people with disabilities, etc.
•   The Act should be amended to expand the definition of alignment to political parties or 
political office bearers to include committees in political parties. There should be severe 
penalties for non-disclosure, including rejection of the application.
Governance and accountability
Lottery governance structure and systems
•   A new Lottery Governance Structure that reflects recommendations from civil society 
research, including from this Coalition, should be implemented and clearly communicated.
•   The NLDTF entity should be governed by its own board or a sub-committee of the existing 
NLB, comprising members with significant development experience. 
•   The board needs to ensure civil society representation and accountability. 
•   DAs should execute their mandate independently of the NLB, declare their interests and 
should not create dissension. 
•   Regulations should require DAs to submit and publish audited reports annually. 
•   Regulations should stipulate increased public accountability reporting by NLB and DAs 
detailing all applications received, processed, approved and rejected, and the time frames / 
amounts / appeals involved. All provisions of The Promotion of Access to Information Act 
(PAIA) should apply at all times to every application.
•   The DTI should set up a structured forum for civil society to engage with the autonomous 
DAs to allow consultation and for civil society to monitor performance.
Lottery transparency and accountability 
•   Annual reporting requirements of the DAs should be prescribed through regulations 
determined by the Minister (or through the terms of appointment by the Minister) and can 
mirror the reporting requirements of the NLB as contained in Section 12 of the Lotteries 
Act. DAs should be directly accountable to the Minister, Parliament and the public. 
•   The distribution agencies and NLB should be required to compile / submit an externally 
audited data report containing the following information: details of applications for 
funding received, details of applications for funding that have been rejected, and details of 
successful applications. 
•   The NLB’s initiative to introduce a fraud hotline has been welcomed. Mechanisms need to 
be put in place to follow up on allegations of fraud reported to the hotline, in cooperation 
with Corruption Watch. 
•   Proper probity checks and investigations by the Board should be done along with 
compulsory disclosure from applicants. There should be penalties for non-disclosure, 
including rejection of an application. 
Vision and strategic direction 
•   The NLB should develop a clear and well-researched development funding vision supported 
by clear policies and good grant-making principles, to be re-visited every three years.
•   The NLB should develop procedures and sector adjudication criteria that align with over-
arching development priorities. 
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•   The NLB should provide an allocated percentage of funding to development and human-
rights related projects that address poverty reduction and eradication. 
•   The new entity should develop and implement an effective impact monitoring and 
evaluation policy and programme.
•   The new entity should allocate funds and support towards capacity building that is not 
necessarily project-related. This would be consistent with the NPO Act. 
•   Provision should be made for rapid response processes to support emergency action, such 
as against the results of the xenophobic violence of 2008. 
Lottery structure 
•   The Minister should require establishment of a separate distribution entity with its own 
administrative capacity and infrastructure that improves on all aspects of management and 
distribution.
•   The DAs would manage the NLDTF. 
•   A clear distinction between the oversight function of the NLB and the distribution function 
of the distribution agencies should be maintained.  
Lottery management 
•   The new entity should have its own management team (CEO and COO), or be outsourced 
to existing funding organisations with proven track records. 
•   An institution-wide Performance Management System that aligns with Lottery aims and 
objectives should be developed.
•   Every individual, at every level within the lotteries (including board members) should be 
required to sign a performance contract that includes clear deliverables and time frames in 
accordance with the Performance Management System.
Grant-making processes 
•   The budget for administration and grant-making should be increased to cover institutional 
development costs, such as recruitment and retention of skilled staff, training and 
development, information technology and management, etc.
•   The website should be upgraded and easy to navigate. 
•   The application process should be simplified and standardised, along with all the requisite 
supporting documentation. To facilitate access to funding for CBOs, assistance with 
application should be provided. 
•   E-mail applications should be encouraged, supported by a significantly upgraded grant 
management system that supports every step of the grant-making process including 
recording each application, production of an acknowledgment letter, filing of applications 
into relevant focus areas, production of all requisite data as required, etc.
•   The technology-based grant management system should be complemented with dedicated 
programme staff, and each funding focus area should be administered by competent 
programme officers. 
•   Management should ensure that only staff with development interest, expertise and 
experience are employed. Additional staff training should be provided to those requiring it. 
•   Adjudication committees should reflect a range of specialist expertise within each sector, 
as well as experience of a range of organisation types (NGO, CBO, etc.). Where necessary, 
this expertise should be co-opted. 
•   While it is recognised that the time between approval of application and payment has 
been significantly reduced, the same should be done from application to adjudication. 
Clear timelines for the adjudication process should be determined and communicated to 
applicants in a transparent manner. This will assist the organisations in their planning. 
•   There should be regular feedback to applicants on the status of their proposal. 
•   Larger organisations with more experience in managing funds should be contracted to 
channel funds to CBOs. 
•   Organisations should be informed within a prescribed period if their applications have 
been rejected, along with reasons for the rejection. 
•   The new entity should set up a research team that analyses progress reports and documents 
lessons learned in order to contribute to knowledge of grant-making practice. 
•   To simplify grant management and build sustainability multi-year funding contracts 
should be available for certain categories, for example the aged, children and people with 
disabilities. 
•   DAs should interact and share information with government departments and other funders 
to identify and prevent ‘double-dipping’ (when organisations access funding for the same 
project from more than one funder).
•   Reporting methods should be simplified and streamlined, including a financial template, 
so that beneficiaries can comply with the requirements more easily.
•   There should be a clear identification of the appeal process that applies to declined 
applications.
Lottery communications / marketing
•   A communications strategy in support of the vision and objectives of the Lottery should be 
produced and continuously revisited.
•   Skilled, experienced and diplomatic spokespersons with developmental competence and 
commitment to the role of civil society should be appointed.
•   The call centre should be well managed and staffed by competent personnel who understand 
the purpose of their role and perform accordingly.
•   Clear, more user-friendly information (printed and online) on guidelines, policies, criteria, 
application forms, available budgets, etc. must be developed and made easily and clearly 
accessible.
•   Regular capacity building programmes should be devised and implemented in all provinces 
to explain funding requirements, time frames, etc. to potential grantees.
•   The DA Research Team should provide successful and/or innovative case studies and 
‘lessons learnt’ for wider distribution. 
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Addressing problem-gambling 
•   The NLB, in liaison with the National Responsible Gambling Programme (NRGP) and other 
organisations, should support interventions that assist people with gambling addictions 
and gambling-related social problems. 
•   Lottery players should be made aware of the gambling counselling service offered by the 
NRGP. 
•   The NLB should contribute to school curricula that address gambling and associated social 
and economic problems. 
•   Advertising of gambling should be strictly monitored, including lottery advertising. 
•   Children under the age of 18 should be barred from all gambling activities. 
•   Warnings about the risks of gambling should be displayed at all Lottery outlets.
Until there is clear evidence of improvement, the lack  
of confidence by CSOs in the NLDTF will continue until  
all stakeholders are satisfied that the institution is  
fulfilling its responsibilities as intended.
CHAPTER SEVEN
The National  
Development Agency 
The same process to that informing the section on the NLB informs this section of the report. The Coalition’s research and advocacy process included commissioning legal 
research into the NDA by Ricardo Wyngaard, a non-profit lawyer. The chapter includes the 
findings of the legal research in addition to suggestions from the provincial consultations, 
case studies and meetings held with the NDA and government departments. 
Fewer of the provincial workshop participants had engaged with the NDA. This was attributed 
to the minimal funds currently available via the NDA, and thus its minimal role as a grant-
maker to the sector. The workshop participants also mentioned their lack of confidence in 
the NDA. Most workshop participants who had experience with the NDA indicated similar 
challenges to those experienced with the lotteries.
Findings from the research process found that, unlike the NLB, the NDA has a clearer 
developmental vision. However, the NDA has been plagued with management and governance 
weaknesses leading to fraud and corruption. A key shortcoming that has negatively affected 
civil society has been the NDA’s inability to produce adequate research on civil society in 
accordance with the requirements of the Act. The directive to maintain a database of the 
sector has also been neglected. The skewed allocation of resources, which sees a significant 
amount of its budget going towards staff and administration costs, results in depleted funds 
for the CSO sector. All these failings have resulted in the previous primary donors to the NDA 
(including the European Union) withdrawing funding for disbursement to civil society, thus 
rendering the NDA inadequate to the most urgent needs of civil socity. 
Background
The concept of an NDA was first mooted in the RDP. Discussions on setting up such an 
agency began in 1994 with a proposed merger between the Independent Development Trust 
(IDT) and the Kagiso Trust. In early 1995, senior representatives of Kagiso Trust, the IDT and 
government met to discuss the need for a new state-created funding agency to channel funds 
to CBOs and CSOs. 
An advisory committee was established in 1996 by Cabinet to consider the functional 
relationship between government and CSOs, in order to build sustainable partnerships between 
the state and CSOs and to build capacity for the implementation of the RDP. In March 1997, 
government accepted a report of the Advisory Committee to the Deputy President entitled 
Structural Relationships between Government and Civil Society Organisations.99 The report 
recommended that a new, independent, statutory body, a national development agency, be 
established to coordinate policy consultations and dispense funds to CSOs. 
99  Structural Relationships between Government and Civil Society, June 1997, Summary Brief available 
at: http://www.healthlink.org.za/pphc/Phila/nda.htm
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As the IDT was linked with the apartheid government, it was agreed to establish the Transitional 
National Development Trust (TNDT) for an interim period until such time as a new regulatory 
framework had been put in place that would result in the creation of what eventually came 
to be known as the NDA. The NDA was established in terms of the National Development 
Agency Act of 1998, with the objective of supporting NPOs, especially those involved in 
poverty eradication. In addition, the NDA was legally charged to facilitate research and policy 
dialogue between government and NPOs, to promote effective capacity-building of NPOs and 
to establish and maintain an NPO database. 
Although the Act was adopted in 1998, the NDA was only launched three years later in 2001. 
Responsibility for the NDA was transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of 
Social Development. The Advisory Committee had suggested the Ministry of Finance or 
the Office of the Deputy President as locations for the NDA. The location of the NDA in the 
Department of Social Development (DSD) rather than the Finance Department as initially 
envisaged, has resulted in an emphasis on funding Social Development priorities (such as 
early childhood development (ECD)) and thus the intended broader developmental focus has 
been lost.
When the NDA came into operation, it sought to distance itself from the TNDT and establish 
its own identity. This resulted in minimal sharing of experience, lessons learned or skills 
transference. Despite its many problems, the TNDT had managed to develop some level of 
expertise and experience. This institutional memory was lost once the NDA came into being.
The concept of the NDA was aligned with the ethos of the RDP, but by the time the NDA 
became operational, government policy had shifted and CSOs were no longer viewed as 
instrumental in the fight against poverty. The political context within which the NDA was 
supposed to operate had changed, with a number of implications for the NDA. 
The Legislation
The NDA’s responsibilities are very clearly articulated in the Act.
The primary objective of the NDA is to:
•   contribute towards the eradication of poverty and its causes by granting funds to CSOs for 
the purposes of carrying out projects or programmes aimed at meeting development needs 
of poor communities, and strengthening the institutional capacity of other CSOs involved 
in direct service provision to poor communities.
The secondary objectives of the NDA are to:
•   promote consultation, dialogue and sharing of development experience between CSOs and 
relevant organs of state; 
•   promote debate on development policy; and
•   undertake research and publication aimed at providing the basis for development policy. 
Duties and powers of NDA are to:
•   act as a key conduit for funding from the Government of the Republic, foreign governments 
and other national and international donors for development work to be carried out by 
CSOs; 
•   develop, conduct and coordinate policy relevant to its objects; 
•   contribute towards building the capacity of CSOs to enable them to carry out development 
work effectively; and
•   create and maintain a database on CSOs including, but not limited to, the scope and subject 
matter of their work and their geographical distribution, and share the information in that 
database with relevant organs of state and other stakeholders. 
The NDA vision and mission 
Vision
The NDA vision is a society free from poverty. 
Mission
The NDA mission is to ‘facilitate sustainable development by strengthening CSOs involved 
in poverty eradication through enhanced grant funding and research’. The mission statement 
was changed from the original statement which was to ‘contribute to poverty eradication and 
elimination of its causes’. The new mission statement is seen to be more specific than the 
previous one (NDA 2011).
The language of the NDA mandate is framed from a development perspective rather than a 
welfarist one. It is explicit that it supports ‘developmental projects in poor communities’.100 
The NDA has interpreted its mandate as limited to reaching rural communities.101 
Structure and governance 
The NDA board and management 
Department of Social 
Development
Minister, Deputy, DG
NPO Act 
NDA Act
NGOs
Entity Oversight  
NPO Directorate
NDA Board
7 Departments
9 Provincial  
Coordinators
National Executive
CEO
Central Committee
9 Provincial Offices
Provincial budget 
allocations
Social Development 
Portfolio Committee
100  http://www.nda.org.za/
101  http://redsummit.org/d.ph?&PageID=353&IX=5754
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In 2008 the NDA engaged the Institute of Directors to induct its board and management on 
sound governance principles. The 2008 NDA Annual Report noted:
This is to align the NDA with the requirements and best practice standards as defined 
in the NDA Act, the PFMA and related treasury regulations, the protocol and the 
recommendations of King II.
Appointments for the third board were seen as more political and aligned to the ruling party. 
This is counter to the Act, which saw civil society participation as ensuring independence. 
A new board was appointed and will serve from 2011 to 2013. The new chairperson is 
Mr M F Kekana. The current board includes CSO representatives, but it remains unclear how 
they anticipate reporting back and accounting to civil society. 
It took almost three years to appoint the next permanent CEO, but in June 2010 Ms Vuyelwa 
Nhlapo, a former DSD deputy director, became CEO. Her appointment has coincided with 
significant financial cutbacks to the NDA budget, which will impact on her ability to achieve 
the NDA’s objectives. 
The central issues of concern with regard to the NDA governance and management are less 
about the lack of accountability measures but rather the lack of compliance, meeting the 
objectives of the Act through effective implementation, and the absence of remedial action in 
situations of non-compliance. 
Governance could be best strengthened through greater 
accountability to the non-profit sector. 
Resources 
Since its inception, the NDA has been allocated comparatively small budgets considering its 
vast mandate. The government has never made the amounts available to the NDA that the 
apartheid government made available to the IDT. 
Over the ten years since its inception, the NDA’s budget has contracted significantly. For 
example, in 2011 the NDA board approved grant funding to 43 CBOs, CSOs and cooperatives 
amounting to R42.4 million. However, in the previous year, funding worth R94.7 million was 
awarded to 77 projects. This was a 55 per cent reduction in funds disbursed. The proposed 
budget for 2011 was R67.4 million. This was, however, reduced to R33 million due to budget 
cuts implemented by National Treasury in the 2010/11 financial year (NDA 2011). This 
amount is less than the amount allocated by the NLB to Makhaya Arts and Culture which 
received R41 million for its programme. The total funds received from the National Treasury 
for 2011 were R83.5 million, representing a reduction of 42 per cent from the previous year 
where the NDA received R144.8 million. The NDA’s plans to raise an additional R20 million 
from other sources did not materialise. R22 million is listed as a liability owed to the EU in 
2010.102 
102  See also http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111013-national-development-agency-201011-annual-report-
deputy-minister-pres; National Development Agency 2010/11 Annual Report to the Portfolio Committee 
on Social Development, by NDA CEO: Ms Vuyelwa Nhlapo, 13 October 2011
The NDA has 11 board members who are appointed by the Minister of Social Development for 
three years and may serve two terms. The board has five government representatives and six 
CSO representatives. The CSO representatives are appointed via a public nomination process. 
The Minister must consult with Cabinet before appointing the government representatives 
to the board, although the criteria used for appointment of government representatives are 
unclear. The Minister appoints one of the CSO representatives as chairperson. 
Board members have come from a range of sectors including education, research, community 
development, child and family development and the faith-based sector. Some board members 
had previous connections to the IDT and the TNDT. 
In terms of the PFMA, the board is the accounting authority of the NDA. Two board members 
are supposed to have proven knowledge and experience of financial management. In terms 
of the PFMA, the board of the NDA must: ensure protection of the assets and records of the 
NDA; act with honesty, integrity and in the best interest of the NDA in managing the financial 
affairs; disclose information on the financial status of the organisation; and prevent prejudice 
to the financial interests of the NDA. 
The NDA board and management have been hampered by similar problems to those 
experienced by the lottery. In addition, the NDA has been plagued by cases of corruption and 
mismanagement. This has resulted in the board playing an interventionist role in the NDA’s 
management. Participants in this research process pointed to the absence of grant-making 
experience and capacity within the NDA. This has resulted in the board making decisions on 
behalf of the NDA management. 
In the first two years of operation, the NDA staff grew to 79 people but only managed to 
disburse 26 per cent of its budget. The board attributed the weaknesses to the mismatch in 
skills of the first CEO who was then replaced by a board member, Delani Mthembu. 
The NDA board is directly accountable to the Minister and falls under the Entity Oversight 
Directorate. Despite legislation that includes oversight structures, during the terms of the first 
board, and under the leadership of board-member-turned-CEO, Delani Mthembu, the NDA was 
caught in a corruption and fraud scandal. Mthembu resigned in 2004, although he contested the 
disciplinary process in court. The COO, Pule Zwane, was also suspended and during this time 
there was a fire at the NDA which allegedly destroyed the evidence of corruption. The NDA 
spent over R1.2 million investigating the allegations while the two were on paid suspension. 
The second board was appointed in 2003, with only one board member remaining from the 
previous board. Although this resulted in a loss of institutional memory, it also represented 
a break from the previous board under whose watch corruption and fraud took place. A new 
CEO, Godfrey Mokate, was appointed in 2005. Despite allegations that the board was ‘too hands 
on’, under the second board’s watch another corruption scandal emerged. R8.7 million was 
transferred to accounts linked to the NDA’s accounts clerk. The new board was seen as more 
decisive in addressing it, and a criminal charge was laid against the staff member concerned. 
At the same time, the European Union (EU) demanded that funds be returned due to lack of 
accountability and the ongoing mismanagement and corruption scandals. Participants in the 
Coalition workshops spoke of the impact this had as the loss of funds negatively affected service 
delivery by CSOs, along with compromising the quality and quantity of what could be offered. 
In 2007 the NDA received its first unqualified audit, albeit with concern over irregular 
expenditure and irregular procurement practices. This reveals the limitations in practice of 
the supposedly rigid PFMA requirements. 
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The NDA’s administrative and governance costs consumed R75.8 million in 2011.103 The NDA 
reported that, ‘Management is still pursuing a financial management model whereby a large 
percentage of its available financial resources are channeled towards service delivery’. This 
has not yet happened. 
In its 2011 annual report presentation to Parliament, the NDA reported a deficit of R30 million. 
It attributed this to the large cut in funding received from the National Treasury. The deficit 
was covered by accumulated reserves from an unused portion of seed capital that it received 
from IDT at the inception of the NDA, as well as from re-appointed funds from discontinued 
projects.104
Despite its legislative mandate to ‘act as a key conduit for funding’, this has clearly not 
materialised. The funds disbursed by the country’s NDA are insignificant compared to the 
billions disbursed by the lottery and the corporate social investment sector. The meagre funds 
allocated to the NDA are seen as indicative of government’s lack of commitment and lack 
of confidence in the NDA’s capacity to act as a conduit of funding. Diminished financial 
resources are also perhaps to blame for the NDA’s inability to meet related responsibilities. 
Thus, in a context where CSOs are profoundly affected by the global recession and cutbacks 
in international donor funding, there have also been significant cutbacks in the budget of the 
government’s main vehicle to support CSOs. 
Board approved project funding 2000/2001 to 2010/2011 financial years
R196 016 437.00 | 2000/2001
R77 685 076.20 | 2001/2002
R40 686 172.00 | 2002/2003
R104 772 958.00 | 2003/2004
R92 643 000.00 | 2004/2005
R68 700 000.00 | 2005/2006
R110 969 560.00 | 2006/2007
R89 886 109.00 | 2007/2008
R85 811 686.00 | 2008/2009
R95 003 148.00 | 2009/2010
R42 954 009.22 | 2010/2011
Total amount
R1 005 128 155.42
(NDA 2011:4)
103  See also http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111013-national-development-agency-201011-annual-report-
deputy-minister-pres; National Development Agency 2010/11 Annual Report to the Portfolio Committee 
on Social Development, by NDA CEO: Ms Vuyelwa Nhlapo, 13 October 2011
104  Ibid.
Strategic direction of the NDA
The NDA is obliged to prepare a three-year strategic plan. Although the NDA was intended to 
act as an independent body, the institution in fact seems to pride itself on closely aligning its 
strategic direction with that of the government:
The NDA’s five-year plan is informed by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
the five Government Priorities, the 12 Government Outcomes, the Government-wide 
Programme of Action, Provincial Growth and Development Programmes and Local 
Economic Development. In doing so, the plan positions the NDA as a relevant and 
strategic role player that is geared towards supporting critical development initiatives 
of CSOs and government at different levels.105 
The NDA’s current Strategic Plan (2010–2013) outlines the following five strategic goals:
•   to build the capacity of CSOs to enable them to carry out development work effectively; 
•   to grant funds to contribute towards the eradication of poverty;
•   to facilitate research towards poverty eradication;
•   to position the NDA as a premier development agency and mobilise resources; and
•   to promote and maintain organisational excellence and sustainability.
The plan does not include developing a database of CSOs or building partnerships between 
the state and CSOs as one of the five strategic goals, although the 2010/2011 annual report 
includes leveraging ‘strategic partnerships to eradicate poverty to enable poor communities 
to achieve sustainable livelihoods’. 
In its presentation to Parliament in October 2011, the NDA included the following strategic 
objective: 
to position the NDA as a premier development agency and to promote and maintain 
organisational excellence and sustainability.106
Statements such as these suggest that rhetoric can replace reality. Considering the history 
of corruption, mismanagement, ineffectiveness in supporting CSOs, and the more recent 
significant budget cuts, such pronouncements suggest that the NDA believes it can talk its 
way out of problems it behaved its way into. 
The NDA has four key focus areas: rural development, vulnerable groups, early childhood 
development (ECD) and land reform. The NDA also partners with the Department of Rural 
Development to support land reform programmes and sustainable food production.107 The 
NDA commends itself for highlighting the issue of food security before it appeared on the 
national radar. 
In line with its developmental agenda, the NDA chose to work with CBOs to the exclusion 
of CSOs. CBOs were viewed as closer to the communities that the NDA set out to reach. 
105  http://www.nda.org.za/docs/Spring%20Issue%202011.pdf; NDA’s ten-year journey towards becoming a 
‘reservoir of knowledge’ 
106  http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111013-national-development-agency-201011-annual-report-deputy-
minister-pres
107  http://www.nda.org.za/docs/Spring%20Issue%202011.pdf; NDA’s ten-year journey towards becoming a 
‘reservoir of knowledge’; Interview with Mr Sonnyboy Lekgau: CSOs and land reform
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According to Swilling and Van Breda (2006:97):
This approach wins political favour because of perceived professional bias in NGOs 
‘out of touch’ with community needs.
From a developmental perspective, reaching CBOs that are close to communities and ad-
dressing grassroots concerns is admirable. The NDA encourages community empowerment and 
promotes developmental activism. The NDA’s Dr Anthony Bouwer described developmental 
activism as follows: 
It involves changing the relationships between ordinary people and people in positions 
of power, so that everyone can take part in the issues that affect their lives.108 
Strategically, the NDA sees CBOs as the vehicle through which to reach ‘ordinary people’ 
but, while theoretically this is sound, support to CBOs has been offered without strategies in 
place to address their lack of capacity, weak controls and inability to account for the funds. 
This absence of strategic focus has reduced the NDA’s ability to transfer significant amounts 
of funding to the CSO sector. In the NDA’s presentation of the 2010/2011 Annual Report to 
Parliament, the CEO reported that 80 per cent of NDA projects supporting vulnerable groups 
failed. Ms Nhlapo conceded that, ‘the NDA would continue to face a challenge in terms of 
capacity building because new organisations needed basic training to manage funds’.109 She 
reiterated that in some cases proper reports were not produced. 
The NDA’s close alignment of its strategy with that of government has the benefits of ensuring 
that it is supporting national priorities. This has, however, been done without consultation 
with civil society. While the Coalition supports CSO interventions that contribute to a 
broader developmental vision, it does so on the understanding that the autonomy of CSOs 
and institutions such as the NDA need not be compromised. 
Funding categories 
The NDA’s precursor, the TNDT, identified education and training, health, rural development, 
urban development and SMME development as priority areas. The NDA has steadily reduced 
its focus to three main areas. These are economic development, education and health. 
Criteria for funding of projects include: 
•   Promote eradication of poverty and its causes. 
•   Promote community ownership of the development process.
•   Adopt a broad-based approach in addressing poverty and its causes.
•   Optimise the effective use of resources / skills through a partnership approach. 
•   Build sustainability and quality development into the project. 
In 2010/2011 the NDA funded projects in agriculture, food security, local economic 
development, capacity building for organisations working in ECD and organisations caring 
for orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs). In support of its economic development focus, 
the NDA has supported cooperatives in activities, such as jewellery making, beekeeping, goat 
108 http://www.nda.org.za/index.php?option=3&id=25&com_task=2&x=6
109  http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111013-national-development-agency-201011-annual-report-deputy-
minister-pres
farming, poultry and vegetable production, and support for communities to enter business, 
for example in the sugar industry. 
Leadership and capacity 
The Minister is responsible for appointing a CEO on recommendation of the board. The 
Minister is also required to approve the NDA’s business plan and estimated statement of 
income and expenditure. 
The NDA Act outlines the responsibilities of the CEO, which include: managing the affairs 
of the NDA and reporting to the board; accounting for all money received by the NDA; and 
performing functions delegated by the board. The CEO is required to enter into a performance 
agreement with measurable objectives, which include preparing the business plan and 
reporting to Parliament. 
The NDA is managed by a National Executive Management Team. The National Office has 
seven departments: 
•   Development Management
•   Human Resources
•   Finance
•   Internal Audit
•   Operations
•   Research and Development
•   Marketing and Communications
There are nine provincial offices, each with a Provincial Coordinator and up to five support 
staff. Provincial offices were set up in order to make the NDA more accessible to CSOs in 
outlying rural areas, but as these are mostly situated in provincial capitals, they do not 
provide significantly improved access for outlying areas. 
The NDA, which distributes a meagre budget, has 120 staff positions (NDA 2011:41). This 
is the same as the NLB staff complement which distributes billions of rands. The NDA 
supported 43 CBOs, CSOs and cooperatives to the value of R42 million (R33 million came 
from the 2010/2011 budget) in the 2010/2011 financial year. The staffing costs for this same 
period were over R47 million (NDA 2011:20.44). 
There is clearly a misalignment between its intention to be more accessible (which is 
welcomed by CSOs) through a bulky provincial structure and the impact that this has on the 
NDA’s ability to meet its legislated responsibility as a conduit of funding. Currently the NDA 
staffing costs are consuming significant amounts of its resources, which divert funds intended 
for CSOs. This then sets the NDA up as a competitor for the very funds meant to reach the CSO 
sector. At the NDA’s presentation of its Annual Report to Parliament, it was stated that, ‘the 
NDA should be working for the poor and should guard against serving individual interests’.110
As noted above, in addition to the corruption charges, the NDA has been plagued with 
management, leadership and capacity problems (Kuljian 2009:129). There has been little 
leadership towards the core vision of the institution, which has negatively affected strategy 
110  http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111013-national-development-agency-201011-annual-report-deputy-
minister-pres
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and implementation. There is clearly misalignment between the organisation’s resources and 
structures. Thus the NDA has so far substantially failed in its responsibilities towards civil 
society. 
Swilling and Van Breda (2006:97) lamented this loss of opportunity:
There is little doubt that if the NDA could have been led from the start by the kind 
of competent leadership with an inspiring vision supported by effective institutional 
capacity that characterised the history of both the Kagiso Trust and the IDT, this 
would have resulted in the NDA becoming a dynamic animator of civil society-based 
development approaches, programmes and projects.
Its ability to act independently could have been earned through competence; instead it lost 
credibility with both government and civil society. While possibly overstating the NDA’s 
potential, Swilling and Van Breda (2006:98) bemoan the NDA’s failures:
Government probably erred when it came to board selection and the board erred when 
it came to management selection. The strategic opportunity costs are incalculable. This 
was the agency that could have changed the course of developmental history in South 
Africa.
The NDA acknowledges weaknesses in leadership and the damage this has caused to its 
reputation. With the appointment of Ms Vuyelwa Nhlapo as the new CEO, the NDA position 
is that it has ‘turned a corner’.111 
Grant-making process
Project proposal Prioritisation
Assessment
Board meeting
Grant
Evaluation
Grant
Monitoring
http://41.204.196.124/www.nda.co.new/index.php?option=3&com_task=1&id=11&x=83
111 http://www.nda.org.za/docs/Spring%20Issue%202011.pdf
Sourcing applications
The NDA has two methods of sourcing applications. It has a request for proposals (RFP) 
method, which is advertised in the media. This process is aimed at well-established CBOs, 
CSOs and cooperatives. The second method, termed the programme formulation (PF) method, 
refers to the process where the NDA provincial offices conduct research into areas identified 
in the provincial growth and development strategy as poverty pockets. The provincial 
offices approach CBOs and CSOs working in these areas to develop proposals for economic 
development or food security projects. Where there are no such organisations, the NDA has 
been known to initiate projects to fill in gaps in government service delivery. If necessary, an 
organisation with the capacity to manage funds administers the grant and channels these to 
the smaller implementing partners. 
While the idea of initiating projects as a form of outreach has definite developmental 
possibilities, the process is also open to manipulation and even fraud if it is used as a means 
to circumvent the request for proposals process.
Processing applications
The NDA has disbursed more funding through the PF method than the RFP method. As the 
RFP method is more competitive and transparent, the NDA has thus largely funded through 
non-competitive processes. Four of the nine provinces (KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, Gauteng 
and the Northern Cape) indicated that funds will only be disbursed through the PF method 
in this financial year.112 The remaining provinces will use a combination of PF and RFP. The 
NDA currently prioritises their own form of proactive funding at the expense of CSO-initiated 
projects. 
Has the NDA served the needs of CSOs in South Africa?
The promulgation of the NDA Act signalled the intention of government to support CSOs in 
a developmental fashion. As reflected above, the preamble to the Act states that it is aimed 
at promoting an appropriate and sustainable partnership between the government and CSOs 
to eradicate poverty and its causes. The NDA Act thus provides civil society with a lobbying 
tool to hold government accountable to its stated commitment to collaborate with CSOs. 
Despite the tremendous potential for the NDA to ‘change the course of developmental history 
in South Africa’, research has shown that it has ‘been unable to disburse funds adequately, 
and its funding practices cannot be described as developmental’ (Swilling and Van Breda 
2006:98) – this despite the language of the Act being framed in developmental terminology 
and concepts. 
The NDA has similar operational problems to those identified in the NLB. These include 
application processing delays, payment delays, site visit delays, poor communication with 
applicants and grantees, and a need for the IT / grant management system to be upgraded. 
Urban organisations are overlooked as the priority is for organisations working in rural areas. 
Organisations waiting for applications to be processed have had to consume reserve funds 
which damages longer-term sustainability. 
112  http://www.nda.org.za
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Capacity-building 
In contrast to the Lotteries Act, the NDA Act makes explicit provision for strengthening the 
institutional capacity of CSOs. Additional research would be needed to assess this aspect 
of the NDA’s performance, but based on available evidence it does seem that capacity-
building interventions have taken place. These have included effective governance, 
financial management, resource mobilisation, community organising, understanding the 
legal framework for CSOs, project management, and other key leadership and management 
competency and capability areas. These initiatives continued into 2011, although it appears 
that the number of organisations reached declined due to the funding cuts. Organisations 
participating in the Coalition’s provincial workshops complained that communication about 
the NDA’s training workshops is poor, thus for many organisations these opportunities are 
lost.
Capacity building and support will remain an ongoing challenge and will require creative 
approaches to ensure that the NDA can reach CBOs effectively. The current failure rate of 
80 per cent of projects reaching vulnerable people reveals that the current approach is not 
working.113 The NDA acknowledges that a ‘new approach is needed’, particularly in relation 
to failures in the land reform sector. The NDA’s Spring 2011 newsletter notes that:
a number of CSOs have closed shop due to mismanagement of resources and directors 
pursuing their own personal agendas.114
Again, in theory the NDA approach is attempting to address developmental concerns 
around support for CBOs in rural areas. What is lacking seems to be appropriate levels of 
communication and consultation. The NDA should develop processes to work collectively 
with a broad range of stakeholders, notably those in the CSO sector. 
Research and policy development 
The NDA Act commits the NDA to undertake research to provide the basis for policy 
development. The NDA has so far not made a significant contribution to research and policy 
development. Participants in this research process lamented the lack of reliable, current data 
and information which hinders the effectiveness of the CSO sector. 
The lack of investment in research and policy development is reflected in the financial 
investment. In 2006/2007 the NDA spent R445 717 on research and development, compared 
with the R1.9 million spent on consulting fees for the CEO’s office in the same financial 
year. While the expenditure in research has increased steadily since then, from R3 million 
in 2007/2008 to over R5 million in 2008/2009, the NDA is still not a significant player in 
generating knowledge and information that informs poverty eradication approaches or 
strengthens the CSO sector. 
113  http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111013-national-development-agency-201011-annual-report-deputy-
minister-pres
114 http://www.nda.org.za/docs/Spring%20Issue%202011.pdf
The NDA acknowledged this shortcoming in its Spring 2011 newsletter: 
We have not yet engaged successfully as a think-tank for issues related to poverty 
eradication. Therefore a more critical focus is needed to continue our strategic 
conversation with such organisations towards becoming a ‘reservoir of knowledge’.115 
A number of research reports were developed in the 2010/2011 time frames. These include 
two best-practice reports, a consolidation of closeout / impact evaluation reports and a 
consolidation of due diligence reports. About eight reports and manuals were compiled or 
distributed on topics such as ‘how to write a project proposal’ and ‘how to start a successful 
cooperative’ (NDA 2011:27). However, these reports are not accessible on the NDA website. 
Consultation, dialogue and sharing development experience 
One of the objectives of the NDA is to promote consultation, dialogue and sharing of 
development experience between CSOs and relevant organs of state. The NDA has hosted 
conferences and dialogues. In 2010/2011 it hosted nine provincial workshops and four 
national think-tanks in preparation for the Rural Economic Development Summit that 
took place in October 2010. The outcomes of the summit were supposed to inform an 
implementation and action plan to be carried forward by the NDA. Reports for the various 
conferences and dialogues are not accessible on the website. The NDA had undertaken 
to coordinate regional and international dialogues in 2010 and 2011 to promote a vibrant 
civil society. However these did not take place due to budgetary constraints. The impact of 
the conferences and dialogues is not clear, and without accessible reports, the knowledge 
generated is not transferred.
Creating a database
Despite the NDA having been in existence since 2001, it only began its legislated responsibility 
to establish a CSO database during the 2008/2009 financial year. The database has seemingly 
not been maintained. 
The NPO Directorate also maintains a database of registered CSOs. It seems self-evident that 
the NDA and the NPO Directorate should be cooperating in this regard, especially as both 
fall under the aegis of the Department of Social Development (DSD). CSOs have repeatedly 
approached the two institutions, as well as Stats SA, to suggest cooperation. The absence of 
current and reliable information is a major hindrance to coordination efforts by CSOs, and to 
the policy and planning of potential donors to the sector. 
Conduit of funds
The intent of the legislation was to establish the NDA as a key conduit for funding from the 
South African government, foreign governments and other national and international donors. 
As shown above, the organisation has failed to deliver on this intention and has thus lost this 
opportunity, and in the process deprived civil society of much-needed funding sources. 
115  Interview with Executive Director of Development Management, Mr Reuben Mogano, http://www.nda.
org.za/docs/Spring%20Issue%202011.pdf; NDA’s ten-year journey towards becoming a ‘reservoir of 
knowledge’ 
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In addition to the damage caused by the corruption charges and the governance and 
management failures detailed above, the NDA has also lost credibility because it has acted as 
the implementing arm of government policy. While this may have been a survival strategy, 
this stance has compromised the NDA’s credibility among international donors, most notably 
the EU, which has completely withdrawn from its relationship with the NDA. In contrast, 
the Foundation for Human Rights (FHR), successfully disburses EU funds via cooperative 
relationships between the EU, Department of Justice and CSOs. This example shows that it 
is possible to maintain commitment to founding values, remain independent, and serve as a 
conduit of funds via government. 
The NDA’s current use of more than 50 per cent (50%) of its annual allocation to cover 
operational costs demonstrates that urgent steps must be taken towards re-directing these 
resources to the intended beneficiaries. 
Organisations applying for and receiving funds from the NDA have had mixed experiences. 
Some expressed reluctance to engage with the NDA again, while other CSOs participating 
in the Coalition’s workshops had a positive experience with the NDA. There are NDA staff 
members who seem to have a ‘heart’ for and genuine commitment to rural development. 
CaSe STudy: Siyakhula Trust116
The Siyakhula Trust does community capacity building work to assist community 
leaders, CBOs, NPOs and government officials to develop the skills needed to 
manage development and job creation projects. Between 2006 and 2008, the trust 
applied three times to the NLDTF but was unsuccessful each time. It then decided 
to abandon attempts to seek funding from the lottery and sought NDA funding. In 
June 2006 Siyakhula responded to an RFP as part of the national poverty alleviation 
project. Siyakhula received funds to facilitate the development of six umbrella 
community structures in nine municipal regions in the North West. Their application 
was successful and they received a grant for two years (2006–2008) for a total of 
R1.7 million. A total of 22 CSOs received funding to conduct various development 
initiatives under this NDA Programme. The director of Siyakhula Trust, Jill Fenwick, 
described the NDA staff as ‘very supportive and interested in the work being done’. 
Despite experiencing a number of payment delays for the second and third tranches, 
Siyakhula Trust was able to continue with implementation and complete the project 
on time. Some of the other 22 CSOs participating in the programme did not have 
reserves to tide themselves over during payment delays and they collapsed. From this 
project, Siyakhula Trust developed a good relationship with the NDA and received 
further funds. They found working with the NDA to be ‘a very positive experience’ as 
they found the staff committed to rural development.
Finally, many of the participants in this research process strongly criticised the NDA’s funding 
of cooperatives as these are not NPOs. Cooperatives receive funds from the DTI, and NDA 
support to cooperatives further diverts funds from worthy CSOs. 
116 Interview conducted with Jill Fenwick, Director, 2011
Public accountability 
The NDA Act and the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), provide a number of 
accountability measures. Annual reports, including the Auditor-General’s reports, are in the 
public domain. The NDA is subject to the stringent regulatory provisions of the PFMA. The 
PFMA should, in theory, ensure also a high level of accountability. 
Despite these measures, the NDA has been plagued with allegations of corruption and 
mismanagement. The NDA website and annual reports mention some of the organisations 
that have received funds. They do not include complete lists of beneficiaries, which has 
raised questions over whether funds are distributed in a fair and equitable manner. CSOs 
participating in the Coalition’s workshops are calling for a greater role in holding the NDA 
accountable. 
The most significant failure in the NDA’s internal controls emerged in 2006 when the Auditor-
General found that R8 770 082.26 of the NDA’s funds was misappropriated through 28 irregular 
payments from the NDA’s bank account into four bank accounts linked to the accounts clerk 
of the NDA. The Auditor-General’s office pointed out a number of weaknesses in the control 
environment which allowed for the misappropriation of the funds and, more importantly, 
that the transfer of such huge amounts through fraudulent payments was not detected by 
senior management. A disciplinary process was instituted against the chief financial officer, 
the company secretary and finance manager. All were found not guilty on the grounds that the 
accounts clerk had illegally obtained authorised passwords. The press release on the clearing 
of the charges did not mention that they failed to detect the payments.117 Criminal charges 
were laid against the accounts clerk who was found guilty and sentenced to a 15-year jail term. 
As mentioned above, the board has subsequently paid closer attention to financial governance. 
Recommendations
NDA governance
•   The NDA should seek to operate as an autonomous grant-making institution, working as an 
independent conduit of government and international funding. Its strategic priorities and 
programmes should be determined through a consultative process with government and 
CSOs in the three-way partnership that was initially envisaged. 
•   Regulations are needed to ensure that there is regular disclosure of information that enables 
monitoring by civil society. To this end, a budget should be allocated in order for the NDA 
to engage with civil society formations on an annual basis around its work, the board’s 
performance, the Auditor-General’s report and the NDA Annual Report. 
•   Civil society board representatives should be required to account to civil society. This 
should include information being made available on performance standards, the resources 
available through the NDA, management of such resources, expenditure-tracking reports, 
strategic plan evaluations and performance monitoring reports. 
117  http://www.nda.org.za/?option=3&id=1&com_id=282&parent_id=273&com_task=1; 2007/16/08; ‘NDA 
senior managers cleared of negligence charges’
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NDA legislation 
•   The NDA has become a funding arm of the DSD. Regulations could provide guidance to 
ensure a wider developmental focus, aligned with civil society priorities and government 
policy beyond the DSD. Funding criteria should be open to public consultation and 
scrutiny. 
•   There is currently no open, transparent process for appointing government representatives 
to the NDA Board. Regulations should identify criteria and skills required for government 
representatives.
•   The legislation should be amended to allow a system of increased public accountability of 
NDA board members. The legislation should make provision for civil society to monitor the 
performance of the six members representing civil society. This would mean that sufficient 
information is made available on required performance standards, the resources at the 
disposal of the NDA, the management of such resources, expenditure tracking reports, 
strategic plan evaluations and performance monitoring reports. 
•   The definition ‘civil society organisation’ should be amended to allow for only NPOs to 
obtain funding from the NDA. The definition should not include cooperatives. 
•   The board should regulate the time frames for considering and deciding upon grant 
applications. Applicants that have not received grant funding should be notified of the 
rejection and be given reasons for the rejection of their applications within a specified time 
period. 
•   The NDA should be required to compile reports containing the number of applications 
for funding received, the number of applications rejected and the number of successful 
applications. 
•   The Annual Report to be prepared by the NDA should reflect the number of board meetings 
held during a particular period, who attended or not, and whether the chairperson provided 
prior approval for the absence of a member. 
•   A process is needed through which NDA board decisions can be reviewed. 
Resources
•   The NDA needs to be adequately resourced so that it can function as intended.
•   A review and rationalisation of operational expenses must take place so that an appropriate 
level of spend on the effective functioning of the institution is achieved, while the 
proportion available for disbursement to civil society is increased. 
NDA strategy
•   The NDA should be guided by a developmental agenda that includes support for advocacy 
and human rights.
•   The NDA board should provide guidance and oversight to ensure that the NDA delivers on 
all legislated obligations including research, policy dialogue and data production on civil 
society.
•   The NDA needs to ensure that it is aware of the activities of other government departments 
so that, for example, it does not duplicate the responsibilities of agriculture, land affairs 
and the DTI.
NDA management
•   The NDA board needs to ensure that the CEO is capable and experienced, with significant 
development funding experience. 
•   The CEO must establish and oversee the implementation of efficient and effective 
management systems and procedures.
NDA operations / human resources
•   Experienced and competent staff should be appointed, including people with development 
and grant-making skills.
•   Systems and efficiency issues are similar to those within the NLB and these should be 
remedied, particularly the flow of applications from provincial to national level, and the 
communication with grantees. 
•   Provincial coordinators and project staff need training and support. 
•   Provincial offices should engage more actively in pre- and post-funding impact assessment 
and the Research Team should document and publicise the lessons learnt.
NDA communications / marketing
•   The NDA should develop more user-friendly on-line and print materials with guidelines 
for applicants.
Capacity building and support will remain an  
ongoing challenge and will require creative approaches  
to ensure that the NDA can reach CBOs effectively.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Good practice  
by grant makers 
While an in-depth study of good grant-making practice is beyond the scope of this report, the Coalition believes that a brief overview of the work of successful grant-making 
institutions may be useful at this point. 
This section is thus informed by:
•   snapshots of other national lotteries
•   the Multi-Agency Grants Initiative (MAGI) – a consortium of funders supporting CBOs118
•   interviews with the DG Murray Trust (DGMT), Tshikululu Social Investments and the 
Foundation for Human Rights (FHR)119
Interviews conducted for this research illustrated that South African CSOs are struggling 
financially. The gradual withdrawal of international donors, the effects of the global recession, 
and the inefficiencies within the NLB and the NDA are among the reasons for this situation. For 
example, PEPFAR’s withdrawal and the removal of NGO funding in bilateral agreements with 
government have resulted in substantially reduced revenues to the CSO sector. Philanthropy-
based funders, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, have been affected by the 
financial crisis. This has resulted in more CSOs turning to local sources of funding, evident 
in the dramatic increase in applications received by local donors.120 Donors interviewed for 
this section spoke of CSOs retrenching staff, cutting back on programmes and closing down. 
Organisations that once had multiple sources of funding no longer do. The financial crisis is 
forcing grant makers to reassess their roles and strategies. The following were identified as 
good funding practice: 
•   Relevance and intelligence
•   Independence and integrity 
•   Good governance
118  Established in June 2006, the Multi-Agency Grants Initiative (MAGI) is a collaborative venture between 
Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries (HIVOS), Atlantic Philanthropies, 
Uthando and the Ford Foundation. The purpose of the fund is to provide a responsive mechanism for 
the provision of small grant funding to organisations at community level within South Africa.
119  Interviews for this section were conducted with: David Harrison, CEO of the DG Murray Trust, 
2 December 2011; Tracey Henry, CEO of Tshikululu Social Investment, 7 December 2011; and Yasmin 
Sooka, Executive Director of the Foundation for Human Rights, 10 December 2011. The Funding 
Practice Alliance is conducting more detailed research into good practice in funding that is likely to be 
released in 2012. 
120  The DGMT received double the applications in 2011 than it did in 2010.
•   Strategic approach 
•   Capacity 
•   Partnerships
•   Grant-making processes
Relevance and intelligence
Assessing their roles and relevance requires making the time and setting up processes for 
critical reflection. The Big Lottery Fund (BLF) which distributes 46 per cent (46%) of funds 
raised in the UK lottery, explicitly strives to be an ‘intelligent funder’. This means that 
‘working more closely with applicants and grant holders will achieve better outcomes’ and 
where improved systems and processes can streamline the ‘funding experience’. 
Intelligent funding includes ongoing dialogue with CSOs, long-term investments and a 
partnership approach (Unwin 2006). Dialogue facilitates better decision-making; long-term 
support enhances sustainability and frees organisations to do their work rather than spend 
time and resources pursuing funds; and partnerships based on respectful and mutually 
beneficial relationships create leverage. 
The DGMT was set up by the construction company Murray and Roberts. The DGMT also 
engages in reflection on their role. Grant makers acknowledge that their resources are meagre 
in relation to the state and thus set out to influence change through leverage. The DGMT 
CEO David Harrison commented on the role of grant makers saying, ‘Foundations are located 
between service delivery and policy and can play a different role’.121
As grant makers become increasingly aware of the limitations and inefficiencies in the state, 
they are moving away from playing the role of ‘gap fillers’ and are working towards more 
creative funding models, identifying bottlenecks and supporting replicable projects that can 
have a knock-on effect, such as the DGMT leadership project. 
Successful grant makers work to their areas of expertise. Where relevant, Tshikululu Social 
Investments encourages social entrepreneurship, such as the hospice shop, as avenues for 
revenue generation for CSOs. There are many approaches that CSOs have used for years that 
are effective. Tshikululu CEO Tracey Henry commented:
Times are tough and are likely to be like this for a while, so we need to ensure that 
funding that is available is responsibly channelled and to constantly question our role 
and what value we add.122 
To avoid falling into empty cycles of administrative and bureaucratic compliance, the 
organisations interviewed for this research see themselves as knowledge organisations and 
have internal structures to build knowledge and generate critical thinking. In Tshikululu those 
working on different areas, such as education, meet every six weeks to share information. 
Tshikululu produces a newsletter and it is part of staff performance areas to produce thought 
pieces. Tshikululu has a book club where colleagues bring in relevant books and readings. It 
runs social investment workshops where knowledge is shared within the corporate sector. 
121 Interview with David Harrison, CEO of the DG Murray Trust, 2 December 2011
122 Interview with Tracey Henry, CEO of Tshikululu Social Investment, 7 December 2011
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Independence and integrity 
The value of the CSO sector lies partly in its independence from the state. Grant makers that 
maintain their independence from the state add value by operating in a space between service 
delivery and policy. The FHR clearly demonstrates the ability for funders to be a conduit of 
funds through government and to simultaneously retain their own programme. Despite its 
close relationship with the Department of Justice, the FHR has funded organisations that can 
be seen as challenging to government, including social movements. The FHR supported the 
Right2Know Campaign, which lobbied against the Secrecy Bill. 
Good governance
Clean and thoughtful governance is central to effective grant-making organisations. This 
includes clear codes of conduct and performance management for board members, ethics, 
values, transparency and risk management. 
Grant makers interviewed for this chapter described their boards as ‘active’. Boards that 
merely rubber stamp decisions from management are not likely to play an effective oversight 
function. It is important for board members and trustees to participate in the development of 
the organisation’s strategy and then to play a strong oversight role. 
The DGMT has endowment funds and an independent board of trustees. The trustees serve 
a five-year term. A diversity matrix on skills and demographics is maintained. The DGMT 
board was described as ‘very engaged’, with a high level of accountability. The CEO and 
trustees have a good working relationship. The DGMT uses a charter to guide the relationship 
between the governance structure and management, with clear conflict of interest clauses. The 
CEO of the DGMT allocates 20 days per year to governance-related meetings and committees. 
Tshikululu Social Investments too places important emphasis on governance and compliance 
and has streamlined processes to minimise bureaucracy. Flexibility is available for creativity 
and initiative. 
Strategic approach 
Local grant makers take national government priorities into consideration, particularly using 
available research such as the National Planning Commission reports. This ensures that 
funding is addressing key developmental priorities. For example, the DGMT has a strategic 
focus on education: it therefore supports early childhood development, complements this with 
a ‘critical transitions’ programme for school children and finally seeks to create ‘connections 
to opportunity’ for young people.
The DGMT encourages partners to think in terms of results rather than projects. The DGMT 
leadership programme seeks not only to support leadership development in disadvantaged 
communities, but also programmes that create linkages between advantaged and disadvantaged 
youth. 85 per cent (85%) of this programme’s participants come from disadvantaged 
communities and 15 per cent (15%) from more advantaged communities. The programme is 
currently being piloted and tested. 
The BLF ‘regularly and widely’ consults with the voluntary and community sector with regard 
to their strategy, programmes and funding principles. Its Big Thinking strategic framework to 
2015 was informed by an online survey that received almost 3 500 responses. An analysis of 
the responses is available on the BLF website.123 Its strategic plan was thus informed by an 
open and transparent consultation process. 
Funding powerful tools for change: advocacy, lobbying and litigation
Foundations and grant makers are motivated by the need to improve the lives of people in 
need and achieve social justice. Historically, philanthropic giving focused on charity and 
welfare-based interventions, with less focus on advocacy, lobbying and litigation.124 As the 
government increasingly views CSOs as service providing agencies for government, private 
foundations are paying more attention to organisations working in social justice and public 
innovation. 
The FHR focuses on rights and social justice, including support for organisations that 
undertake advocacy and lobbying. The FHR has initiated a programme aimed at building 
participatory democracy. This includes convening provincial and national forums and 
facilitating public policy dialogues to strengthen participation in national and provincial 
legislatures. The FHR is concerned that:
the inadequate presence of the voices of the vulnerable in these processes robs the 
nation of critical inputs to help deepen and sustain a democratic culture based on the 
values enshrined in the constitution.125 
This is the type of work that the NDA should be doing. 
Organisations like the DGMT have traditionally not supported advocacy and lobbying. 
This is changing with the realisation that, ‘there is a need to regain the commitment to 
the public good, and for foundations this may include supporting legal instruments and 
focusing across sectors.’126 The DGMT leadership programme aims to develop ‘a cohort of 
connected young people with a focus on the public good’. David Harrison noted that, ‘old 
white money is waking up to advocacy concerns with the rise of corruption’. He advised 
advocacy organisations to develop clear programmes that could ‘give foundations hooks’ to 
invest in. 
For Tshikululu Social Investments supporting advocacy and lobbying is, ‘becoming an 
increasingly important part of what we do’.127 Tshikululu supports advocacy on issues such 
as gender-based violence and disability, along with supporting organisations that offer legal 
support. 
123 http://www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/index/about-uk/bigthinking.htm
124  http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/learning/speech-investment-south-africa-inside-and-out-
reflections-overseas-friend
125 http://www.fhr.org.za/page.php?p_id=70
126 Interview with David Harrison, CEO of the DG Murray Trust, 2 December 2011
127 Interview with Tracey Henry, CEO of Tshikululu Social Investment, 7 December 2011
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Many of those working in foundations and grant-making organisations have a sense of honour 
and privilege in being able to do their work. They approach their interactions with grantees 
in a spirit of partnership and derive tremendous satisfaction from the contributions they 
make. They appreciate the opportunities to work up close with ‘the champions of change, 
people who are silent heroes doing the most amazing things’.128 This includes some people 
in government (and the NDA and NLB) who are committed to addressing poverty and under-
development. 
Proactive vs reactive funding 
Some leading foundations and grant makers are concerned that some CSO partners do not 
keep up with changing social development needs. Therefore, some funding agencies are 
adopting more proactive approaches: they regularly assess social needs that may not yet have 
support and sometimes initiate programmes based on this assessment. 
For example, the FHR scans the human rights context nationally and provincially and initiates 
projects where there are ‘gaps’. However, the FHR is keenly aware that their proactive approach 
may be perceived as competition by implementing CSOs. This possibility is managed through 
consultation and cooperation. Until 2010, the DGMT only responded to proposals. With the 
introduction of a new strategy in 2011, the Trust is now more proactive and implements some 
lead initiatives. 
Capacity: the ‘dream team’ 
While the NLDTF and the NDA are plagued by inefficiencies, outside of government the 
grant-making sector has become increasingly professionalised. Grant-making in a context 
of resource scarcity comes with profound responsibility, and funding agencies must have 
the requisite capacity and experience for wise and informed decision-making. Good grant-
making requires individuals who understand development and are accountable, ethical and 
unwilling to compromise the integrity and purpose of their organisation. 
Grant-making leaders interviewed for this research believe that grant makers need to be open 
to ongoing learning in a rapidly changing context. This requires respect for the knowledge 
and expertise of the CSOs supported. Humility and good listening skills strengthen funders’ 
ability to forge relationships and develop better understanding of the issues facing partner 
organisations. 
Leaders need to be aware of issues facing management. When the DGMT shifted strategy in 
2011, the opportunity to recruit a ‘dream team’ was created. This team was rapidly bogged 
down when the number of proposals doubled in 2011. To address this required active 
management intervention. The DGMT reviewed how staff were spending their time. When 
it was found that time was disproportionately spent, for example on smaller grants, then the 
process for managing smaller grants was trimmed to rectify this. Management interventions 
are done in a way that reinforces confidence in the team and creates latitude for them to take 
initiative and avoid unnecessary administrative drudgery. 
128 Ibid. 
The MAGI project indicated that the ingredients required for an effective grant-making team 
include ‘top-class people, with experience and networks in development, or with the potential 
to develop these, and with passion for, and commitment to, what they are doing’. Getting the 
right people into the right jobs is essential for grant-making to be innovative and effective. 
Partnerships 
With grant makers aware of limitations in the context of diminishing resources, leverage and 
‘punching above their weight’ are largely aimed for by forging partnerships. 
MAGI sees the basic pillars of grant-making as capacity-building, brokering linkages and 
referrals, monitoring and evaluation, and leveraging of additional funds within a consortium 
model.129 
To enhance the impact of its ECD intervention, the DGMT is working with two other non-
governmental funders – UBS Optimus and Elma Philanthropies. The three foundations are 
supporting a single strategy and pooling resources in partnership with the government in the 
North West. 
Interviewees all noted that establishment of successful partnerships requires time and 
diplomacy: as Tracey Henry noted, ‘The gaps are huge between knowledge of the problems 
and how to solve them’. The private sector can be cautious to partner and invest when there 
are unallocated budgets in the state, or concerns that the funds won’t be used for the intended 
purpose. Added to the mix are complex state structures where it can be difficult to locate 
people with authority and identify the most appropriate channels for partnerships. 
Effective foundations and grant makers are aware of the power dynamics inherent within 
the funder-beneficiary equation. Tracey Henry said, ‘What funders don’t always realise is 
that it is not their money… there can be a grandiose sense from some funders.’ Conversely, 
‘Foundations can be patronising in their attempts to not be patronising’.130 The DGMT, 
Tshikululu Social Investments and FHR have high expectations and treat their ‘beneficiaries’ 
as partners and equals. David Harrison said:
There is a need for robust engagement which leads to more honest relationships. 
Foundations are looking for good projects and success stories so it is not a one way 
street.
Grant-making processes 
Effective grant makers have clearly articulated visions and strategies that guide implementation. 
For example, the UK’s Big Lottery Fund (BLF) aims to be an ‘intelligent’ funder by following 
the following steps: 
•   Creating and sharing a clear vision and purpose
•   Knowing and stating their place in the market
•   Creating a ‘learning’ organisation
•   Aligning structures and resources with vision / mission
•   Managing and adapting to change
129 http://magi.org.za/
130 Interview with David Harrison, CEO of the DG Murray Trust 2 December 2011
96   |   Critical Perspectives on Sustainability of the South African Civil Society Sector Good practice by grant makers   |   97
Good grant-making organisations work to be vibrant participants in addressing poverty and 
development. The grant-making process flows from a clear sense of purpose underpinned 
by relevant capacity and skill. Interviewees for this chapter stressed that grant-making is not 
‘rocket science’, and that the simpler and more accessible it is, the better both for applicants 
and for those processing applications. Assessment processes need to be as transparent as 
possible, communication with potential grantees timely, and financial processes and systems 
streamlined to avoid delays in payments. There is a need for accountability, regular feedback, 
communication and evidence-based research to inform decision-making. Monitoring and 
evaluation should cover both quantitative and qualitative indicators. 
Taking into consideration the capacity limitations of many CBOs, a number of grant makers 
have conscious strategies to ensure access to funding by smaller organisations. These strategies 
include: 
•   administering smaller grants; 
•   offering capacity-building support through training, mentoring or coaching; 
•   simplifying reporting requirements; or 
•   seeking out larger more sophisticated CSOs to mentor and monitor funds on behalf of 
CBOs. 
Another strategy is to include smaller organisations in larger consortium projects. Some large 
donors support other donor programmes, such as MAGI, that have specific programmes to 
support CBOs.
Effective grant makers have clearly  
articulated visions and strategies  
that guide implementation. 
CHAPTER NINE
Conclusion and final  
recommendations
There is no doubt that the South African civil society sector is facing a funding crisis. This 
needs to be addressed on many fronts. At the macro-level, legislative reform and renewed work 
on an enabling policy environment for civil society, and for grant-making and other forms of 
investment in social development, is required. It is unfeasible to expect that a developmental 
state can be built in the absence of visionary legislation that defines the human development 
objectives of the country.
At the more intermediate and micro-levels, there is urgent need for more strategic and effective 
approaches to development funding. International sources are now much less available, 
which means that local funding sources must be developed and leveraged. These include 
private philanthropy, corporate social investment and the contributions from state-related 
agencies such as the NLB and the NDA. 
The work of the Coalition and other civil society formations such as the Funding Practice 
Alliance (FPA) highlight the problems within these agencies and suggest remedial action. 
Since the Coalition began work on this initiative, both the NLB and the NDA have publically 
committed to change. As this report is going to print, the NPO Directorate in the DSD is hosting 
consultations with civil society with regard to intended improvements in its functioning. 
The environment is clearly ripe for change. However, these changes must be informed by 
appropriate contributions from civil society. The Coalition intends this report as one of those 
contributions.
CSOs are encouraged to continue their creative efforts to access funds and to hold the NLB 
and the NDA accountable. It is important to remember that members of the public who 
purchase lottery tickets are often motivated to buy tickets because of the perception that their 
money supports good causes. It is therefore possible to use the power of these consumers to 
ensure that the lottery is held accountable for how it uses the funds. CSOs can and are using 
the various strategies available to them, such as research, advocacy, litigation and protest, to 
extract funds from the NLB and the NDA, and to push for enduring changes. 
Much more cooperation is needed, including partnerships between public and private 
funding sources. For both the NLB and the NDA, there is need for both short-term repair 
and regulatory reform leading to systemic change. If the South African government is indeed 
serious about its ‘developmental state’ stance, then legislative reform must not take place 
in piecemeal fashion. During the Coalition’s various engagements with government and 
other state-related agencies, it became disturbingly clear that there is very little contact, let 
alone cooperation, between the various government institutions having responsibility for the 
wellbeing of civil society.
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While we acknowledge and commend the movements towards improvement currently taking 
place in the NLB, the NDA and the NPO Directorate, we urge these agencies, together with 
responsible leadership in related bodies such as Treasury, SARS and the National Planning 
Commission, to commit to a cooperative process towards over-arching and systemic reform 
of the enabling environment for civil society. 
We call for a review by the NPC of the developmental aid architecture in South Africa as a 
matter of urgency. 
We further recommend that a cross-sectoral working group, which includes strong civil 
society representation, is established to plan the necessary changes. We expect the outcome 
of this recommendation to be a holistic framework for the location and effective functioning 
of the National Development Agency (NDA), the National Lottery Distribution Fund (NLDTF), 
specific allocations from official development assistance, private philanthropy and corporate 
social investments, congruent with the developmental state.
The environment is clearly ripe for change.  
However, these changes must be informed by  
appropriate contributions from civil society.  
The Coalition intends this report  
as one of those contributions.
 
Appendix
Provincial consultation schedule 
•   Durban, 21 April 2010
•   Middelburg, 14 July 2010
•   Polokwane, 15 July 2010
•   Cape Town, 11 August 2010 
•   East London, 16 August 2010
•   Port Elizabeth, 17 August 2010
•   Potchefstroom, 10 September 2010 
•   Johannesburg, 15 September 2010
•   Bloemfontein, 16 September 2010
•   Kimberley, 17 September 2010
Consultative meeting, SANGONeT CEO circle, October 2009 
List of interviews 
•   Interviews with six CSOs for case studies
•   Interviews with Lottery DA member (request for name to be withheld)
•   Interview with NDA board member (request for name to the withheld)
•   Interviews with NDA CEO, Vuyelwa Nhlapo, and senior management
•   Interview with Big Lottery Fund (UK)
Engagement with government
•   Meeting with Minister Rob Davies, Department of Trade and Industry
•   Meetings with executives in the Presidency
•   Meeting with R. Toli of National Treasury
•   Meeting with H Mhkize of NEDLAC
•   Meeting with Methodology and Standards division, Statistics South Africa
•   Meetings with NLB board member, and with management during 2010/2011
•   Participation in NLB National Consultative Indaba, June 2011 
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Including an assessment of the 
National Lotteries Board (NLB) and 
the National Development Agency (NDA) 
Charities Aid Foundation Southern Africa
www.cafsouthernafrica.org
CIVICUS
www.civicus.org
CORE
www.corejhb.org.za
Legal Resources Centre
www.lrc.org.za
National Welfare Social Service & Development Forum
www.forum.org.za
SANGONeT
www.ngopulse.org
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